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This thesis presents an analysis of both the emergence and effects of definitions of 
homelessness, through a consideration of the manner in which British homeless policy 
constructs political identities. This task is approached by an application of Laclau and 
Mouffe's (1985) radical democratic theory to examples from policy, in order to reveal both 
the process of identity formation and the key discursive influences that impact on 
definitions of homelessness. As Neale (1997), Jacobs et al (1999) and others have argued, 
the use of social theory to analyse issues surrounding homelessness remains 
underdeveloped and this project attempts to fill this gap in existing research by using 
discourse theory to investigate changing definitions of homelessness. It therefore represents 
an original contribution to knowledge, as it is the first explicitly theoretical, extended 
investigation analysing recent British homeless policy 
In the first half of the thesis existing perspectives on homelessness are reviewed and 
an essentialism regarding conceptions of structure and agency is identified. Radical 
democratic theory is then presented as a possible route past this impasse and a useful tool 
for the study of homelessness. Chiefly this relates to Laclau and Mouffe's contention that 
identities are discursively formed, unstable entities and that the presence of antagonism can 
challenge privileged subject positions. This theory is then applied to the three major 
conditional categories in homeless policy: priority need, intentionality and local connection, 
in order to examine the theoretical implications of these judgements. The emergence and 
various incarnations of these categories are considered in the context of different policies 
and political debates through England, Wales and Scotland. 
The changeable nature of definitions through different time periods and across 
different geographical locations is seen to proscribe the possibility of an objective measure 
of homelessness and in the final chapter, the concept of radical democratic citizenship is 
considered as an alternative framework for inclusion within the terms of policy. The 
conclusion summaries the key insights of this analysis and assesses the suitability of radical 
democratic theory for the context of homelessness. 
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Introduction 
Homelessness is perhaps the most pervasive representation of inequalities in 
modern British society. The continued existence of homelessness as a social phenomenon, 
be it the absolute rooflessness of rough sleepers, those in temporary accommodation, or the 
`hidden homeless' who may find shelter on friends floors and sofa's acts as a dividing line 
in British society, where access to property has increasing become a major determinant in 
both the social status and financial prosperity of individuals. 
Nevertheless, the right to housing as prescribed by British housing policy is not a 
universal entitlement; it is regulated by policy definitions of homelessness. In order to 
qualify for re-housing applicants have to satisfy local authorities that they fulfil policy 
criterion, namely that they fall within priority need categories, that they did not make 
themselves homeless intentionally and that they have a connection to the local area in 
which they are applying. This framework has altered over time and has been changed 
across devolved parliaments in the UK, but ultimate access to social housing is determined 
by a consistent framework in which a boundary is constructed, a boundary that represents 
the limit of provision and consequently excludes those who do not possess certain 
characteristics, or who are deemed to be ineligible because of their personal history. 
Therefore at the root of definitions of homelessness lies a conception of the proper 
role of the state in providing targeted housing assistance. By extension this is informed by a 
belief concerning the ability of individuals to negotiate social forces and control their own 
housing outcomes. This is the same set of issues that are central to accounts of identity 
formation, namely the relationship between individuals and power. 
This study will analyse both the emergence and the effects of definitions of 
homelessness by considering the manner in which legislation constructs political identities. 
Identity in this sense refers to a particular subject position, a classification constructed by 
policy. This thesis presents an analysis of the normative and ideological assumptions 
inherent to the formation of individual positions, with expressed aim of exploring the 
perception of identity formation behind such changing definitions. 
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This analysis is undertaken through reference to theoretical debates over identity, 
applied to policy. Explicit theoretical approaches to homelessness are hard to find in current 
British research and as Neale (1997) has noted, the majority of accounts consider 
homelessness within a framework that privileges either structural or agency-based factors. 
The duality of such an approach is increasingly recognized to be inadequate as an 
explanation, as homelessness as a social phenomenon is unlikely to be solely caused by 
either shortages of housing or individual fallibility. Individuals become homeless for 
different reasons and any explanation focusing on particular causal factors is likely to 
exclude a significant number of cases. 
In attempting to move beyond such a division this project does not attempt to strike 
a balance between structure and agency. A `mid-point' explanation is likely to suffer the 
same drawbacks as a structural or agency-based theory, primarily because as an attempt to 
formulate this framework cannot account for the diverse circumstances that lead different 
individuals to become homeless. For example, Dyrberg (1997) criticises Giddens' (1984) 
model of structuration for the way in which agency is constrained or facilitated by 
structural forces, as both structure and agency remain as essentialised concepts in this 
theory. In many cases, either structural or individual factors will simply be irrelevant as 
causes for homelessness and the consideration of such issues is likely to lead to 
exclusionary judgement. 
This thesis will therefore attempt to present a critique of the essentialism inherent to 
the formation of homeless identities. This critique will operate by analysing the manner in 
which policy constructs fixed boundaries which act to exclude or include from within their 
terms. Such boundaries are seen to present a binary opposition, in which an individual's 
claim for assistance can be judged against an official criterion of need. This duality, often 
referred to as the deserving/undeserving opposition, will be seen to be important for two 
reasons (Carlen 1996, Neale 1997). Firstly, as a theoretical position such a duality 
represents a division in which the diverse experiences of individuals in becoming homeless 
cannot be reflected in the decision making process. Effectively the essentialism of 
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explanations of homelessness reveals itself through binary outcomes; either individual's 
deserve permanent re-housing, or they do not. 
This framework will be challenged through reference to a particular branch of post- 
structuralism, that of radical democratic theory. This perspective, developed by Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), stresses the manner in which identities are created through particular 
political contexts. Crucially, identities are not purely the result of a `top-down' imposition 
of meaning, but arise from the antagonistic clash between different political perspectives. 
Radical democratic theory will therefore be seen to be a useful tool in the analysis of 
homelessness, as it applies Derrida's (1978) concept of `overdetermination' to political 
theory with specific reference to the process of identity formation. Identities are seen to be 
formed in opposition to each other, with a positive position established by reference to a 
corresponding negative `other'. However, the relationship between the two is seen to be 
unstable or overdetermined, as a privileged identity is seen to be undermined by the 
elements that it lacks. Laclau and Mouffe have contended that this situation can produce 
antagonistic relationships, which is an ever-present possibility in the formation of binary 
oppositions. It is antagonism that is seen to hold the possibility of change, in this case the 
renegotiation of privileged and subordinated identities and therefore the boundaries of 
inclusion. 
This point can be usefully illustrated by reference to manner in definitions have 
altered over time. For example, in the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 an applicant 
can be deemed to be homeless if there is a risk of violence in their current residence. 
However, this refers to domestic violence and the Homelessness Act 2002 set out to 
specifically include those who were at risk of any form of violence (HOC, 2001). Therefore 
victims of racist violence or anti-social behaviour could qualify for assistance in a manner 
that was impossible for the twenty-five preceding years. The definition of violence was 
seen to be too narrow to incorporate groups that had gradually become seen to have a 
legitimate claim for re-housing, a case of a positive position being de-stabilised and 
consequently re-formulated by the elements that it lacks. 
9 
This also highlights a second point concerning this approach, the influence of 
discursive formations on the construction of normative boundaries. Jacobs et al (1999) have 
shown how the extent of policy is influenced by the level of public concern over 
homelessness, a constructivist position that illustrates the manner in which definitions are 
discursively formed. However, this project will apply the work of Foucault (1972), to 
illustrate that whilst homeless discourse is an unstable paradigm in the manner described by 
Jacobs et al, it is also influenced by other discourses. Thus an expanded definition of 
`violence' can be seen to be informed by the wider government concern of the protection of 
victims of crime (Home Office, 2003). 
Ultimately this perspective renounces the possibility of a totalised vision of society 
and therefore negates the formation of an objective measure of need. Definitions are viewed 
as a product of their context, of the political circumstance of their formation and therefore 
an overdetermination of homeless subject positions. This critique will be developed with 
particular reference to the formation of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 as it was 
this legislation that developed the conditional framework that survives into current English 
policy. Subsequent legislation will be considered and the Homeless Act 2002 is of some 
importance because of its more inclusive definitions of homelessness, but ultimately it is 
the structure of policy that is the central concern of analysis. In this respect the 
Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 is of interest, as this legislation has attempted to 
reformulate the basis of homeless policy by disbanding several of the conditional aspects. 
The categories and debates surrounding this legislation will be considered as a comparison 
to the English example and a possible resolution of the theoretical conflicts identified 
through the thesis. 
Having presented a critique of an objective, universal definition of homelessness, it 
is then necessary to suggest an alternative framework. This task will addressed by reference 
to Mouffe's (1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 1996,2000) development of a radical 
democratic citizenship, a theory that is seen to be useful because of its focus on diversity of 
experience. In particular, this model develops a version of citizenship that allows 
competing groups to negotiate rights claims within the ethical boundaries of liberal 
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democracy. It is important to distinguish this model from a post-modern focus on the 
harmonious co-existence of differentiated identities, as Mouffe maintains that the 
irreducibility of antagonism demands an active citizenship in which individuals and groups 
attempt to negotiate their position within the framework informed by the twin aims of 
liberty and equality. 
This project therefore has several important aims. Firstly in developing a theoretical 
approach to the study of homelessness, this thesis attempts to develop a sustained piece of 
normative research in response to a perceived gap in this area. Through the investigation of 
changing definitions, examined within a theoretical framework, this project will attempt to 
highlight the nature of the relationship between individuals and social forces that is implied 
by the structure of homeless policy, as well as the manner in which the boundaries of 
inclusion are dependent on changing discursive formations. 
This highlights a second aim, which is reflective of the theoretical stance adopted 
through this thesis. The critique of essentialism supplied by Laclau and Mouffe can be seen 
to be important in a variety of different ways. The rational, grounded model of identity 
implied by the moral judgements that inform a conditional policy are seen to form an 
inadequate explanation of homelessness, as it sites causal factors within the individual and 
therefore ignores social and political power. Conversely, an essentialism of structure is seen 
to be equally unrealistic, as individuals are viewed as faultless and more importantly, 
powerless victims of social forces. This project therefore guards against simply replacing 
one form of essentialism with another and therefore accepts that homelessness cannot be 
reduced to a problem of supply and demand. 
Contextually, this thesis has the opportunity to compare the application of this 
perspective to contrasting pieces of British legislation. The advent of the Homelessness etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2003 presents a policy that is broadly informed by a structuralist agenda and 
more importantly, a policy that attempts to address the exclusion that can result from a 
conditional framework. The approach to definition and the debates surrounding this 
formation can be usefully contrasted with English and Welsh examples and the extent to 
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which Scottish legislation replaces an essentialism of agency with an essentialism of 
structure can be assessed. 
The radical democratic vision of citizenship is therefore important as an attempt to 
accommodate the antagonistic nature of social relations within a theory that recognises both 
the contingency of identity and the necessary ethical limits dictated by liberal democracy. 
This is useful for the study of homelessness, as a focus on the possibility of inclusion for a 
variety of different identities is tempered by a need for individual responsibility to assert 
their own positions. This version of citizenship therefore offers a means to assess individual 
cases in manner that can move beyond universal definitions and consider applicants on 
their individual merits. 
Methodology 
Initially it is important to consider the methodological stance adopted through this 
thesis. This study is unique as a sustained piece of theoretical research applied to British 
homeless policy and it is therefore important to justify this particular approach. 
Fundamentally this requires a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of a theoretical 
approach and the insights that can be gained through this method, but cannot be achieved 
through empirical observation. I want to approach this issue by addressing some the 
limitations of the positivist method, before stating the methodological approach of this 
thesis. 
In her investigation into the use of theory within homeless research Neale (1997) is 
critical of the lack of interpretive elements and maintains that a number of opportunities to 
apply the work of contemporary thinkers to this context have been missed, or remain 
relatively underdeveloped theoretically. For example, Neale's speculation as to the 
usefulness of post-modem and post-structural theory to this field remains one of the few 
overt attempts to broaden the canvas of research, a situation that can be attributed to the 
combination of a number of factors. 
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Firstly although research into homelessness comes from a variety of different 
academic disciplines, the majority of research comes from the broader field of housing 
studies, a discipline which has been criticised for its narrow empiricist focus (Kemeny 
1992, King 1996). Although some moves have been made to rectify this situation within 
housing studies, much homeless research has retained a limited theoretical outlook. 
Unfortunately, by this focus the epistemological boundaries of the field remain 
unquestioned and whilst empirical data is always vital in any inquiry, what has been 
lacking in homeless research is an interpretative element. This is not to be seen as a 
hierarchical distinction, but rather a realisation that practice and empirical research operate 
within the discursive boundaries of the field itself and continue to report shortcomings as 
they find them. Thus, as King (1996) states, a theoretical study should both inform and be 
informed by other codes of research and practice. 
In turn, this can be partly attributed to the perception that homelessness as a need 
based issue can have little use for the abstractions of theory at the expense of quantitative 
data detailing the extent of the problem. Such work runs the risk of seeming pretentious or 
irrelevant, particularly as so much research comes from charities and focus groups that 
possess a close practice based link with policy, or the homeless themselves. Therefore 
homelessness is frequently discussed in statistical terms; the construction of such an agenda 
leading to the dominance of positivistic methods, as the consideration of need is held to 
demand a quantifiable statement as to the extent of the problem. In this sense the collection 
of empirical data can be seen as a positive contribution to alleviating need. This is 
particularly relevant when it is considered that research into homelessness comes from a 
wide variety of disciplines in academia, as well as from interest groups such as Shelter or 
Crisis, who have their own reasons for the presentation of homeless issues in a certain 
manner. 
A pertinent example of this is the recent Roof campaign `Who's Counting? ' 
Launched in October 2001 this campaign sought to highlight the number of evictions by 
social landlords, contending that the majority of cases would show evictions due to rent 
arrears. In the light of this, the campaign called for a comprehensive count of evictions 
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together with increased information about the causes of such action. However, Roof 
themselves are quick to point out that this information alone does not `answer the very big 
question of where people evicted from social housing go' (Delargy 2002, p. 19). As the 
agenda of the Roof campaign does not question this division, one of the limitations of a 
positivistic approach is exposed, as the research is constrained within official guidelines. 
However, the quantitative bias extends beyond the work of charities and pressure 
groups in this area. In a recent article on perspectives in housing research, Clapham (2002) 
has highlighted the dominance of positivistic assumptions even within such perspectives as 
the state policy approach. He argues that the central premise of such investigations is `that 
they assume the existence of a world of social facts to be uncovered by researchers using 
quantitative and empirical research methods' (p. 59). This is held to be tantamount to the 
portrayal of social relations as an `objective reality' in which actors participate in a 
`uniform' and `uncontentious' manner (p. 59). 
The connection between the two points is immediate; that housing research is (or 
has been) dominated by positivistic assumptions and that the presentation of such data is 
likely to assume its universal value in terms of need. Clapham uses this as a starting point 
for the exploration of a post-modern analytical framework, a framework that demands the 
questioning of universal truths and the consideration of what Bauman (1992), calls the 
`dissipation of objectivity' (quoted in Clapham 2002, p. 61). Clapham's interest lies in the 
manner in which social realities are assumed and empirical data is presented in an 
unquestioning realisation of those realities. This of course is a bare bones account of the 
social constructivist perspective, an examination of the manner in which social realities are 
constructed through discourse. In itself it is the beginning of a justification of normative 
research within housing, as this is the type of research that is suited to the framework that 
Clapham is proposing. However, despite the common linkages between housing and 
homelessness there remains the problem that for many people (not least rough sleepers), 
homelessness is an objective fact and for many researchers the project of deconstruction in 
this context merely draws attention away from consideration of need. 
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Consequently a degree of caution is required when proposing the formation of a 
new paradigm in this area. It is perhaps too easy to justify normative research from within 
post-modem position with such generalisations as ̀ things are changing' or references to the 
importance of cultures in the era of globalisation. What is required in this context is a 
rigorous statement of methodological aims that conveys the strengths of the perspective and 
the manner in which it fits into the wider concerns of homelessness. In short, what a 
theoretical perspective can add the subject. 
To this end I want to examine some of the major objections to the positivism that 
Clapham, Kemeny (1992) and many others have identified at the heart of housing studies. 
Chiefly these objections relate to the limitations of objective, scientific methods within the 
social sciences, as the subject matter is seen as too `messy' and inexact to produce 
meaningful results. Human beings do not interact in a uniform way and thus analysis of 
social relations in terms of generalities and social groups is likely to gloss over important 
omissions or variation in opinion. From this perspective it is perhaps inappropriate to 
attempt universal conclusions, a key consideration in the post-modem critique that 
Clapham employs. 
A fundamental objection to positivism is that issues of social relations are unlikely 
to be investigated in an impartial manner and consequently it is difficult to support 
positivism's claims of detachment from its subject. This opens up the question of researcher 
involvement, as in emotive subjects such as homelessness problems of this nature are likely 
to be amplified. I have already mentioned the large amount of research commissioned by 
charities and pressure groups which are likely to support a particular position. This not to 
criticise the work of Shelter or Crisis but merely to illustrate this point, as their supported 
publications are rarely going to recommend a non-interventionist government strategy. 
Such research is unlikely to exist in an ideological vacuum and thus the conclusions cannot 
support the objectivity that the method claims. 
Related to this issue is the idea that the mere collection of empirical observations is 
unlikely to produce meaningful research on its own. This point relates back to Kemeny's 
(1992) original critique regarding the lack of interpretative research within the housing 
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field; the consideration that a degree of theoretical engagement is necessary to illuminate 
observation and clarify the issues involved in the terms of that observation. This is central 
to the context of homelessness as positivism proceeds without questioning its base 
assumptions. It is a method that essentially accepts the world as it is perceived and seeks to 
observe social phenomena within these terms. Consequently the definitions that frame the 
research remain unquestioned. 
Thus, in these arguments there are strong implications for the accuracy of 
positivistic research as an adequate representation of social relations. This is especially 
central to the issue of homelessness where the problem of defining such issues as 
intentionality is crucial. For example, Jacobs et al. (1999) cite the prominence of 
government funding as a factor in the acceptance of official guidelines as a basis for 
research, a critique that offers an ideological element to the acceptance of normative 
boundaries. The implication for this position is that positivistic research can be driven by 
external perception rather than seeking to question that perception. Whilst such research is 
directly relevant to policy in terms of direct information, it cannot assess the terms under 
which that information was collected. Consequently, when we are considering need from a 
positivistic standpoint it becomes easy to reduce homeless issues to a simple formula for 
welfare supply. The detailing of numbers, the statistical accounts of the characteristics of 
the homeless (see Kemp 1997), or surveys on the health of single homeless people (see 
Bines 1997) are important contributions to knowledge in their own right, but equally can be 
misleading in their claims of universality. It is the assumptions that underpin such 
investigations that a theoretical approach to homelessness should seek to examine in order 
to assess the accuracy of positivistic research. 
In addressing such issues, this thesis will utilise a branch of discourse analysis that 
Torfing (1999) refers to as discourse theory. Torfing develops this method from the work 
of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Zizek (1989) and Dyrberg (1997) amongst others and 
stresses the role that discourse plays in producing identities, or subject positions. By this he 
means social identities, the role that is ascribed to individuals by their position within a 
particular discourse. The theoretical underpinnings of this method will discussed in chapter 
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3, but in general terms discourse itself is viewed as a shifting construct, renegotiated by its 
participants. This is not to say that the concept of power is redundant in this context, as 
certain actors are likely to have more influence than others in the discursive formation of 
norms. The task of discourse analysis in this sense is to identify the ideological conflicts, as 
well the areas of commonality that go towards the make-up and renegotiation of the 
discourse. In this sense discourse theory offers a useful grounding for the study of homeless 
issues, as its focus on the political nature of discourse can illuminate ideological bias. 
At this point, it is worth considering the way in which this branch of theory is be 
used through the thesis. The method outlined by Torfing (1999) stresses the subjective link 
between theory and method, particularly as discourse theory stresses the impossibility of 
viewing society in an objective manner. In this sense, discourse theory is used as a tool 
with which to interpret homeless policy, an application of Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) 
radical democratic theory. However, whilst discourse theory is used as a tool through which 
to critique the formation of homeless identities, the context of homelessness also provides a 
test for Laclau and Mouffe's framework. It is through the application of this particular 
branch of theory to a specific political context that its strengths can be highlighted, and any 
limitations identified. 
As this study addresses the formation of political identities it is important to analyse 
the documents that create a political norm and in this sense such documents act as empirical 
material. It is through the interpretation of material such as policy documents and 
parliamentary debates that the chief political influences on the formation of definitions of 
homelessness can be considered. Such evidence is more instructive than empirical 
fieldwork for the purpose of this project, as definitions are considered as products of the 
discursive conditions at the time of their emergence. Therefore the analysis of discourse 
surrounding policy, the terms and concepts that are used by political actors, can reveal the 
ideological and practical influences on the framework of homeless policy. It is at this point 
that the theoretical function of such a framework can be analysed and the conditions for 
inclusion within the polity can be examined. 
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It is important to note that discourse theory is subjective method; indeed Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) are sceptical about the possibility of viewing social relations in an objective, 
detached manner. The influence of post-structuralism on discourse theory demands that 
truths are considered within the context of their formation, that universal statements are 
unlikely to describe social relations in an accurate manner. Therefore truths surrounding 
homelessness are a product of a certain time, as well as a certain political structure and 
cannot be considered within a universal framework. However, in advancing this perspective 
it should be noted that while the model provided by radical democratic theory represents 
one possible interpretation of homeless policy, it is equally possible to investigate the 
formation of normative definitions through the application of other branches of theory. The 
subjective concern of discourse analysis stretches beyond individual texts and extends to 
the selection of the method itself. 
This thesis can therefore be considered to be a normative study, in that it seeks to 
analyse the manner in which policy arrives at a definition. King (2003) defines normative 
statements as `prescriptive' as they are statements that establish `what we should or ought 
to do' (p. 8). It is in this way that we can view definitions of homelessness as normative, as 
they prescribe the necessary conditions for an individual to be perceived as homeless and 
receive housing assistance. Such definitions therefore create a `norm' concerning both the 
behaviour of individuals and the proper role of the state in providing for its citizens. This 
thesis seeks to analyse the emergence of these definitions and interpret the theoretical 
implications of both their formation and modification. It is through such an analysis that 
this thesis will add to existing research by presenting a thorough application of theory to 
political context and by beginning to question the terms and concepts that are used in order 
to make sense of homelessness. 
Overview of the Thesis 
At the root of the formation of political identities lies a normative judgement 
concerning both the nature of individuals within society and the corresponding 
responsibilities of the state in providing for its citizens. These two factors are inextricably 
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linked, for instance a belief in the rational power of individuals to govern their own social 
position places emphasis on a political system that allows individuals to maximise this 
potential. In such a system the focus is on the removal of state impediments to the 
flourishing of individual citizens, the prioritisation of liberty over a more utilitarian agenda. 
Accordingly, a belief in the power of culture or politics to limit the choices available to 
individuals, to construct subject positions, leads to a conception of the re-distributive state 
in which the poorer members of society should be assisted in order to compensate for their 
disadvantaged starting position. 
Chapter 1 presents an overview of perspectives on homelessness in existing 
research, an overview that identifies the dominance of dichotomy noted above. The chief 
aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical foundations of explanations of homelessness 
and identify a corresponding lack of normative research. The benefits of a theoretical 
approach to this context will then be discussed, with particular reference to the post- 
structural critique of essentialism. In chapter 2 these issues will be related to theories of 
identity, and the relative weaknesses of agency based and structuralist models will be 
identified. In opposition to the essentialism of these perspectives, the foundations of the 
post-structuralist perspective will then be discussed. 
This will act as a prelude to chapter 3, in which the radical democratic approach is 
outlined and appraised. Beginning with Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) initial critique of 
Marxism in which they utilised post-structural concepts in order to focus on the 
authoritarianism that they saw in an essentialist view of structure, this chapter will highlight 
the conception that they advance of identity formation. The major criticisms of this 
perspective will then be outlined, balanced with the potential benefits of this approach for 
the study of homelessness. 
Having set out the theoretical framework, this thesis will consider more contextual 
material from chapter 4 onwards. Initially this will consist of a discussion of the 
deserving/undeserving opposition and its relationship to structure/agency. This will be 
examined with reference to historical examples, in particular the manner in which the 
homeless were differentiated to the settled poor. Some of the major contexts for the 
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emergence of this opposition will be considered in order to examine the appearance of a 
conditional approach to homelessness, as well as establishing the extent to which 
antagonistic relationships within discursive formations have led the reformulation of the 
boundary between inclusion and exclusion. 
From chapter 5 onwards, the focus will shift to consider the modern inception of 
homeless policy. Beginning with a description of the emergence of the Housing (Homeless 
Persons) Act 1977, this chapter will then consider the politics of three major conditional 
categories within this legislation. The changes to these categories will also be considered, 
both within English policy and through variations in definition latterly instigated by the 
devolved assemblies. In chapter 5 this will consist of an examination of priority need, both 
in terms of the politics of the category itself and the theoretical effects of the expanded 
definitions within Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 
and its Welsh equivalent. This will be shown to construct a binary opposition informed by 
individual circumstance, the important consideration being that this position can lead to the 
exclusion of individuals from provision. The proposed cessation of priority need in 
Scotland will then be discussed and the implications of this policy, one which will 
eventually remove any judgement of individual circumstance, will be considered as an 
embodiment of an essentialist view of social power. 
Chapter 6 will develop this analysis in order to investigate the category of 
intentionality. Again the formation and original justifications for the category will be 
examined with reference to Laclau and Mouffe (1985). This will reveal the emergence of a 
binary opposition in the same way as priority need, but one that is dependent on the 
judgement of local authorities. Therefore the overdetermined nature of identity is seen to be 
important in this context, as the possibility of antagonism can undermine the legitimacy of 
a relative judgement. The Scottish re-formulation of intentionality will be important here, 
as in contrast to the `blanket' acceptance implied by the dissolution of priority need, this 
category retains a degree of individual judgement. This is not used as a justification for 
immediate exclusion however and therefore the Scottish example is seen to offer a proper 
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consideration of individual behaviour, which allows applicants to negotiate their own 
inclusion. 
Chapter 7 concludes this examination of conditional categories by considering the 
emergence of the need to prove a local connection. Whilst the preceding two categories 
were seen to offer a judgement as the proper circumstance and behaviour for individual 
applicants to be eligible for full housing assistance, the test of local connection determines 
the proper location of an individual. Again the justification for this test will be considered 
and the possible variations in judgement will be highlighted. The binary assessment 
identified in the previous two categories is only relevant in this case as an exclusion from a 
geographical area, but this is still deemed important as a potential impact on the ability of 
an individual to sustain a tenancy. The Scottish suspension of local connection is 
considered as a possible route past this impasse, although a degree of scepticism is shown 
towards the practical impact of this change. 
Having used a post-structuralist critique of conditionality to deconstruct categories 
in homeless policy, chapter 8 will attempt to develop a framework which allows an 
appreciation of context whilst recognising necessary limits on plurality. Crucial to this 
framework will be Mouffe's (2000) recognition of the tension between liberal notions of 
plurality and individual rights, as opposed to the democratic idea of belonging within the 
political community. These two ideas are seen to be inadequate in isolation of each other, 
as liberal conceptions of citizenship cannot account for the role of power in the formation 
of identities, whilst a communitarian position is seen to suppress liberty through a focus on 
a normative common good. The radical democratic vision of citizenship, as a forum 
through which rights claims can be assessed through the assertion of identities within the 
universal framework of liberal democratic institutions, will therefore be considered to offer 
a route beyond an essentialist, conditional approach to homelessness. 
The following chapters will therefore propose that the work of Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) offers a theoretical framework with which to analyse homelessness. This framework 
will be used to critique existing approaches to homelessness and examine theoretical 
assumptions in policy. Radical democratic citizenship will then be suggested as a model 
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through which the exclusion of homeless applicants can be adequately addressed, before 
the strengths and limitations of this approach are assessed in the conclusion. Potential 
improvements in the theoretical framework, together with suggestions for future research, 
will also be discussed at this point. 
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Chapter 1- Existing Perspectives on Homelessness 
This chapter will outline existing research on homelessness with a view to 
identifying the theoretical underpinnings of this work. This research will be split up to 
consider three related issues, those of definition, explanation and theory. 
With regard to definition, this chapter will outline the manner in which definitions 
of homelessness can be seen to exclude significant numbers from permanent housing. This 
can be seen through the focus on rough sleeping as an absolute form of exclusion, as 
opposed to the far greater numbers in temporary accommodation. This will then be linked 
to the central issue for this project, the manner in which policy definitions serve to exclude 
those who are perceived to be unworthy of permanent re-housing. 
The second issue of explanation serves as a principle through which the judgements 
required by definitions can be formed. Central to this section will be a consideration of the 
dominant paradigm in homeless research, that of structure and agency. It is this duality that 
this project will seek to question, as it is through the consideration of structural or agency- 
based factors in isolation that deserving/undeserving conceptions of the homeless can exist. 
The final section will consider attempts to apply a theoretical approach to the study 
of homelessness. Beginning with a look at the possible benefits that a theoretical approach 
can bring to this context, this section will then consider the limited number of attempts to 
move beyond the structure/agency divide. 
Defining Homelessness 
`The sight of a rough sleeper bedding down for the night in a shop doorway or on a 
park bench is one of the potent symbols of social exclusion in Britain today. 
(Tony Blair, SEU, 1998 p. i). 
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Homelessness is an issue that is generally represented as a visible form of absolute 
poverty; an issue that is seen to be indicative of the overall health of a society. As Tony 
Blair states, the presence of individuals sleeping rough on the street is a constant reminder 
of those who struggle on the fringes of society. Wright (1997) argues that the homeless 
have become `stand-ins' for the poor in both the public consciousness and political 
discourse; a visible representation of the abstract notion of poverty (p. 1). Likewise, Pleace 
(1998) notes that `there is in truth no such thing as unique social problem called 
homelessness and any study predicated on the assumption that it can be isolated and studied 
in its own right is founded on a misconception' (p. 57). These points illustrate a body of 
opinion that views homelessness as a created social category that is the result of the 
interaction between varied economic, political and individual concerns; a category that 
serves to generate theories and explanations that are incomplete due to their narrow focus 
on the affected group rather than wider causal factors. 
Before the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 a statutory definition of 
homelessness did not exist and it was only the introduction of this legislation that placed 
the term in the vocabulary of social policy. This does not mean that before 1977 no-one 
was without housing, but that the introduction of homeless legislation created a legal and 
political label for those in this situation. The same flurry of concern that led to the 1977 act 
also cemented the idea that homelessness could be separated from wider social issues as a 
distinct problem with its own set of causes and explanations. 
Thus homelessness can be seen, both in a strict legal sense and in terms of popular 
representations, to be a socially constructed category. The use of the homeless as a 
signifier, a representation that evokes a connotative association with common myths about 
those without shelter, serves to focus attention on the individual characteristics of the 
visible cases. Wright (1997) claims that this leads to the stigmatisation of all of the 
homeless as victims or passive recipients of benefits, as the most memorable individuals are 
invariably those that best fit the stereotype of the `vagrant'. In particular, he hypothesises 
that the focus on stereotypes serves to generalise from the characteristics of particular 
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individuals, with the result that a group comprising of many different circumstances can 
appear homogenised. 
Our common perception, one that is informed by all manner of representations from 
pop music videos to news reports, is of the homeless as those living on the streets, those 
who are absolutely without shelter. Problematically, in the UK, this is actually a description 
of rough sleeping and here lies a distinction both in terms of perception and legal 
definitions, as those on the streets are not defined as homeless by statute. Rough sleeping 
by these terms is represented as the visible poverty, a position of absolute need. Conversely 
it is also presented as a social problem; ordinary people are offended by the sight of 
anonymous bodies sleeping in shop doorways. This has been the view taken by successive 
governments in the UK, for example the 1995 Consultation Paper Rough Sleepers 
Initiative: future plans stated that `their evident plight is distressing not only for them but 
also for those who live, work and visit the centre of the capital' (quoted in Kennet 1999, 
p. 52), whilst Tony Blair's introduction to the Social Exclusion Unit Report of 1998 adopted 
a similar stance. 
"Many people feel intimidated by rough sleepers, beggars and street drinkers, and 
rough sleeping can blight areas and damage business and tourism. ' (SEU 1998, pii) 
The Rough Sleeper's Initiative was originally opened in 1990 as a response to the 
increasing numbers of street homeless in London. It initially drew on explanations 
concerned with the vulnerability of certain individuals and Kennet (1999) notes that its aim 
to clear the streets of the homeless was presented as both beneficial to the homeless 
individual and society as a whole. Although the RSI was closed in 1993, the Social 
Exclusion Unit set up the Rough Sleepers Unit in 1998. This team, headed by Louise 
Casey, had the expressed purpose of reducing the numbers of rough sleepers to one-third of 
1998 levels by 2002. It has been widely accepted that this target has been met and the 
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Rough Sleepers Unit has since become part of the Homeless Directorate, whilst Louise 
Casey has moved on to a new post in the home office. 
However, in dividing between those who are defined as homeless by statute and 
those who are considered to be rough sleepers, the problem of definition is further 
complicated. For instance, Pleace (2000) claims that the notion of special treatment for 
rough sleepers helps perpetrate stereotypes of the homeless as either deviants or victims 
depending on the context. He regards each state as equally unhelpful, but is chiefly 
concerned by the time taken to integrate `the new consensus' on rough sleeping into the 
popular consciousness. Pleace is concerned that rough sleepers become targets for the 
negative images that have traditionally been bestowed on the homeless and that in 
separating such a group by definition, reintegration (as one of the expressed aims of the 
RSI) is likely to be considerably more difficult to achieve. 
Cloke et al (2001) similarly address the dichotomy between the homeless and rough 
sleepers. In particular, they agree with Pleace's interpretation and comment on the extent to 
which `the focus on rough sleepers serves to distort popular appreciations of the scale, 
profile and location of homelessness in the UK' (p. 260). In addition to this discursive 
function of definition, they also question the extent to which figures in this area can be 
relied upon to be accurate. Whilst they see no conflict in terms of the definition of rough 
sleeping as a practice, they argue that to enumerate this practice is unreliable as numbers 
are likely to fluctuate. In addition to this, fear of police action or personal attacks demand 
that those sleeping rough are unlikely to do so in prominent, visible places, particularly as 
sleeping rough is technically illegal under the terms of the Vagrancy Act 1824. 
In commenting on perceptions of the homeless in the US, Wright (1997) claims that 
the dichotomy between `street homelessness' (rough sleeping in the UK) and cases of 
individuals in temporary accommodation is influential in determining suitable responses. In 
particular, the focus on extreme cases can make short-term micro solutions seem more 
beneficial than pushing for larger redistributive changes (p. 1). This certainly has 
repercussions for the UK, particularly as fears that the government focus on rough sleeping 
has distracted attention away from the wider issue of homelessness appear to be supported 
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by statistics. The aforementioned scepticism about the accuracy of rough sleeper counts 
notwithstanding, statistics have shown rises in wider cases of homelessness as numbers of 
rough sleepers have dropped. 
However, in the context of UK housing law, the issue of definition is more complex 
than a simple dichotomy between rough sleepers and the homeless. The source text that 
established present definitions is the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. This piece of 
legislation will be discussed in greater depth later on, as it forms the framework for 
subsequent policy and as such is responsible for establishing the normative structure within 
which homeless issues have been viewed. The structure of legislation means that in order 
to be classified as homeless and therefore receive full state assistance, applicants are 
assessed by a number of conditional categories. Legislation contains the mechanisms to 
enable local authorities to assess individual cases according to `priority need', with 
individual characteristics compared against a set criteria that judges who should be given 
preferential treatment in finding permanent accommodation. Likewise, applications can be 
assessed by intention; the `intentionality' clause allowing local authorities to determine 
whether an individual has made themselves homeless in order to be re-housed. Finally, 
`local connection' demands that applicants have a prior association with the area in which 
they are applying. The provisions of the act passed unchanged into the Housing Act 1985 
and Lowe (1997) notes that although the Housing Act 1996 repealed the earlier legislation, 
many of its provisions were retained. Although the Homeless Act 2002 reversed several of 
the more stringent measures of the 1996 Act and extended priority need categories, the 
overall framework of the 1977 Act remains in place. Consequently the issues of definition 
raised in the wake of the 1977 Act remain pertinent in the present context and much of 
existing research and commentary exists in a broad consensus in viewing this legislation as 
the benchmark for subsequent policy. 
Much of the analysis of homelessness views the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 
1977 as important in this context, chiefly because of its aim to develop a right to housing 
for those classified as homeless by statute. The act shifted the focus of homelessness away 
from the welfare departments, the implicit message being that homelessness was caused by 
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a lack of quality housing rather than individual failing. This in itself was a significant 
declaration and one Hutson and Clapham (1999) claim `successfully challenged earlier 
views which had been consistent since the passing of the 19th century poor laws linked 
homelessness with vagrancy and idleness' (p. 4). However, it should be stated that just as 
the recognition of homelessness as a housing issue was the chief attribute of the Act, so this 
in turn required that the homeless themselves became subject to official categorization in 
order to qualify for the right to housing. Cowan (1997) has considered this legal framework 
with explicit reference to the extent that it demands reference to an `appropiate' applicant. 
In this context the issue of definition becomes crucial, particularly as applicants were to be 
judged on `intentionality' and thus have their own role in their situation assessed. Kennet 
and Marsh (1999) note that such measures are necessary for policy to operate, but equally 
there is a strong aspect of judgement involved in using such a criteria. The politics of 
applying such definitions as those contained within 1977 Act will be discussed later, but the 
very fact that applicants were assessed for `intentionality' suggests that a moral guideline 
was present in the act. Somerville (1999) concurs with this point stating that although the 
act marked a major achievement, it did not `put an end to Poor Law thinking' (p. 32). 
Jacobs et al (1999) interpret the significance of the 1977 Act by way of categorizing 
government responses to homelessness as a socially constructed issue. For them the 
problem of definition is one that is inextricably linked to predominant explanations of 
homelessness. In the case of the 1977 Act this involves an account of the discourse that 
developed around homelessness in the 1970's, particularly surrounding the public reaction 
to the film Cathy Come Home. The author's note that this characterised a view of 
homelessness as structurally caused and this in conjunction with pressure group activity led 
to the `zenith of homelessness', the passing of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 
(p. 17). This, they argue, was the high water mark of public concern about homeless issues 
and in keeping with the constructivist approach they note a gradual return to a minimalist 
state approach as public interest lessened. This concurs with the response afforded to the 
Housing Act 1996, as several commentators noted that this was the end product of a gradual 
tightening of definitions from 1986; effected with the expressed aim of excluding certain 
groups, for example asylum seekers (see Lowe, 1997 for a summary of these changes). 
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Essentially, the result of this act was that the responsibility for local authorities to provide 
permanent accommodation was removed; this came as a consequence of the 1995 ruling in 
R. v London Borough of Brent, exparte Awna. 
Research into the definitions that frame homelessness in the UK has generally been 
funded by government or government linked agencies. Jacobs et al (1999) maintain that 
this has hindered a comprehensive discussion of definitions as such research is likely to 
have it agenda pre-determined by existing policy. In essence, they claim that the contracts 
offered for researchers to quantify the extent of homelessness have forced an acceptance of 
official measures. Equally, charities have a vested interest in promoting `a pathological 
conceptualisation of the homeless as victims, this being an effective way of securing 
donations' (p. 22). Therefore the dissenting voices on this issue have come from 
independent researchers and Jacobs et al contend that there has been a scarcity of normative 
research that explores the constructed boundaries of homelessness. 
However, the mere fact that US academics such as Wright (1997), Blasi (1990), 
Schiff (2003) and Hopper (1991) have noted the differentiated manner in which issues of 
homelessness are discussed indicates that this construction results from larger factors than 
legislation specific to Britain. Whilst our current (British) understanding of homelessness 
may be framed by definitions within policy, clearly the creation of the homeless as a 
distinct social group did not begin solely with the 1977 Act. Instead, the definitions 
contained within this legislation and adapted for more current policy were themselves 
influenced by wider suppositions about the characteristics of the poor generally, and those 
without housing in particular. 
Explanations of Homelessness 
Existing research into homelessness has been generally concerned with quantifying 
the extent of homelessness, the problems that arise from this exercise in terms of definition 
and visibility, the normative strands that inform our own perceptions and thus impact on 
definitions, together with related issues such as local authority variance in interpreting 
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guidelines. All of these issues are in some way influenced by different attitudes as to the 
predominant causes of homelessness and this in turn is likely to have a bearing on the 
recommendations of research. In this section I want to look at some of the recent research 
into this area and identify the major perspectives that have emerged. 
The literature in this area stems from a range of disciplines and consequently a 
variety of factors are considered in existing explanations. Therefore there is a 
predominantly policy based analysis (Kennett and Marsh 1999), a legal perspective (Lowe 
1997, Carlen 1996, Cowan 1997), a concern with discursive and media representations of 
the homeless, mainly in US literature (Huckin 2002, Wright 1997) and a growing body of 
work that seeks to document the experience of homelessness (May 2000, Thomas and 
Dittmar 1995, Watson and Austerberry 1986). Increasingly there is a realisation that 
`homelessness is a highly ambiguous and intangible phenomenon' and that a simplistic 
approach is unlikely to be illuminating (Neale 1997, p. 48). As Kemeny (1992) has stated 
with reference to the broader discipline of housing studies, it is through such a wide ranging 
focus that research can begin to highlight issues beyond the simple supply of housing. 
Furthermore, there is a growing recognition that research on homelessness needs a greater 
theoretical input in seeking to account for the multi-faceted nature of the issue. 
As Neale (1997) has stated, literature seeking to uncover the causes of homelessness 
can be grouped into two predominant concerns. These two perspectives are broadly 
classified as explanations that focus on structural reasons for homelessness, or those that 
concentrate on individual responsibility for providing shelter. Traditional conceptions of 
left and right in politics would see these explanations attributed to the extreme of the 
contrasting perspectives; the culpability of individual settling with a traditional 
conservative ideology, whilst structural explanations suggest a need for more (or perhaps a 
different form of) state provision. Whilst it is inappropriate to discuss such an issue in 
terms of polarities, the normative assumption at the root of structural explanations for 
homelessness suggests that a lack of affordable housing is at the root of homelessness, 
whilst agency based explanations concentrate on the effect that the behaviour or 
vulnerability of an individual has on their situation. 
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Explanations of homelessness are simultaneously varied and incomplete. Few 
researchers have commented on the structure and agency divide without noting the futility 
of producing a comprehensive explanation by these means. However, few policy or 
discursive responses to the issue exist independently of this causal debate. In particular, the 
manner in which homelessness is defined reveals sympathies or otherwise with certain 
explanations. Some research has sought to analyse this phenomenon by considering 
changes in macro politics, although it would be unrealistic to suggest that such an analysis 
of structural forces constitutes a complete explanation of the causes of homelessness. More 
fitting a description would be that such research seeks to show the effects of policy in terms 
of ideological trends and the resultant changes in the homeless population. Whilst such an 
analysis is likely to struggle in offering a complete account of homelessness, it offers a 
political context to explanations of homelessness. 
Kennet and Marsh (1999) discuss an example of this by citing the `new homeless', 
those who have fallen victim to structural forces in the last twenty five years (p. 1). This 
they attribute to breakdown of political consensus on welfare policy and the `external 
pressure upon governments of all political complexions, which required them to reduce 
welfare spending' (p. 5). Furthermore, the fiscal pressure that has resulted in this reduced 
expenditure has in turn reduced the willingness of the state to intervene in housing markets. 
Consequently, such policies as the `right to buy' reduced government involvement in 
housing and limited the stock of tenancies available to local authorities. By this measure a 
real lack of affordable housing lies at the root of homelessness, this in turn being the result 
of wider economic factors. 
However, Kennet and Marsh also highlight another interpretation of this economic 
explanation. This is an explanation that concurs with the justification given above, but 
states that the fiscal pressures described were simply used as a way of enforcing a pro- 
market ideology. Carlen (1996), for example, points to a neo-liberal discourse that justified 
punitive measures against the poor by way of reference to the `overload' theories of the 
seventies, as well as more overt and recent references to the `feckless underclass' (p. 27) . 
In this way, the breakdown of the post-war consensus on welfare in general and housing in 
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particular, is supposed to have a direct influence on the number of homeless individuals, as 
well as the nature of their situations. 
Whilst this approach is useful for determining political approaches to homelessness, 
it stops short of being a comprehensive causal explanation. The `top-down' nature of 
macro-structural approaches is illuminating as a record of the changing opportunities open 
to the homeless, but can only account for changes in the availability of housing or welfare 
provision. Clearly this only offers a one-sided explanation of the causal factors relevant to 
the continuation of homelessness and can do little to enlighten as to the role of individuals. 
A case in point is the promotion of pro-market ideology under the Thatcher governments, 
as whilst changes in housing provision at this time undoubtedly increased the number of 
homeless individuals, this does not mean that such measures were solely responsible for 
homelessness as a social phenomenon. The analysis of macro-structural forces in this 
context offers an explanation of the influence of ideology on the extent of homelessness, 
rather than a holistic account of causal factors. 
Conversely, the consideration of individual characteristics in isolation has also 
provoked criticism. Neale (1997) points to two dominant strands of agency based 
explanations in existing literature, both based around the influence that individual 
characteristics hold over homelessness. The first she refers to as the `victim blaming 
approach', a fairly self evident concept (p. 49). This infers that the individual is responsible 
for their own housing situation and having failed to provide for themselves, they are 
undeserving targets for extended state assistance. This is the same mode of thinking that 
Jacobs et al (1999) argue was prevalent before Cathy come home and was embodied by 
provision under the National Assistance Act 1948; a provision that Richards (1981) and 
Richards and Goodwin (1997) describe as a direct descendant of the New Poor Law, with 
many of the dehumanising traits of the workhouse retained. 
Some of these traits can be identified in the position adopted by the Social 
Exclusion Unit's report on rough sleeping (1998) and an individualistic view has been 
explicitly referred to in Tony Blair's forward. Likewise, Louise Casey has spoken of the 
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difficulties faced by the Rough Sleepers Unit in trying to persuade members of the rough 
sleeping community to accept the assistance that has been offered to them. 
`It's a bloody big challenge, helping an ex-serviceman, a guy happy on the streets 
with his drinking friends, who is perfectly capable of sleeping outside and won't 
believe it's bad for him. Making him believe its okay living five miles out of the 
city centre and he will get some mates, it's a tough job' (Interview with the Big 
Issue, May 120', 2001). 
The implications of this position reveal an explanation based on a combination of 
vulnerability and individual choice and it is interesting to note the perceived reluctance of 
many rough sleepers to take up hostel places. Certainly this quote, in tandem with the 
`coercive' tactics employed against rough sleepers, raises a number of issues concerning 
freedom of choice and movement. Waldron (1993) has addressed these issues by focusing 
on individual rights to construct an argument against the policing of rough sleepers. 
Despite this, it is instructive to note that whilst the continuation of rough sleeping is 
attributed to individual's inability or refusal to access services, point 2: 6 of the SEU report 
notes that it is `not true that beds are available if only rough sleepers would take them' 
(SEU, 1998 p, 3). This point implies that the amount of available hostel accommodation 
does not meet demand, but whilst more recent research has noted that more has to be done 
in this area; criticisms of existing provision have focused more on the quality of the 
accommodation provided. For example, the 2002 report from the homeless directorate 
notes that whilst the physical availability of hostel places in some areas is still a problem, a 
far greater concern are problems of access, in particular eligibility criteria that may exclude 
individuals who are drug users. In addition to this, the support services in hostels come 
under scrutiny in the report and the directorate plans to introduce hostel inspectors. The 
focus on vulnerability requires that hostels act as more than lodging housing and have the 
expertise and facilities to make an active difference to the lives of their clients. 
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Recent approaches to rough sleeping have concentrated on the pathology of 
individuals, an approach that Pleace (2000) claims may be no more helpful than the 
individualistic explanations that dominated the political approach prior to the Housing 
(Homeless Persons) Act 1977. Such an explanation upholds the view that to some extent, 
homelessness results from individual failings and whilst there is recognition of the diverse 
factors that lead to homelessness, ultimately there remains an impression that homelessness 
is a tangible social problem that can be treated by correcting the behaviour of individuals. 
Much of the research on agency based explanations has in fact been a critique of 
successive government's individualistic approaches to welfare. In contemporary homeless 
research there are few, if any, examples of researchers appealing to the stereotypes of 
`deviants, dossers, alcoholics, vagrants and tramps' that characterised the popular vision of 
the homeless until the 1960's (Neale 1997, p. 49). Some research has focused on 
quantifying the instances of drug misuse, alcoholism or mental health problems amongst 
the homeless (Rowe et al 2001), but in contrast to the `blame the victim' approach, this 
explanation attempts to combine individualistic causation with collective solutions. This 
second strand of agency explanation again focuses on the pathology of the individual, 
focusing on the characteristics that may make some people more vulnerable to negative 
structural forces. Here, whilst the explanation is individualistic, the solutions offered tend 
to favour increased welfare provision. Pleace (2000) notes the existence of a significant 
body of work that stresses the role that individual circumstances play in homelessness (for 
example Hutson and Liddiard, 1994), but states that to ignore structural factors shows a 
one-dimensional approach. It is the eventual emergence of a `halfway-house' explanation 
drawing on the work of Giddens (1994), that Pleace claims is a reliable yardstick for the 
government's present position forming `a new consensus' on explanations of homelessness. 
This perspective assumes that the relevant resources are in place in terms of material 
provision and if assistance is required it is in the decision making process of the individual. 
As such, it is only an agency explanation insofar as homelessness is seen as a result of the 
individual's inability to negotiate access to services; a position that will explicitly 
considered later on with reference to the Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 
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Theory and Homelessness 
Increasingly this attempt to combine structural and individualistic causal factors is 
seen as the most accurate explanation of homelessness. However, as Neale states, ̀ there are 
not likely to be any simple explanations of homelessness, or utopian solutions that meet the 
diverse needs of all homeless people' (p. 59). Consequently, in recent years, and particularly 
in the wake of Neale's work, there have been some attempts to utilise the branches of social 
theory that stress the diversity of experience. However, whilst some studies have begun to 
look at the benefits of the theoretical evaluation of assumptions surrounding the homeless, 
these have predominantly acted as `signposts' to future research rather than providing a 
comprehensive investigation. For example, in addition to Neale's study, Watson (1999) has 
considered how the work of Foucault could be applied to homelessness and has presented a 
short overview detailing the application of his ideas on power and discourse under the 
banner of a `new social imaginary' (p. 47). Both of these studies reiterate the need for 
research to become more critically engaged and in particular, to assess the relevance of 
post-modem theory. It is hoped by both Watson and Neale that such an engagement would 
lead to the end of the search for unattainable meta-theories and focus on `paying attention 
to local contexts and the locally different effects of policies on different groups of people' 
(Watson 1999, p. 95). This is a common cry from those within the post-modern canon, the 
focus on difference and microanalysis being central to the perspective. However, both 
Watson and Neale recognise the limited scope of their own investigations as well as the 
need to progress this analysis. 
Neale's evaluation of post-modern theory is relevant here, primarily for its 
conclusion. Neale questions some of the facets of post-modem and post-structural theories 
on the basis that whilst they provide a loose framework for recognising that experiences of 
both the causes and realities of homelessness are subjective, they are flawed in the ultimate 
implications of their position. In some general points on the practical uses of such theories, 
she expresses scepticism that deconstructive techniques can be used to make a meaningful 
contribution to research on homelessness. Post-modernism's insistence on the centrality of 
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language, coupled with a cynicism towards universal interpretation is seen to ruin any 
attempt to define homelessness for practical purposes, purely because any such definition is 
likely to be susceptible to deconstruction. Equally, post-structuralism is seen to concentrate 
exclusively on the subjective, especially micro-power and therefore value agency factors 
above structural ones. Neale is adamant that a recognition of structural power as a tangible 
influence on homelessness is central to any emerging perspective; post-structuralism's 
rejection of authority seemingly placing it at odds with the practical ambitions of policy 
makers. 
However, Neale is careful to state that despite initial problems in applying post- 
structuralism and post-modernism such theories can offer a useful critique of perspectives 
on homelessness. What is required in this context is a `flexibility and a willingness to 
combine reason with relativity according to circumstances', in order to combat what Neale 
sees as the tendency towards irrationality in some post-modern theory (p. 56). She hopes 
that by advocating the use of post-modern perspectives in a restrained manner, and in 
association with other perspectives, a more accurate theoretical framework may emerge. 
Although Neale maintains that her investigation should only be read as an 
exploratory study, she tentatively proposes Giddens' (1979,1984) theory of structuration as 
a useful framework to advance explanations beyond the structure agency divide. This 
model represents a compromise between structure and agency based influences on social 
position. It recognises a degree of autonomy, in that individuals have the ability to 
challenge social structures, whilst in turn, social structures make individual action possible. 
However, social institutions are reproduced by the existence of `mutual knowledge', which 
dictates patterns of behaviour and therefore maintains power relationships within a society. 
Such a theory is attractive as it offers a way of bypassing the impasse created by 
the structure/agency divide. However, as Dyrberg (1997) has noted, this is a 
`reformulation' of the duality, rather than an attempt to reassess the manner in which power 
operates (p. 4). As such, structuration does not `explain how the meaning of concepts and 
structural forces can be retained without losing a sense of their subjectivity and relativity' 
(Neale 1997, p. 57). The implication of this position is that structuration cannot account for 
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the plurality of experience in homelessness, purely because of the essentialism common to 
its conception of both subject and object. 
This requires that Neale's conclusions are subject to a degree of reassessment. 
Whilst she acknowledges that post-structural theories can provide the fluidity to adequately 
conceptualise social relations in a manner that circumvents some of the problems 
encountered by the structure/agency divide, it is the ultimately circular nature of these 
arguments that lead her to limit her endorsement of such theories. Chiefly, the charge she 
levels against post-structuralism and post-modernism is that their focus on the subjective 
can lead to a relativism that stifles any hope of political action. Neale's caution is based on 
her assessment that the language based focus of post-modernism leads to overly subjective 
understanding of homelessness, as `individuals can, therefore, be roofless and yet maintain 
that they are not homeless because their home is on the streets' (p. 55). By this standard the 
reverse may also be true; those in excellent accommodation may not feel at home and could 
therefore claim to homeless. Neale's point is that in concentrating on individual's 
interpretation of the truth of their housing situation, any practical measure of homelessness 
is lost. 
This charge of relativism is one that is frequently levelled against `post' theories 
and is one that Laclau (1990) has explicitly addressed whilst discussing the criticisms 
aimed at `post-Marxism'. Firstly, he quotes Rorty (1982) on the misinterpretation at the 
heart of accusations of relativism. 
`Relativism is the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps about any 
topic, is as good as every other. No one holds this view... The philosophers who get 
called `relativists' are those who say that the grounds for choosing between such 
opinions are less algorithmic than had been previously thought. ' (Quoted in Laclau, 
p. 104, original emphasis) 
37 
Laclau's development of this position is to state that far from proposing a dissipation of 
truth, the proposition at the heart of post-Marxism is that truth is bound by context. He uses 
the example of a diamond, as whilst the physical object is the same whether it is in a rock- 
face or a jewellery shop, it only becomes a commodity within a certain social environment. 
Thus truth is constructed only insofar as it is agreed, or perhaps imposed, within a system 
of social relations. In this light, Neale's argument seems to be a somewhat exaggerated 
position. Definitions of homelessness vary according to the political regime in place; many 
people classified as homeless in the UK would be not receive the same label, or indeed 
assistance, in the US. Even within the UK decision making of this nature can be extremely 
localised with laws differing through England, Scotland and Wales. ' According to Laclau, 
the truth of an individual's homelessness would not be an arbitrary, subjective decision, but 
a constructed value based on the norms of a society. 
This argument is far from exhaustive and will be developed at a later stage, but it 
does demonstrate that a post-structuralist critique can analyse the fluidity of meaning within 
a system of social relations, rather than producing an external, subjective assessment. 
However, what is required is an explanation of the role of the subject in this system, 
specifically the role that individuals can play in amending their own situation. In the next 
chapter I wish to consider the relationship between individuals and social power within a 
specific theoretical framework, that of identity formation. 
Summary 
This chapter has considered existing research on homelessness through reference to 
three major issues. Firstly, research on the definition of homelessness has concentrated on 
the distinction between rough sleeping and wider instances of homelessness, as well as the 
manner in which UK legislation limits the states responsibility by adopting a conditional 
agenda through which individuals who are seen to be culpable their own homelessness can 
be excluded. This is a critical point for this thesis; as such definitions are informed by 
' Differences between homeless legislation in England, Scotland and Wales will be considered in chapters 5, 
6and7. 
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dominant explanations of homelessness and therefore particular visions of identity 
formation. 
Therefore the second issue, explanations of homelessness, was heavily linked to the 
issue of definition. Much of the research discussed in this chapter falls within the 
structure/agency dichotomy, a division that was seen to be unhelpful as it encourages the 
judgement of individual applicant's worthiness. 
The third issue of theory and homelessness arose from the need to move beyond 
such a duality of explanation. The benefits of a theoretical approach were considered, 
before a paucity of normative research on homelessness was identified. Neale's (1997) 
consideration of the possible benefits of various approaches to homelessness was identified 
as helpful, although her endorsement of structuration was rejected as a mere reformulation 
of the structure/agency divide. 
However, if Neale's conclusions are to be rejected, then an alternative framework 
with which to analyse homelessness is needed. With this in mind the next chapter will 
review the structure/agency divide in more theoretical terms, with specific reference to 
theories of identity. Central to this chapter will be the criticisms aimed at essentialist 
models of identity, be they structuralist or agency based. It is hoped that through the 
consideration of such issues this analysis can be moved forward to a more contingent 
model, in which the diversity of experience amongst homeless people can be properly 
accounted for. 
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Chapter 2- Theories of Identity 
This chapter will attempt to provide an overview of major theories of identity, 
concentrating on the impact that each have on the structure/agency debate as outlined in 
chapter one, and leading into the implications for any application to homeless issues. 
Beginning with a definition of identity, this chapter will then examine traditional, agency 
based models of identity. Objections to this perspective will considered by highlighting the 
structural elements to identity formation that can remain unaccounted for by focusing 
purely on an individual's ability to rationally choose their own identity. This chapter will 
then look at the challenges to the essentialism of both subject and object that are integral to 
both structural and agency based models of identity and summarise the initial implications 
for the study of homelessness. 
Introducing identity 
A precise definition of identity is difficult to arrive at, primarily because of the 
many different contexts in which the term is appears. It is a word that is frequently referred 
to in popular culture as well as in academic writing, and for this reason it is extremely 
important, initially, to be clear about exactly which sense the term is being used. For 
example, identity is commonly used to describe a representation of the sense of self; the 
knowledge held by an individual about what is important to them. By this definition 
identities come to represent the psychological `core' of an individual; an external 
expression that implies an essential, inevitable connection between identity and the 
individual. However, there are many obvious factors that prevent individuals from 
assuming the social position that they desire and can even be seen to be fundamental in 
influencing the nature of this desire itself. Thus, the first point to make about identities is 
that they are social representations and as representations, are governed by social and 
cultural factors. 
Thus, to initially clarify terminology, the term identity does not represent social 
actors in their entirety. Instead, individuals assume given social positions and it is these 
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positions to which we are referring to when we discuss identity. Discussions about identity 
therefore centre on the politics of selection; how identities are chosen by, or imposed upon, 
individual social agents and it is this situation that leads Hall (1996) to prefers to talk of 
identity formation rather than the nebulous term identity. Such a term encapsulates the idea 
of a process, as it is the manner in which individuals assume given social positions that is 
deemed to be important. 
Consequently, both the formation and selection of identities are seen to be 
enmeshed in external social relations. In this sense identity can be described in terms that 
relate to the membership of a group, on both the macro and micro social levels. Thus, 
identity can refer to a national belonging, membership of a social class or localised single 
issue groups. Identity in this sense refers to common characteristics; an external collection 
of unifying factors that can be adopted by, or attributed to, individuals. By this definition 
identities represent the traits that are shared by a given collection of individuals and 
therefore exist as external social classifications. 
Thus, the politics of identity occur at the point of selection and it is the `play' of 
forces at work in this selection that are at the root of debates on identity. This debate 
encompasses wide ranging questions as to the nature of human beings as well as the role of 
politics in shaping social agents. The question of individual autonomy is central to this 
issue, as contention exists as to the extent to which individuals are `positioned' into 
identities by social forces, as opposed to consciously choosing which identities to adopt. 
Thus, whilst identity is viewed as a social phenomenon, there remains a debate as to the 
extent to which individuals can rationally choose their own position. 
This has led some theorists to view identity as a mode of self-presentation. By this 
measure we can view identity as the manner in which, or even the locus through which, 
individuals view themselves and are perceived by the world. Just as we can see identity as a 
social and therefore external idea, so there is a flipside at its psychic roots. It is this mode of 
thought that provokes Whitebrook (2001) to discuss identities in terms of narratives, `a 
matter of the stories that persons tell others about themselves, plus the stories others tell 
about those persons and other stories in which those persons are included' (p. 4). Thus 
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identity is something like `what the self shows the world' together with `what of the self is 
recognised by the world' (p. 4). 
Immediately certain questions reveal themselves as a result of this proposition. The 
first is to ask whether this division between social or external identities and the core values 
of the self is a genuine or even useful one. A conception that draws on the understanding 
that the self universally contains the apparatus needed for intentional selection can have the 
effect of underplaying the influence that social forces play in the initial creation and 
consequent positioning of individuals in certain identities. Initially we can identify clear 
political implications at the heart of this argument. For example, explanations that stress the 
power of rational thought can be clearly extended to set criteria in policy, as the emphasis 
placed on the ability of individuals to achieve their own ends demands a corresponding 
responsibility to assume the consequences of their choices. 
In contrast to this, a more socially determined conception of identity helps to shed 
some light on the role of social forces in excluding certain individuals. However, is it 
helpful to stress the influence of power on identity formation and imply less individual 
responsibility for the adoption of certain positions? Such an argument can run the risk of 
structural determinism, reducing individuals to passive victims of social forces. Whilst it is 
undoubtedly true that the homeless by the very nature of their material position are more 
open to negative structural influences than the majority of society, we have seen in chapter 
one that structural accounts are neither wholly accurate, nor necessarily helpful 
explanations. 
The division between rationally chosen and discursively formed identities is by no 
means a hard and fast distinction and the analysis of identity should question the polarity of 
these positions. Essentially this dichotomy does not offer a development of the 
structure/agency dualism identified in chapter one, but it is the analysis of the `play' 
between the two sides that characterise theories of identity and offer a route beyond the 
impasse encountered in existing explanations of homelessness. It is any discrepancy that 
may exist between the two positions that is central to the analysis of homelessness, as such 
a discrepancy indicates the influence of social forces that may prevent individuals assuming 
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their chosen identity. The examination of these debates is crucial in assessing the political 
implications of identity, whether it is formed by rational choice or by more discursive 
means. 
Consequently, discussing identity immediately poses several conceptual questions. 
Firstly, different models of identity stress different factors in why certain positions are 
adopted rather than others, and thus the selection of the theoretical model assumes a great 
importance in the negotiation between social and agency based influences. This is crucial to 
the project of applying theories of identity to homelessness, as whilst many theories of 
identity attempt to develop the structure/agency paradigm, the overall bias of the theory 
holds key significance for the direction of this project. With this in mind the next section 
will begin this analysis by considering the constituent parts of rationally chosen identity. 
The Implications of `Chosen' Identity 
The undeserving/ deserving opposition is one that has been given considerable 
attention in studies of homeless policy (Carlen 1996, Neale 1997, Somerville 1999) and at 
the heart of this opposition is an assumption of personal responsibility. Such an axis implies 
that an individual can be deemed to be culpable for their position, as the suggestion that 
policy can label certain individuals to be undeserving of assistance implies that they alone 
are responsible for their situation. Consequently this division suggests a definite model of 
the manner in which identities are selected, as by adopting a perspective that sees agents 
choosing rationally between alternatives, so an individual can be required to assume the 
consequence of that choice. To see a policy promoting the classification of individuals as 
either deserving or undeserving of assistance is to see it actively subscribe to a view of 
identity formation that stresses individual rationality at the expense of uncontrollable social 
forces. Thus accounts of homeless policy that have stressed the role of that policy in 
creating an deserving/undeserving division have seen legislators working to a model of 
identity that is based on the ability of individuals to actively choose appropriate positions. 
43 
Furthermore, the granting of assistance to certain individuals involves a certain 
`marking' of their identities; the implication that they, for whatever reason, have not been 
capable of ensuring a certain standard of life for themselves. Whether we agree with this 
proposition or not, there appears to be definite assumptions and judgements at the heart of 
this discourse surrounding the homeless, ones that we can reasonably suggest involve a 
degree of certainty about the way that identity works and individuals make decisions. The 
mere fact that the deserving/undeserving duality has provoked so much opposition within 
studies of homelessness demands that this rational model is subject to some scrutiny. Of 
course, documenting models of rationally chosen identity demands a necessary 
generalisation, not least because the nature of rationality itself has proved to be extremely 
contentious and has concerned philosophers for over two thousand years. Consequently, 
this section will limit itself to identifying the contextual issues relevant to a rationally 
chosen model of identity, rather than attempting to document the numerous different 
accounts of rationality. 
Models of rationally chosen identity are often associated with the Enlightenment, 
for example Archer (2001) refers to the rational agent as `modernity's man' and links this 
mode of thought to the dominant discourse of progress and scientific advancement (p. 51). 
Archer sees this discourse as offering the `Clint Eastwood of the eighteenth century', a 
figure `who was necessarily a chooser, because he was no longer embedded in, let alone 
constituted by, tradition' (p. 51). The popular presentation of this time in history, as 
represented in Berman's (1982) second period of modernity, supports this position by 
emphasising a belief in progress at the expense of tradition. By this criterion identity 
through the enlightenment centres on self-creation; the human agent by this measure is the 
sole author of identity, narrative being constructed through rationality and the measured 
negotiation of the social. 
However, this rationality is not necessarily seen as the natural state of human 
beings, instead it is seen as a goal to be attained. If we look back through the history of 
philosophy, we can see Aristotle distinguishing between animals and humans on the basis 
of their telos or purpose (Lofpson p. 31). Likewise Farrer situates the attained notion of 
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rationality by stating that `choice is exercised by us, appetite comes upon us' (quoted in 
McQuarrie 1973, p. 192). 
Those seeking to explain enlightenment models of the self in terms of unified, 
essentialist concepts often overlook this division. The process of rational thought thus 
demands something akin to the extreme example of Freudian therapy; that is the primacy of 
the ego over the drives. Indeed, Kant refers to irrational or immoral behaviour as belonging 
to the realm of the pathological and whilst this term should not be confused with its 
unfortunate Freudian overtones, it illustrates the split at the heart of rational models. 
Zupancic (2001) expands this point by drawing the parallel between Kant and 
psychoanalysis (albeit Lacan rather than Freud) and stating that `our inclinations and 
deepest convictions are radically pathological' (p. 23). A further illustration of this split is 
provided in the Zizek's (2000) paraphrasing of the unconditional ethical imperative; `you 
can do your duty, because you must do it' (p. 133). 
Thus by this generalised account of chosen identity we can see that rational 
behaviour is something that is set as a benchmark for individuals, something to be fought 
for. However, just as this mode of behaviour is to be reached towards, so a failure to 
achieve it has its own consequences. The assumed exercise of choice carries with it the 
inherent judgement of decisions and a consequent responsibility to choose rationally. What 
is missing from this picture is the extent to which the rational process is influenced by 
social forces and therefore the next section will concentrate on introducing theories that see 
identity as a more structurally determined construct. 
Structural Theories of Identity 
The last section considered a notion of identity as a position chosen by a rational 
subject; an agent that is the centre of meaning. This section will concentrate on the other 
side of the structure/ agency dualism, namely structuralist models of identity. Whilst the 
last section saw individual agents as the sole authors of identity, as constituted prior to 
social forces, structural theories see identity purely as a result of social forces. Structuralist 
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theories therefore abandon the rational agent and concentrate on identity as a phenomenon 
that is formed entirely by power. The difference between these perspectives, in terms of 
ability to formulate identities is summarised in relation to homelessness in fig. 2: 1. 
Structure 
Homeless Individual Affluent Individual 
Fig 2: 1: Example of contextual influence on identity formation 
Agency 
Dyrberg (1997) characterises the difference between the two positions by stating 
that models of rationally chosen identity assume an external relationship between power 
and identity, with the subject fully constituted prior to structure and possessing the 
necessary faculties to negotiate social forces. Dyrberg notes that this is the reason that 
essentialist theories concentrate on minimising the impediments to this negotiation through 
the consideration of individual rights, as such a perspective is geared towards allowing 
individuals to utilise the power that is granted by their full constitution. In contrast to this, 
structuralism sees the relationship between social forces and identity as an internal one, 
with the individual subject removed entirely. Identity in this sense is fully constituted by 
structure, with the essentialism of the individual replaced by an essentialist view of power. 
This is a central point with regard to structure/agency divide, as both extremes in this 
dualism assume that either subject or object is the author of practice. Archer (2000) 
characterises this by citing identity as a product of social structure as an example 
`downwards conflation' (p. 86). 
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There is considerable variance in structuralist conceptions of identity. In general 
terms, structuralism was originally conceived as linguistic theory, developed from De 
Saussure's concern with the structures of language and the manner in which meaning is 
constructed through the laws that regulate language. As a result, language is discussed in 
terms of its formal aspects rather than its uses or the consequences of its uses. In short, 
structuralism is concerned with what Saussure refers to as langue (the rules of language) 
rather than parole (the uses of language in context). It is this focus that Ricoeur (1976) 
contends is at the heart of debates on language, as the semiotic concern with langue leaves 
it as a `closed' self-referential system that `is no longer treated as a `form of life', as 
Wittgenstein would have it, but as a self-sufficient system of inner relationships' (p. 6). In 
short, the structural elements of language are not necessarily illuminating by themselves; it 
is only in relation to wider discourse that they begin to take on political significance. 
Consequently structuralism involves a necessary generalisation in its analysis as 
whilst it considers that meaning is specific to a given culture at a particular moment, 
meaning is generated through the laws of language that are seen to govern interpretation. 
Essentially this `top-down' approach leaves language and culture generally as un-reflexive 
tools, with little room for the possibility that the intended meaning as defined by the 
structure of language may `slip' during its reception. Within structural theories of identity 
this problem is magnified, as the formal, repressive nature of structure means that power 
itself becomes an essential, fixed construct. 
Structuralist theories have often been associated with Marxism. The two 
perspectives have common concern for influence of political structures on the individual 
and many structuralist thinkers became involved with socialist politics in the 1960's. For 
example, Lilla (2001) points to Foucault's involvement with left wing politics in the wake 
of the 1968 Parisian student's revolt and highlights the role of structuralist thinkers in 
proposing a doctrine for French politics at this time. However, the structuralist thinker who 
had the keenest Marxist leanings was Althusser and it is in his work that it is possible to see 
the fundamental break that linguistic structuralism made with orthodox Marxism. This 
break occurs in the two perspectives' view of the individual subject. Archer (2000) clarifies 
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Marx's conception of a rational subject at the heart of social relations, biologically driven 
to be `committed to continuous practical activity in a material world' (p. 122, author's 
emphasis). Furthermore, this `practical work in the world does not and cannot await social 
instruction, but depends upon a learning process through which the continuous sense of self 
emerges' (p. 122). Such a conception presents a rational agent with a settled sense of self, 
attempting to negotiate the social through learned behaviour. 
Crucially for the structuralist perspective, Althusser's (1992) work involves an anti- 
humanist reading of Marx in which individuals are a mere effect of structural arrangements. 
This is problematic, in that by not investing a significant degree of rationality in the 
individual subject, social forces take on an essential, overbearing character, which 
individuals cannot hope to resist power. Adopting this deterministic view of human beings 
goes against most of the thought that preceded Althusser and consequently he attempted to 
justify this exceptionally `thin' view of the subject in his Ideological State Apparatus 
(1992) essay. Althusser's conclusion confirms this position; 
`The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit 
freely to the commandments of the Subject ie. that he shall freely accept his 
subjection ie. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 
`all by himself. There are no subjects except by and for their subjection. ' (p. 62 
author's emphasis). 
Althusser attempted to develop a conception of the subject to fit in with his 
structural leaning by incorporating Lacanian psychoanalysis into his model. He focused on 
the notion of misrecognition in order to describe a process whereby social forces 
symbolically attempt to `hail' the subject into a given identity. Ideology works to make 
choices self evident, giving the illusion of a free selection. Consequently, the subject is 
required to invest in this position through what Zizek (1999) refers to as a `false 
autonomy'; that is a position whereby the subject confirms their identity as an autonomous 
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being whilst not being aware that this is purely a representation (p. 258). Zizek contends 
that, `ideological identification succeeds precisely insomuch as I perceive myself as a `full 
human person' who `cannot be reduced to a puppet, to an instrument of some ideological 
big Other' (p. 258). Althusser's proposition is that it is at this moment that ideology has 
fulfilled its function and positioned the unwitting individual. 
However, the Ideological State Apparatus essay has been widely criticised for a 
misinterpretation of Lacanian psychoanalysis in support of Althusser's proposition that the 
subject is purely a result of ideology. Hall (1996) draws attention to Hirst's critique of this 
idea; a critique that concerns the nature of interpellation and its recognition by the subject. 
This recognition, Hirst argues, is dependant on the fact that the `subject would have been 
required to have the capacity to perform before it had been constituted within discourse as a 
subject' (Hall p. 21). Or as Zizek (1999) puts it: 
`If then, as Althusser would have put it - the perception that, prior to interpellation, 
the subject is always-already there is precisely the effect and proof of successful 
interpellation, does not the Lacanian assertion of a subject prior to 
interpellation/subjectivization repeat the very ideological illusion that Althusser 
endeavours to denounce? (p. 258) 
Problematically for Aithusser it would appear that the conception of the subject in 
Lacan is too `thick' or `ever-present' to support his claims. This example highlights a 
fundamental problem in structuralist views of identity, in that the attempt to remove the 
subject from analysis leads to it becoming extremely difficult to account for the manner in 
which identities are selected. The process of completely de-centring the individual as the 
author of meaning is the development that negates the very possibility of individual 
autonomy and paradoxically relegates human beings to becoming effects of society, as if 
society itself was not created by human beings. This is not to suggest that social structure 
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does not hold a strong influence over the selection of identities, but rather that structure 
should not be seen as an impenetrable totality. 
It does not seem realistic to suggest that individuals have no impact on either their 
own position or the wider social environment and this essentialist conception of structure 
leaves it as an un-reflexive concept. This is a pessimistic view of the formation of identity, 
as the view of power as unchanging and inescapable leaves little opportunity for personal or 
political change. This is especially unhelpful for those in marginalized positions, such as 
the homeless, because whilst the structuralist perspective dissolves individual liability by 
acknowledging the considerable social forces at work in the formation and selection of 
identities, the underplayed nature of the subject does not allow for any individual resistance 
to, or influence on, social structure. 
The Contingency of Identity2 
Thus far this chapter has concentrated on developing the theoretical underpinning to 
structure/agency dualism in identity formation. The models of identity discussed in this 
chapter share a common feature in that both perspectives insist on the essentialism of either 
structure or agency. As we have seen, both conceive identity as settled phenomenon and 
both have extreme consequences in terms of rendering individuals either culpable for their 
position, or as passive victims to un-reflexive social forces. Clearly both extremes offer an 
exaggerated position and to further this analysis it is important to balance the contrasting 
influences on identity formation within the context of homelessness. To do this it is 
necessary to consider this purported essentialism in a little depth, as essentialist conceptions 
of both subject and object have been seen to be repressive for differing reasons. 
The pluralistic themes of post-modernism have led to a questioning of the certainties 
involved both in the judgement of action in this way and the extent to which identity can be 
viewed as a rationally chosen and settled concept. This has arrived via a critique of both the 
traditional liberal humanist idea of the self as a `chooser' in its rational sense and the 
2 This phrase comes from Tajbakhsh (2001). 
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dominant strands of structuralism that we have seen defining identity in terms of a 
reductive, deterministic analysis. Of course this is not a consistent critique, as implied by 
the doctrines of post-modernism it spans a variety of political perspectives and discipline 
areas. However, what unites this body of theory is an opposition to the idea of identity as a 
settled, unified phenomena, whether it is defined in terms of structure or centred on a 
human-led mode of rationality. 
The change in perspective for studies of identity comes from the belief that the 
twentieth century saw a massive re-evaluation of the enlightenment ideals. In particular the 
belief in progress and scientific rationalism comes under intense scrutiny in a century 
where the technologies of advancement appeared to be hi-jacked; from the atomic bomb to 
prison camps, critics noted the subversion of values and a loss of faith in ideals. Crucially 
such instances highlighted the problems of universal theories or `meta-narratives' (Lyotard 
1984, xxiv). Correspondingly, politics has been seen to diversify, with social movements 
representing specific concerns beyond the traditional areas of focus for the major political 
parties and further enhancing the image that it is increasingly difficult to view social groups 
as anything other than part of the project of identity. By post-modem reasoning, identikit, 
unified and pre-defined identities are unreasonable constructs for precisely the reason that 
social groups are likely to include a diverse selection of influences, priorities and 
psychologies. 
Consequently, identity has come to be viewed from an anti-essentialist standpoint 
from within this perspective, as a concept with few if any unifying features and formed and 
reformed within discursive practices. This notion of identity as a temporal phenomenon 
reveals an understanding of a concept that is constantly in a state of flux, a product of a 
moment in time. Any association of identity with an essential core, a `true' value, is held to 
be unsustainable, as is a search for any universal human values within the subject. In very 
basic terms, the idea of identity can be seen to have shifted from a focus on human agency 
or social structure as the site of the production of identity towards an unstable paradigm. In 
keeping with such subjective concerns, post-structuralism has looked to combat 
structuralism's passive conception of the subject, whilst simultaneously developing a 
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critique of the Cartesian ideal that positions the individual as the sole source of meaning. 
Again, both ideas are seen to be insufficiently flexible to allow for the multiple subject 
positions open to individuals and incompatible with post-structuralism's overriding concern 
with discursive practices. This post-structuralist idea, or cultural critique, is based on the 
concept of identity being a perpetual process, the subject being constantly `decentred' 
within it. 
This reassessment has also influenced ideas on individual psychology, with the notion 
of a settled, centred self receiving some criticism. In the field of social psychology, Lifton 
(1996), in his account of what he calls `Protean Man' (named after Proteus, the Greek God 
who was able to adopt different forms) talks of the inherent tension that he sees in the 
modern necessity of adopting different `masks' (p. 126). Lifton talks of society promoting 
an idea of the plural self, that is one that changes `masks' or subject positions according to 
the various situations he finds himself in. However, Lifton maintains that this role shifting 
occurs on a conscious level, the subject being able to "put on or take off' various personas 
(p. 127). Consequently, Lifton sees the subject as "starved of ideas and feelings that can 
give coherence to his world" and open to feelings of guilt, as there are "no outlet for his 
loyalties, no symbolic structure for his achievement" (pp. 127-8). Here the adoption of 
multiple positions is a cause of anxiety, the loss of judgement revealing psychological 
costs. However, post-structuralism has been quick to stress the positive political aspects to 
the concept of multiple personas and the possibilities it holds for overturning dominant 
hierarchies. 
For introductive purposes I shall initially concentrate on Hall's overview of cultural 
theory Who Needs Identity? (1996). For Hall, identity is a process that exists in the 
subject's identification (in the psychoanalytic sense) with specific discursive fields. 
However, it is this process of identification that can be seen to present the first stumbling 
block for this debate. Hall notes that identity, in general terms, is a product of discourse and 
points to Foucault's later work in an effort to stress the inadequate conceptualisation of the 
subject as a part of this process. As I have already shown, in the work of Lifton a 
conception of the subject's identification with a subject position in post-modem terms is an 
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extremely negative idea, one that is likely to lead to anxiety or guilt. However, perhaps 
more importantly, this idea of the subject consciously choosing one subject position for a 
particular moment in time offers no lead as to why certain positions are adopted rather than 
others. It was this criticism that led Foucault to reassess his position in relation to the 
subject as a result of discourse and it is a similar set of factors that led Lifton to state that 
`the whole stability/change issue badly needs general psychological revaluation'. 
Hall maintains that identification with subject positions differs from the 
`commonsense' idea in a number of ways (p. 16). Firstly, identification as a process 
involved with finding a suitable subject position is never completed. It is `always too much 
or too little' to fit in totally with a discursively defined role and as such, is constantly 
renegotiated (p. 17). This is because identity is seen in this context to be a concept that is in 
process across the varying boundaries of discourse, constituting itself by means of what 
Hall calls `discursive work', drawing a boundary between its chosen position and that 
which is excluded (p. 17). 
Here Hall is referring to the second important point concerning the `subject in 
language' approach to identification, namely that the process is (temporarily) completed 
and subsequently consolidated through a relationship to the excluded pole of identity. For 
this point Hall draws on the work of Derrida (2000) and, in particular, his work on how 
language forms subjectivities. Derrida looks at the concept of the `sign' and concludes that 
in substituting the representation for the object, meaning is always deferred. The sign is 
both `secondary' and `provisional' and as a representation of both an object and a concept, 
it is also partial (p. 89). Meaning is therefore created by the omissions contained within the 
sign, specifically the signified concept. Derrida states that `every concept is inscribed in a 
chain or a system within which it refers to the other'; for example, when we think of the 
concept of `day' it is in relation to its opposite, `night' (p. 89). This may be true of language, 
but Derrida also relates this idea to the relationship between language and the subject. He 
again draws on Saussure's contention that `the subject is inscribed in language', that we 
have no other terms to think of ourselves other than within the confines of language, and 
even when we talk of consciousness it is within subjective terms (p. 92-93). 
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This reference to `the other' is a central feature of post-structural theory and Hall 
maintains that it is this relationship that both constitutes an identity and opens the way for 
politics to enter the field of investigation. He refers to Laclau when documenting how this 
exclusion is `an act of power' (p. 18), but Zizek (1989) expresses the argument in a more 
anecdotal and overtly political form. 
`In the anti-Semitic vision, the Jew is experienced as the embodiment of negativity- 
but the `truth' of anti-Semitism is, of course, that the very identity of our position is 
structured through a negative relationship to this traumatic figure of the Jew. Without 
the reference to the Jew who is corroding the social fabric, the social fabric itself 
would be dissolved.... if I lose this `impossible' point of reference, my very identity 
dissolves. ' (p. 176) 
So, for a positive identity to be constituted there is necessarily a corresponding negative 
`other' against which identity is defined. By this theory the homeless become the `traumatic 
figure' suggested by Zizek and this in turn is a continual factor in their exclusion. It is 
through the functioning of binary oppositions like this that we can continue to define 
groups as opposed to mainstream society and thus as somehow inferior to it. 
However, Derrida's (2000) concept of deconstruction offers an alternative reading of 
this situation. His idea that `totalization can be judged impossible' led him to question the 
extent to which the dominant signifier or opposition can continue to function on the basis of 
exclusion (p. 89). For Derrida the process of closure is `overdetermined' as the excluded 
pole acts to destabilise the sign (Hall p. 18). Therefore, in terms of identity, meaning is 
never fully realised as it is constantly undermined by the element that it lacks. It is 
negotiated in what Derrida referred to as `play' and certainly cannot be traced back to what 
we could refer to as its essential fact. This is a central proposition for studies of identity, 
one that has implications for the relationship between structure and agency. Furthermore, 
this insight has been developed beyond Derrida's original, rather abstract, focus, to apply 
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directly to formation of social political identities. In particular, Laclau and Mouffe (1985), 
Laclau (1990), Dyrberg (1997) and Torfing (1999) have borrowed the concept of 
overdetermination to re-evaluate the troublesome relationship between subject and object in 
structuralism and offer a more flexible conception of social relations. This branch of theory 
will be central to this project and consequently the next section will concentrate on 
documenting these developments and beginning to speculate how this angle can be useful 
in the study of homelessness. 
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Chapter 3- Radical Democratic Theory 
In this chapter I am going to develop the summary of identity from the previous 
chapter and begin to suggest one way in which the problems associated the essentialism of 
subject or object can be overcome. Chiefly this development will stem from the critique of 
structuralism by Derrida discussed at the end of the previous chapter. In particular this 
chapter will focus on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and their development of a 
branch of theory that was initially labelled `post-Marxism', but has more recently been 
christened `radical democratic theory'. This chapter will begin to highlight the chief 
advantages for the study of homelessness in applying this perspective. 
This chapter will begin by looking at the development of two branches of post- 
Marxist theory, as an attempt to overcome the essentialism of structure identified in the 
previous chapter. Following this, the basic tenets of Laclau and Mouffe's theory will be 
outlined, with particular reference to the concepts of antagonism, overdetermination and the 
impossibility of society. This positioning of post-structural concepts within political theory 
will be considered as a way past the structure/agency impasse. 
The last three sections will concentrate on the development of radical democratic 
theory, with particular reference to the later work of Mouffe (1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 
1996,2000). Mouffe's work on citizenship and democracy is seen to be relevant to the aims 
of this project, as whilst it relies on the critique of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), 
it presents this work within a political context. Mouffe's version of citizenship is also seen 
to be beneficial to the study of homelessness, as it attempts to address political exclusion 
through a post-structural critique, whilst appealing to universal aims. Finally the major 
criticisms of this perspective will be considered and the relevance to this project will be 
summarised. 
Post-Marxism 
In this instance and as is generally the case, the use of a label such post-Marxism to 
describe a diverse body of philosophy and political theory is problematic. In general we can 
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refer to post-Marxism as an approach that has sought to re-evaluate Marxism in the light of 
both the theoretical insights of post-modernism and the social and political upheavals that 
have cast doubt on Marxism as both a feasible and just doctrine for political rule. As Sim 
(1998) notes, a number of contrasting theorists have been placed within this post-Marxist 
grouping and whilst there is some commonality in overall themes, there remain several 
distinct approaches to the place of Marx in post-modern theory. It should be noted that this 
debate took place within the confines of left-wing theory and so is framed within a certain 
ideological bias. However, the more recent work of Mouffe (2000) has adapted the earlier 
post-Marxist framework to include the insights of prominent liberal theorists. 
Sim splits this perspective in two, drawing attention to the different roles ascribed to 
Marxist theory within post-Marxism and post-Marxism. Firstly, post-Marxism can be 
described as a rebuttal of Marxism; a perspective that `can no longer subscribe to the 
Marxist world view, nor the efficacy of its analytical methods' (Sim 1998, p. 6). Chief 
proponents of this perspective include Baudrillard (1983) and Lyotard (1988), writers for 
whom the essentialism of Marxism had become incompatible with their world view. For 
Lyotard, Marxism was a meta-narrative whose claim to universality had led to the 
development of exploitation in Stalin's Russia. Furthermore, Lyotard opposed the 
universalism of language within Marxism, a universalism that prevented opposition except 
within the terms of Marxism itself. Lyotard saw the very use of Marxist terminology as a 
concession to its legitimate status as a universal language. Consequently this post-Marxism 
is post-modern theory first and foremost; condemnatory of the universalism in Marxism 
that is seen as one-dimensional and untenable. 
In contrast to this rejection of Marxism, post-Marxism has explicitly committed 
itself to the renewal of the political left. The central text in this perspective is Laclau and 
Mouffe's (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, in which an attempt is made to 
formulate a non-essentialist version of Marxism; to deconstruct Marx. This is deemed 
necessary for two interrelated reasons. 
Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe share Lyotard's distaste for the political oppression 
exhibited by communist states throughout the twentieth century, from the Soviet 
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suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, to the occupation of Prague in response to 
Dubcek's attempt to relax the prohibitive stance of Soviet communism. They note the 
manner in which the perceived ̀ evident truths' of Marxism `have been seriously challenged 
by an avalanche of historical mutations on which those truths were constituted' and 
conclude that the practical uses of Marxist doctrines demand that the left re-evaluates the 
basis of socialism (1985, p. 1). 
Secondly, the failures of Marxism, coupled with theoretical developments 
questioning the universal goals of modernity, have led to the re-evaluation of the viability 
of monism. This position shares Lyotard's and Baudrillard's rejection of Marxism as 
metanarrative which is incapable of providing the necessary flexibility to allow for the 
contingent nature of social relations. After the fall of Soviet communism in 1989, Laclau 
(1990) directly attributed the failure of this doctrine to the inadequate accommodation of 
difference. 
`.. the rule is clear: the more `universal' the idea to be embodied is, the greater the 
distance from the historical limitations of the social agents intended as its bearers 
will be; and the more likely it is that the result will be a monstrous symbiosis' (p. 1). 
Indeed, it is possible to see Laclau and Mouffe's work as a critique of totalitarianism that 
happens to concentrate on Marxist texts. Certainly their stated aim in this project is to re- 
evaluate the relationship between autonomy and equivalence within hegemonic formations; 
with the purpose of revealing how such formations repress individual agendas. In this 
sense, it is the example of the experience of Marxism and Marxist applications in social 
history that highlight this trend. 
Laclau's account of the fall of Soviet communism is inextricably linked to the same 
flaws that were identified in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). Chiefly, his and 
Mouffe's opposition to classical Marxism stems from its emphasis on class identity, an 
emphasis that they see as both unrealistic and unreflective of the varied debates between 
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Marxist thinkers. Initially they illustrate this by presenting an analysis of the emergence of 
the concept of hegemony that attempts to show the diverse readings of class identity over 
the twentieth century. They trace a genealogy that stresses the varied interpretations of class 
unity in Marxism, beginning with Rosa Luxemburg's account of the differences in strike 
action in Russia and Germany at the very beginning of the 20th century. From this account, 
Laclau and Mouffe describe how the extent of class unity was dependent on the political 
and economic context of the country, proposing that the Russian situation in which strike 
action became a unified class struggle was a situation due in no small part to the political 
and economic realities that fostered a sense of class identity. Luxemburg drew attention to 
the German situation, in which working class struggle was far more fragmented and 
concentrated on isolated economic disputes between employers and workers. This, Laclau 
and Mouffe claim, illustrates that class identity in western democracies has not been a 
unified concept, either in a national or local arena, or even in individual subjects who may 
experience different loyalties at either a political or economic level. The overall objective 
of this analysis is to suggest that some Marxist texts have correctly identified that class 
identity is not an overriding, `master' identity for the majority of workers in western 
European countries, but have struggled to fit this into a classical Marxist framework, 
whereby differences are forgotten and a unified class emerges. Laclau and Mouffe see this 
attempt to theorise a unified class framework as a fundamentally misguided project and 
identify the theoretical developments in the `second international' that justified such an 
eradication of difference. 
Laclau and Mouffe note that whilst Luxemburg identifies the plurality of 
antagonisms within the German working class, her analysis focuses on areas of 
commonality between the German and Russian examples and presents the fragmentation of 
working class interests in Germany as a phenomenon to be overcome. Consequently, the 
contingency of identity is presented as a social reality which is a mere obstacle to 
revolution and is only resolved at the spontaneous moment that revolution takes place. This 
leaves the problem of how so many different interests could be unified in a collective 
struggle and Laclau and Mouffe identify three significant schools of thought that developed 
in response to this issue. 
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Firstly they point to an orthodox perspective embodied by the work of Kautsky, in 
which the fragmentation of the working class in Germany is acknowledged, but is seen as a 
trend which will eventually subside, with unification taking its place. Kautsky ascribed a 
directorial role to intellectuals, but ultimately believed that evolution of capitalism would 
lead to a united working class. This evolutionary stance is linked to the second perspective; 
the revisionist ideas characterised by Bernstein. Laclau and Mouffe note that this 
perspective placed more emphasis on the plurality of identity for individuals, with social 
agents expected to fulfil the roles of worker, citizen and consumer. In addition, this was 
seen to have a detrimental effect on class unity. Bernstein also makes a break from the 
orthodox conception of historical determinism, by allowing for the impact of will on 
history. 
However, whilst the revisionist perspective allows for a slightly more contingent 
view of social relations, Bernstein still envisages a unification of the working class based 
the rational evolution of human history. Consequently, the plurality that Bernstein observes 
in the social field would gradually be eroded as class identity became the `master' identity. 
Laclau and Mouffe summarize this point: 
`Thus, although `the facts' are freed from the essentialist connections which linked 
them together in the orthodox conception, they are later reunited in a general theory 
of progress unconnected to any determinable mechanism' (p. 34). 
Against these two perspectives, the third option is revolutionary syndicalism. This 
perspective rejects any evolutionary view of history and accepts that a working class 
revolution is not inevitable. What is required for the unification of the working class is a 
`myth' around which activism could be organised. Laclau and Mouffe draw attention to the 
work of Sorel on this issue, stating that he saw the focal point for class unification as the 
general strike and it was unimportant whether this action was successful or not. What was 
seen as vital in the formation of a unified class identity was the existence of a political 
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opposition against which identities could be constituted. However, whilst this perspective 
emphasises the contingency of history and the role of representation in constituting identity, 
it remains unclear why any resultant action would be based around class. Laclau and 
Mouffe note that the focal point for the constitution of identity could effectively be 
anything and that in the wake of European syndicalism's failure, many of its former 
advocates looked for a similar unifying principle in the guise of nationalism. 
The central proposition to come from this analysis is that whilst Marxist writers 
have identified that class identity is fragmented, their analysis has always sought to imagine 
ways to overcome this. Thus, there is a gap at the heart of this analysis, between the portrait 
of contingent social relations and the faith that this contingency will be replaced by a 
constituted, unified identity in the future. This gap is the means of transition between the 
two states, a process that cannot adequately be resolved in Marxism. In hindsight, history 
has shown that this gap has been filled by authoritarian measures and the oppression of 
difference. 
It is at this point that Laclau and Mouffe introduce Gramsci's concept of hegemony, 
as whilst they concede that his work `does not unfold all of its deconstructive effect on the 
theoretical terrain of classical Marxism', it is nevertheless seen to be critical in abandoning 
the idea of `natural' transition to class unity (p. 85). The crucial break made by Gramsci, is 
to concede that hegemony should span class interests and that this should be conceived by 
political articulation. Here he is echoing Kausky's earlier assertion that the mediation of 
intellectuals is required in order to forge unity, as for Gramsci historical change had to be 
produced; it was not a result of the laws of economics or politics. Thus, this mediation 
resulting in the unification of identities from a diverse range of backgrounds and positions 
is properly conceived as a social construction and not merely a helping hand towards an 
inevitable historical conclusion. 
This attempt to re-imagine the concept of hegemony is used to draw a number of 
conclusions about both the construction of social relations and the nature of identity. 
Identity is not a result of an essential historical sequence and Laclau and Mouffe consider 
that the primacy of collective will lends a `cultural aspect' to the constitution of identity (p. 
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67). They speculate that Gramsci's conception of ideology gives primacy to `collective 
will' over class loyalty, `as the ideological elements articulated by a hegemonic class do not 
have a necessary class belonging' (p. 67). However, their ultimate rejection of Gramsci's 
position stems from the idea that whilst hegemony contains a number of elements that may 
span classes, the ultimate unity in a hegemonic structure has to originate in class belonging. 
Thus, whilst this conception of ideology introduces the notion of articulation, Laclau and 
Mouffe note that `the ultimate core of the hegemonic subject's identity is constituted at a 
point external to the space it articulates', maintained through an ultimate focus on class 
(p. 85). In terms of identity, this means that the subject/object dualism remains in place, as 
beneath the contingency that Gramsci grants to both history and social relations lies an 
ultimate adherence to an essentialist view of class. 
They overcome this impasse by adopting an explicitly political version of the post- 
structuralist critique of identity that was highlighted in the previous chapter. This involves 
an appreciation of the work of Althusser, but an ultimate dismissal of the essentialist 
connotation in his work, together with an application of Derrida's critique of totalization. 
These theories work towards a conception of identity that although based on contingency, is 
nevertheless defined by the social forces that constitute political identities. The remainder 
of this chapter will look at the initial formation of these ideas in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy and their subsequent development in Laclau and Mouffe's separate work. 
One problem has to be addressed before we move on to look at Laclau and 
Mouffe's approach to identity. Why, following the deconstruction of the major components 
of Marxism, do Laclau and Mouffe adopt the label `post-Marxism'? As Sim (1998) notes, 
Marxism is a doctrine that is universal by its very nature and Laclau and Mouffe's attempt 
to concentrate on plurality and difference is `founded on a recognition that cultural change 
has overtaken the doctrine of classical Marxism' (p. 7). Sim concludes that the universality 
inherent to Marxism makes it incompatible with the type of post-structural theory that 
Laclau and Mouffe are attempting to introduce and considers that the `nostalgic' rejection 
of Marx by Lyotard and Baudrillard offers a more theoretically consistent approach (p. 6). 
These are important criticisms and will be addressed, in turn, below. 
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Firstly, the incompatibility of universal Marxist goals with the fragmented nature of 
class structure identified by many Marxist writers is the central concern of Laclau and 
Mouffe's analysis in the first part of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Here, Laclau and 
Mouffe appear to concur with Sim's view and state in deconstructing the concept of 
hegemony and stressing the contingency of social forces, that have been identified, but not 
adequately addressed by Marxists, they are attempting to highlight a route whereby the 
mistakes of the past could be avoided. Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe stress that they are 
attempting to theorise a new type of politics, which could be presented from within any 
number of ideological perspectives. Properly speaking, the Marxism in Laclau and 
Mouffe's work is an example of how the theoretical perspective that they adopt can be 
applied, of how the relationship between the universal and the particular, between subject 
and object, can be reconsidered without granting either category complete authority. In this 
sense Laclau and Mouffe are testing Marxist texts against developments in theory and 
attempting to save a conceptualisation of social relations, whilst abandoning the end-game 
universality that characterises Marxist solutions. Laclau (1990) attempts to clarify this 
relationship with Marxism: 
`Marx, Kautsky, Otto Bauer or Rosa Luxemburg mean so much more to us if we 
know ourselves to be different from them, if we can think out the specificity of our 
situation and our differences when coming to grips with their texts.... I have no 
objection in principle to this kind of operation which would turn Marxism into a 
floating signifier and thus give way to completely new language games (on the 
condition, of course, that this operation is recognised for what it is and does not 
claim to discover the real meaning of Marx's work)' (p. 203-204). 
Thus, Marxism is not abandoned entirely, but neither are the elements that Sim sees as 
incompatible with Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical stance retained. 
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There are also good reasons for rejecting the post-Marxism that Sim favours and 
these are relevant to both the context of this study and the application of post-Marxism to 
political subjects in general. Baudrillard, in particular, is extreme in his rejection of value 
judgements and belief in the impossibility of political action. Again, Laclau (1990) 
illustrates the differences between this stance and his own. 
`As to Baudrillard, I do not share the view that moving into a certain post-modernity 
entails the erosion of all authenticity, and thus produces a `social world of repetition 
and vacancy'. Contrary to the assumption of the thinkers of the Frankfurt School, 
the decline of the `major actors', such as the working class of classical socialism, 
has not led to a decrease in social struggles or the predominance of one-dimensional 
man, but to a proliferation of new antagonisms' (p. 214). 
In the context of this study, an acceptance of the extreme relativism proposed by 
Baudrillard leads inevitably to the type of `circular arguments' identified by Neale (1997). 
As stated in chapter 1, it is the re-establishment of a political context in theories of identity 
that offer the possibility of overcoming such problems whilst retaining the focus on 
difference that Neale found to be beneficial. With this in mind, the next section will focus 
on an examination of the post-Marxist approach to discourse, highlighting the manner in 
which this approach is useful for the study of identity. 
Discourse as `Overdetermined' 
Laclau and Mouffe's approach to identity casts a different light on the 
structure/agency paradigm, in that identity is a concept that is seen to be irreducible to 
either polarity. As previously stated this involves dispensing with the essential, fixed nature 
of either subject or object, that characterises both structuralist and rationally chosen 
identity. 
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At the heart of this theory is a specific conception of social relations. Laclau and 
Mouffe insist on the `impossibility of the social', the idea that social relations cannot be 
objective. This point is made in reference to Derrida's original idea that totalization is an 
impossibility, a declaration that Laclau and Mouffe attempt to illustrate through their 
deconstruction of Marxism. It is in this sense that they abandon any form of essentialism in 
structure and formulate a theory based on contingency. This has a number of implications 
for the manner in which identities are formed, as the possibilities of identity are seen to be 
governed by their relation to the social, but in turn this terrain is limited by the formation of 
identities. There are a number of different concepts to outline here and I will attempt to 
summarize them in the following section. 
The impossibility of the social refers to the belief that unity, explored through the 
differential conceptions of class unity in Marxism, is a construction. The notion of 
objective social relations is linked to this as such a stance is seen to be an imposition that 
cannot represent the differences that make up the social field. Laclau and Mouffe present 
the concept of discourse as the site on which social relations are objectified and thus 
identities are unified. Discursive formations are consequently seen as a site where 
differences, although not eradicated, are temporarily constituted to produce a totality. In 
this sense, identities are directed towards subject positions in a manner that we have seen 
operating in structural theories. 
It is important to note that when Laclau and Mouffe refer to the totality of discourse, 
they are referring to a totality of symbolic relations, rather than an objective unity. In this 
sense they are following Foucault (1972) in conceiving discourse, not as a collection of 
related objects, unified by themes or concepts, but rather as a system in which `dispersion' 
is the principle of unity `insofar as it is governed by rules of formation, by the complex 
conditions of existence of the dispersed statements' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 105). 
Such a system may consist of seemingly unrelated objects that may be unified purely by 
their symbolic membership of a discursive framework. 
There are a number of points to come from this hypothesis. Firstly, the formation of 
discourse involves an imposition of a symbolic unity, or equivalence over difference, an 
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operation that obviously requires social or political power. However, they are careful to 
conceptualise power, not purely as a repressive entity, but rather as an 'articulation'. 
Articulation in this sense is described as ̀ the creation of something new out of a dispersion 
of elements', the assimilation of disparate objects into a discourse (Laclau 1990, p. 183). 
Secondly, this contingency of social relations shows itself in the emergence of 
antagonism, the very experience that makes articulation necessary. Here Laclau and Mouffe 
borrow Derrida's (1978) concept of the `constitutive outside' and contend that the existence 
of antagonism is the `constitutive outside' of discursive formation. Such an outside acts as a 
`surplus of meaning', difference that cannot be contained within the discursive whole. 
Thirdly, Laclau and Mouffe develop the concept of `overdetermination' to show 
that although the formation of discourse positions identities in such a way as to disguise the 
genuine nature of social relations, the nature of discursive identities means that they cannot 
be fully constituted. Furthermore, discourse itself cannot be entirely fixed, as this would 
mean it would have existence as a totality and identities would be structurally determined. 
Discourse itself becomes subject to the same overdetermination identified in the previous 
chapter, consistently undermined by the elements that it lacks. Laclau and Mouffe refer to 
this lack as the `field of discursivity' and propose that discourse is formed in an attempt to 
dominate this terrain (1985, p. 111). As we have seen, the subversion effected by this field 
acts to destabilise; consequently the meaning and unity of discourse can only be realised 
partially. 
Because discourse is only partially constituted, Laclau and Mouffe maintain that it 
can only retain its form temporarily. This brings us back to the concept of antagonism, the 
force that prevents the objectivity of discourse. It is worth dwelling on this concept as it 
assumes central importance in Laclau and Mouffe's approach to identity formation and 
separates their approach from other constructivist accounts. 
The central thesis of antagonism involves a break from both the idea of 
contradiction and real opposition. Both categories are seen as totalities, in the first case the 
totality of concepts and in the second case the real opposition of differentiated physical 
objects. A physical, real opposition is not seen to be an antagonistic relationship, but 
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merely the result of an objective clash. Thus any attempt to transpose this relationship to 
social situations is to consider society as a series of material connections. 
`To apply the same principle to the social terrain would be tantamount to saying that 
what is antagonistic in class struggle is the physical act by which a policeman hits a 
worker militant, or the shouts of a group in parliament which prevent a member of 
the opposing sector from speaking' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 123). 
Such actions cannot, therefore, be considered to be antagonistic, as clearly it is the meaning 
behind the actions that is important in this context. However, Laclau and Mouffe also reject 
the notion of contradiction, where an opposition of concepts represents a site for 
antagonism. Whilst they concede that real contradictions exist in society, they do not 
necessarily produce antagonistic relationships. They also point to examples in social history 
where contradictory belief systems did result in conflict and propose that the reason for the 
leap between contradiction and conflict is presented as an inevitable reaction, without ever 
properly being explained. This is the same `void' they identified at the heart of second 
international Marxism and thus the concept of antagonism becomes the key concept in the 
formation and re-formation of identities. 
The key problem faced by Laclau and Mouffe is that both contradiction and real 
opposition demand a fully constituted object, which makes the relationship with its 
opposite comprehensible. However, antagonism is the force that prevents this full 
constitution and is therefore `a relation wherein the limits of every objectivity are shown' 
(p. 125, author's emphasis). This subversion is seen to exist through the prevention of 
closure in discourse, structured through `difference and equivalence'. Difference in this 
context refers to `opening out' of discourse and the increase of complex relationships, 
whilst equivalence conversely entails a simplification, a grouping together of differences. 
Dyrberg (1997) provides an interesting illustration of the principles of equivalence and 
difference in the construction of Danish national identity by nationalist groups. In this case 
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a chain of equivalence is created in the `other' of Danishness; a variety of different ethnic 
groups are bracketed together in the threat that they pose to the national identity. This 
opposition is therefore antagonistic, in that both positions are built on negativity, on what 
they are not. The Danish nationalists perceive ethnic groups as equivalent to each other 
because they are not Danish, but form their own identity in opposition to this constructed 
position. However, this negativity means that neither identity can be properly constituted, 
as both are representations of `something that is not present', but is presented as essential to 
the separate identities (p. 122). 
Thus this conception of antagonism as the force that prevents objectivity is 
ultimately the nub of Laclau and Mouffe's approach to social relations. It allows them to 
portray a conception of society in which the formation of discourse and discursive identities 
are not only linked, but dependent on each other. In this way they apply the post- 
structuralist ideas identified in the previous chapter into a wider political context and begin 
to speculate as the social implications of this model. However, the manner in which 
individuals fit into this theory remains relatively unexplained and so the next section will 
concentrate on the role of the subject in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. 
Identity and `the Impossibility of Society' 
Ultimately this is not a theory that concerns itself with individuals, in terms of 
speculating as to `what they are like'. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe concentrate on the 
possibilities for identity, in terms of mapping the terrain of social relations. Their focus on a 
non-essentialist conception of discourse, in which structure cannot be fully constituted, 
leaves the way clear for a model of structure and agency that dispenses with both 
categories. This section will attempt to conclude this approach, by looking at the 
implications of this view of society for the concept of identity. 
The conception of the subject, the bearer of identity at the heart of Laclau and 
Mouffe's theory, marks an attempt to move beyond conceptions of identity as either a self- 
determined or structurally given entity. The subject is enmeshed in the social relations that 
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govern the limits of discourse and the formation of identity is seen to be both produced by 
and productive of discourse. Laclau (1990) elaborates on this, stating that `the constitution 
of a social identity is act of power and that identity as such is power, a position that implies 
power itself is a symbolic force that flows between subject and object (p. 31). Consequently, 
this approach to identity formation is impossible to separate from their wider approach to 
the formation of discourse. 
In keeping with this approach, Laclau and Mouffe state that when they are referring 
to individual subjects, what they are actually describing are discursively formed subject 
positions. In this sense a subject position is a discursively defined role. However, this does 
not mean that individuals are reduced to passive effects of ideology, and it is here that 
Laclau and Mouffe break with Althusser's `anti-humanism'. In contrast to the criticisms 
voiced against Althusser in chapter 2, that his adoption of the Lacanian subject was too 
`thick' to support his position, they propose that it was his conception of social relations 
that was at fault. It is the essentialism at the heart of Althusser's view of structure that 
cannot support the role of the Lacanian subject rather than vice-versa. Consequently, the 
conception of social relations that Laclau and Mouffe advance attempts to leave a space in 
discourse. They propose that the individual subject acts as a void, an element that prevents 
the full constitution of discourse. As we have seen, discourse itself is unable to be fully 
constituted because of the subverting influence of the elements that it lacks. These elements 
are identities, which through their antagonistic relationship with each other prevent a closed 
system of discourse. 
The notion of identification is critical in this sense as this is the entry point for the 
subject into the symbolic order that Laclau and Mouffe propose. The adoption of a position 
within discourse requires the identification of the individual with a subject position. 
However, Laclau and Mouffe use the Lacanian notion of the subject; a conception that 
proposes that the process of identification is based on a fundamental misrecognition. It is 
this phenomenon that results in adoption of subject positions that cannot `fit', as they are 
not adequate representations of individuals. Laclau (1990) expands this point through 
reference to the process of class identification in the Russian revolution. 
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`It is because the bourgeoisie could not take up `its' democratic tasks that Russian 
social democracy felt they had to become those of the working class, etc. It is this 
act of `taking up' a task from the outside, of completing it and filling the gap which 
has opened up in the `objectivity' of the structure, that characterises the hegemonic 
relation' (p. 212). 
This brings us back to the point at which we started. Throughout Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe are insistent that this historical moment was context-specific 
to the economic and political conditions of Russia at this time. Concepts such as hegemony 
were the product of perceived necessity and the identification of so many people with the 
subject position `working class' was extremely unlikely to happen in a different social 
context. Yet this crystallises their approach to identity, as the identification with a subject 
position leaves a surplus, the other things that the subject knows he or she is. Consequently 
the failure of structure to adequately represent the subject is the very factor that means 
neither subject, nor object, can be fully constituted, settled concepts. 
Radical Democracy 
Laclau and Mouffe's account of the formation of discourse and identity is ultimately 
concluded by the presentation of their conception of radical democracy. This is the aim of 
their attempt to re-imagine the concept of hegemony, as they propose a politics based on 
based on multiplicity of opinion and agenda. In the preface to Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy they draw attention to protest movements from diverse and varied groups, a 
phenomenon that they see as a challenge to the primacy of unified class struggle within 
classical Marxism. This of course becomes the central motivation for the subsequent 
deconstruction of Marxism and thus the presentation of a politics that can adequately 
represent diversity becomes the end-game. 
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The concept of radical democracy is an attempt to imagine the type of politics that 
Laclau and Mouffe see emerging from their model of social relations. Their genealogy of 
Marxist thought attributes the failures of socialism to an inability to account for 
innumerable agendas and antagonisms within a system based on class allegiance. The 
emphasis on pluralism is therefore the defining feature of this critique and the focus for the 
subsequent reconstruction of left orientated politics. In this way they attempt to redefine a 
number of oppositions, most notably the left's emphasis on equality at the expense of 
liberty. Liberty in this sense is seen as the site of individual expression and is a notion that 
Laclau and Mouffe consistently see neglected within Marxist theory. However, this defence 
of liberty is not a defence of liberal rights. Just as the Marxist tendency towards 
equivalence is criticised, so the notion of `natural rights' is seen to produce `an absolute 
system of differences' that results in a similar totality (p. 182). 
Liberty is seen to be eroded by the creation of symbolic equivalence between 
differential groups; for example the demands of groups representing rough sleepers may be 
fundamentally opposed to those working with the single homeless in terms of the 
prioritisation of resources, even though both groups are working towards the eradication of 
homelessness. Equivalence therefore creates an aggregate identity, in this case that of 
homeless charities, which cannot represent the diverse needs of its constituent parts. 
Furthermore, this equivalence has to be accepted as `common sense' in order to be 
effective. In this way, Laclau and Mouffe echo Foucault (1994c) in seeing the construction 
of knowledge around accepted rules and norms as central to the project of establishing a 
temporary closure based on equivalence. 
However, whilst this equivalence of identities is seen to be something that can 
restrict the autonomy of individual positions, it is also seen to be a necessary requirement in 
challenging a hegemonic structure. In this sense, Laclau and Mouffe retain the Marxist 
emphasis on collective struggle by stressing the need for diverse groups to find some form 
of common ground in order for anti-hegemonic protest to be effective. 
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`It is only on this condition that struggles against power become truly democratic, 
and that the demanding of rights is not carried out on the basis of an individual 
problematic, but in the context of respect for rights to equality of other subordinated 
groups' (1985, p. 184). 
This relationship between equivalence and autonomy can be illustrated through two 
contrasting examples, the first being Caryl Churchill's play Top Girls (1991). The play 
shows the relationship between two sisters, Joyce, a single mother struggling to provide for 
her child on a low waged job and Marlene, a successful business woman. Debate between 
the two centres on the division between their respective notions of emancipation, as whilst 
Joyce represents individualism and speaks of her achievements as an example of the 
liberating power of a rights based discourse, Marlene consistently reminds her that her 
niece may not have the necessary attributes to achieve a similar career path. In this case 
Churchill is considering the relationship between socialism and feminism, arguing that 
isolated examples of achievement do not directly advance the position of the majority of 
women. Thus it is the lack of equivalence that is being attacked in this instance; the belief 
that the equality of women cannot be achieved through a system that accentuates a 
difference of outcomes. 
An example more directly relevant to homelessness was the formation of the Joint 
Charities Group (JCG), an umbrella organisation for a variety of groups working with the 
homeless. This group came together following the reduction of the re-housing duty applied 
to local authorities in the Local Government Act 1972 and was united against the 
government's position on homelessness. However, it was because of a need to retain this 
equivalence, as well the desire to maintain good relations with government, that a 
government draft bill was submitted rather than the JCG's own document. Consequently, 
the individual agendas present were subordinated to the cause of the group, with the 
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eventual result being the proposal of a bill that deviated considerably from the JCG's 
original agenda. 3 
Both examples illustrate the tension between the equivalence required to challenge a 
hegemonic position and the autonomy that is required for the expression of individual 
agenda's. Clearly there is a delicate balance between these two elements and as in the case 
of Laclau and Mouffe's model of identity formation, the crucial notion in this balance is 
that of overdetermination. The division between the equality of the left and the liberty of 
the right is seen to be an opposition that is never resolved and the prospect of dominance by 
one particular wing is seen to be partial, temporary solution that reflects the destabilised 
nature of liberal democracy. The emergence of alternative discourses that reveal the 
overdetermined nature of the hegemonic moment is precisely the moment that antagonisms 
can result between subordinated identities and more accepted positions. 
This phenomenon can be usefully illustrated by reference to the movement for 
women's suffrage. In this case, it was the notion of universal voting within a democracy 
that revealed the false equivalence between subject positions. The notion of a citizen 
possessing certain rights was subverted by the differential position of men and women with 
regard to the right to vote. This in turn had been supported by certain `common sense' 
assumptions surrounding the role of women in society, assumptions that were questioned 
by both the general campaign for universal suffrage and the specific demand for a vote for 
women in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was the establishment of an alternative 
discourse that revealed the overdetermined nature of the patriarchal subordination of 
women and established an antagonistic relationship. The net result of this relationship, the 
eventual establishment of equal voting rights in 1928, required a specific re-negotiation of 
the democratic idea of `the people'. 
Mouffe has clarified the political underpinnings of this position in a more recent 
work, The Democratic Paradox (Mouffe 2000). In this book Mouffe takes the basis of 
her 
theory from Schmitt's ideas on liberal democracy; a project that he believed would be 
destroyed by its internal contradictions. Schmitt sees the concepts of liberalism and 
3 For a more detailed account of this instance see page 97. 
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democracy as fundamentally incompatible due to the democratic need for an exclusive 
group- `the people'- as opposed to liberalism's focus on the universal values of humanity. 
However, whilst Schmitt sees the contradictory versions of equality in liberal and 
democratic models as ultimately jeopardizing the practice of democracy, Mouffe celebrates 
this tension. Taking on board Schmitt's observations about the contradictory nature of 
liberal democracy, she envisages a politics in which the universal rights of liberalism 
require the constant re-negotiation of notions of inclusion within a democracy. 
Thus, the first point concerning radical democracy is that it proposes a re-evaluation 
of the left's relationship with liberal concepts and institutions. This involves a discussion of 
the form of liberal democracy, as Laclau and Mouffe maintain that socialism itself is not 
`axiomic' with democracy and it is the apparatus and practices of the democratic state that 
allow the various protests and struggles that they document to emerge (Laclau 1990, p. 124). 
The liberal-democratic state has to be `defended and consolidated' rather than overthrown, 
as it is the divide between equality and liberty that allows the emergence of antagonism 
(Laclau 1990, p. 129). It is the contradictory nature of liberal democracy, the varied 
emergence of opposition between universalistic and particular ideals that is seen to be the 
site of the emergence of democratic practice. 
Radical Democratic Citizenship 
The central idea behind radical democracy, the recognition of varied and diverse 
struggles for the extension of political inclusion, requires a re-appraisal of individual's roles 
as citizens. Clearly the thesis that Laclau and Mouffe propose involves an expansion of the 
number of agendas to be considered in the democratic process. Mouffe (1992a, 1992b, 
1993a, 1993b, 1996,2000) has developed the radical democratic model of citizenship and 
attempted to clarify the exact relationship of this idea to political concepts and institutions. 
Consequently, this work provides a framework within which it is possible to see the 
relevance of concepts such as liberty and equality within a politics based on the 
impossibility of reconciling difference and equivalence. 
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The issue of the extent of citizenship is central to this project, as Mouffe's aim is to 
provide a theory of citizenship that stretches beyond a minimal conception of the citizen as 
a passive bearer of rights and provides a forum through which social and political inclusion 
can be negotiated. The starting point of this theory is a critique of both liberal and 
communitarian models of citizenship, centred on the potential of either perspective to allow 
for a conception of the social agent `not as a unitary subject, but as an articulation of an 
ensemble of subject positions' (Mouffe 1993a, p. 71). It is the recognition of this view of 
identity that Mouffe sees as vital in re-inventing citizenship as a more inclusive category. 
Concerns over the extent of citizenship and its potential for inclusion are not new. 
Marshall (1992) questioned whether citizenship effectively upheld class divisions; likewise 
Marx (1977) expressed scepticism over the concept itself, viewing the promise of equal 
legal rights as one which divided the public and private self. Such a tactic was seen to focus 
attention onto the public, legal claim for rights, whilst disguising the existence of a real 
source of power within the private sphere. However, whilst these criticisms are aimed at the 
idea of citizenship, Mouffe's objections are based on the various models of citizenship that 
have been debated in recent years. 
Laclau and Mouffe's long term project has been to present the theoretical 
underpinning for `renewal of the left wing project' and as such it is hardly surprising that 
Mouffe rejects the liberal conception of citizenship, even though the basis of radical 
democracy means the retention of liberal institutions (Mouffe 1992b, p. 2). Her opposition 
to liberalism is based on a conception of citizenship that is presented in purely legal terms, 
as a set of rights that individuals may use in order to further their private interests. This is 
central to the liberal doctrine; the belief that citizenship should maximise individual liberty 
through the protection of what are seen as natural rights, generally conceived in a negative 
manner as freedom from state interference. Therefore the state acts as a protector of rights, 
allowing individuals to prosper through their own efforts. Waldron (1993) has applied this 
perspective to construct an argument against the policing of those forced to live their daily 
lives in public spaces. Waldron reasons that rights have to be situated and by denying rough 
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sleepers access to public facilities (such as subways or public toilets), policy effectively 
blocks access to all other rights by denying the space in which to live. 
Mouffe takes issue with this perspective, citing communitarian critiques which 
attribute `the disintegration of social bonds and the growing phenomenon of anomie' to 
liberal doctrines (Mouffe 1993b, p. 80). This is turn is seen as result of liberalism's failure 
to provide guidance over the exercise of the rights that it protects, as Mouffe contends that 
the insistence on the neutrality of the state renders it unable to provide a political identity 
for its citizens. Equally, the focus on negative rights as freedom from coercion is seen to 
leave marginalized groups and individuals with few political avenues through which to 
better their position. With respect to Waldron's argument, such a critique would not take 
issue with the right to be free from intimidation or arrest in public space. The real problem 
lies in the extent of the rights bestowed on the individual; namely Waldron's presentation 
of rights in a purely negative light. Mouffe contends that those marginalized under existing 
modes of citizenship require more positive rights in order to negotiate their position within 
the political community. 
Conversely, whilst Mouffe takes issue with the liberal conception of a citizenship 
based exclusively on the protection of individual liberty, she also criticises the 
communitarian perspective for being too prescriptive. Mouffe's (1992b) objections to the 
communitarian conception of citizenship chiefly lie in the idea of organising a community 
around a universal idea of the `common good'. This she sees as an unsustainable project, as 
the use of citizenship as a common identity that overrides other associations is likely to 
suppress the interests and conflicting identities of the many individuals and groups that 
make up the community. Such an idea runs the risk of oppressing identities in order to 
adhere to a universal value that may, or may not, lead to the continued subjugation of 
identities. To relate this idea to the discussion of intentionality and priority need, the 
original justification for these categories was rooted in an idea of the common good; 
namely a fear that a universal `right to housing' would lead to the abuse of homeless policy 
by those trying `jump' waiting lists (Richards 1981). As we will see, the implementation of 
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these concepts can be viewed as exclusionary as those who fall outside of provision have 
little opportunity to renegotiate their position. 
This is central to the radical democratic conception of citizenship; that politics 
proceeds on the understanding that it is impossible to create a completely harmonious 
society and in fact, power is necessary in order for society to exist. This point relates back 
to Laclau's (1990) assertion that `destroying the hierarchies on which sexual or racial 
discrimination is based will, at some point, always require the construction of other 
exclusions for collective identities to be able to emerge' (p. 33). The central claim of radical 
democratic theory therefore places citizenship not as a set of rights bestowed on the 
individual prior to policy, but as a contested terrain in which individuals can posit their own 
claims. The tension between universal and particular ideas of citizenship is therefore not 
resolved, but accepted as the ground on which rights claims are contested. 
One prerequisite of this position is the `opening up' of political discourse, as to cite 
citizenship as an area of conflict is seen to constitute `a reinvigoration of the political 
sphere by making no questions unanswerable' (Rasmussen and Brown 2003, p. 176). This 
focus on inclusion relates back to Mouffe's central aim in formulating a theory of 
citizenship that offers the opportunity to overcome some of the exclusionary practices that 
lead to repression of certain social identities. Related to this point is that radical democratic 
theory locates this struggle not just between the varying interests of citizens, but also within 
individual's relationship to the political community. The question of identity formation 
becomes central in this context as Mouffe adheres to a model of identity that stresses a 
multiplicity of competing associations. Consequently it is not just competing group rights 
that have to be negotiated, the various associations and priorities of individuals have to be 
considered too. In this way the political realm becomes constitutive of both the competition 
between agents and the temporal practice of association that is central to Mouffe's model of 
identity formation. 
If we take these points together we can see a proposed expansion in the terms of 
citizenship, as well as an extension of the types of activity that constitute political 
involvement. Rather than being reduced to a neutral set of legal rights, citizenship becomes 
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a banner under which political and social negotiation takes place in both the public and 
private sphere. Redefining the boundaries of citizenship in this manner holds considerable 
potential for the inclusion of marginalized groups, as the borders of the political are 
expanded to include group based activity. For example, Rasmussen and Brown (2003) have 
applied this mode of thinking to the situations of those living with HIV and AIDS in 
Vancouver and hypothesised that events such as memorial exhibitions are implicitly 
political, as they show the tensions between state funded support groups, grass roots 
community organisations and families. These events were also educational for the wider 
community and generated funds for various support organisations, thus fulfilling a wider 
purpose of promoting awareness and enabling support networks to continue functioning. 
This application can be furthered to include various projects working with the homeless, 
particularly those that focus on activities such as music or the arts. Such activities may not 
be seen as explicitly political, but Mouffe's focus on inclusion and competition shows them 
as instrumental in defining political agendas, both for the group themselves and the wider 
community. 
Criticisms of Radical Democracy 
This chapter has focused on the theoretical framework originally developed within 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, as the critique of the totality of social structures has 
remained relatively consistent throughout both Laclau and Mouffe's subsequent work. 
However, whilst the proposition of radical democracy contained within this work sets the 
agenda for a type of politics based on plurality, it would be inaccurate to suggest that this 
concept has not been developed in recent years. Indeed at the time of publication this area 
of their work received substantial criticism within left-orientated journals, primarily 
because it was felt that Laclau and Mouffe could not adequately state how this hegemony 
of differential positions could be sustained. Forgacs (1998) summarises this response: 
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`Their notion of an open plural democracy depends crucially on maintaining an 
unstable equilibrium between different social agents without lapsing either into 
authoritarian centralisation or fragmentation. An attractive idea, but hard to see how 
it would work' (p. 35). 
This in turn relates to a more general critique, in that Laclau and Mouffe are clearly 
influenced by theories that can be loosely classified as post-structuralist. Consequently they 
are open to many of the criticisms that have been aimed towards the branches of theory 
with the `post' affix. The chief accusation levelled against such theories is that whilst they 
provide an admirable critique of exclusion, the logical conclusion of their position is that 
any judgement in policy is immediately destabilised by that which it excludes and thus 
open to the same criticisms as the position that it attempts to supplant. In relation to 
housing, King (2003) has argued against the anti-universalist nature of `post' theories 
stating that their relativist stance on ethics leaves them without the means to engage in 
politics, in that the abandonment of universal values leaves the theory with no grounds on 
which to judge whether one position is better than another. In other words, post- 
structuralism presents a metaphysical argument that cannot allow for any compromise from 
its initial position. 
These are important criticisms and deserve some consideration. In many ways the 
two criticisms are interrelated, as the very process of sustaining a hegemonic structure 
demands a universal point of reference in the same way that ethics require external criteria 
to be judged against. In terms of Laclau and Mouffe's notion of radical democracy two 
related points emerge from these criticisms. Firstly, in what way could any emergence of a 
hegemonic structure be sustained and accounted for theoretically? Secondly, in the absence 
of universal ethics, how could it be ensured that any emergence of a unifying principle was 
indeed ethical? 
The problem of sustaining a loose coalition of interests, such as that proposed by the 
theory of radical democracy, is considered in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Chiefly, 
this involves the institutionalisation of the tension between equivalence and difference, the 
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movement beyond institutions as the site of the `management of the social as positivity' 
and the recognition that political structures should recognise their constructed and 
precarious position (p. 191). However, this abstract reasoning leaves few clues as to how 
such a position could be effected and sustained, an omission that led Aronowitz (1998) to 
bemoan the lack of case studies in Laclau and Mouffe's work. Problematically Laclau and 
Mouffe's (1985) initial concept of radical democracy supplies a description of the type of 
political relations that radical democracy should aim to promote, but does not give a 
concrete example of how this model could be enacted. 
However, Mouffe (1992a) has proposed that these ties should be formulated around 
the idea of citizenship. As we have seen, her version of citizenship demands a re-appraisal 
of the relationship between the forms of acts that are deemed to be political. In this way she 
is following the feminist idea that the personal is political, as it is within the realms of the 
private that discursive norms are legitimised and enacted. However, she does not envisage a 
politics where this distinction becomes redundant, as to collapse the personal completely 
into the political is seen as a challenge to liberty. Instead there is a recognition that 
decisions taken in private have to be acted out in public. It is this `acting out' that is 
deemed to be the unifying principle, as it is done by accordance with the `ethico-political' 
principles that govern the democracy (p. 238). 
Mouffe (2000) has advanced this idea of `ethico-political' principles in order to 
show how the concept of ethics sits with pluralistic demands of radical democracy. In doing 
this she distances herself from the post-modernist conception of democracy as an `endless 
conversation', as such a position is seen to deny the antagonistic nature of politics (p. 129). 
This in turn results in the assumption that differences can somehow be reconciled or 
forgotten in a painless manner and a unity can emerge. 
For Mouffe this is an unrealistic position. The creation of unity is necessarily 
exclusive; it leads to the subordination of some identities and the possibility of antagonism. 
She proposes that the genuine ethical question is not how to formulate a universal formula, 
as `the multiplicity of ideas of the good is irreducible', but rather how to deal with the 
inevitable antagonism that results from temporary points of closure (p. 139). In this respect 
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the idea of ethics that is being advanced does indeed require `some limits to pluralism', as it 
is the practice of limiting, of forming consensus, that allows antagonism to challenge the 
legitimacy of these decisions (p. 134). Consequently ethics and politics are shown in 
separate spheres, one consistently testing the legitimacy of the other. 
The major criticisms that Laclau and Mouffe have received relate not to their model 
of social relations or their critique of Marxism, but instead to the alternate that they 
propose. In many ways the notion of radical democracy is one which cannot provide an 
alternative, as the necessary conditions for change that they identify are all present in the 
system of liberal-democracy. Instead, they concentrate on the forms of social relationships 
that have to be protected and increased; in this way what they are really proposing is an 
agenda for inclusion, coupled with a defence against authoritarian control. Mouffe's later 
work is helpful in this project, as she attempts to provide a concept of citizenship that 
allows for the development of a political community, whilst recognising the necessary 
limits that are placed on this community as an absolute totality. 
Major Points for the Study of Homelessness 
Consequently, the conception of social relations forwarded in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy remains relevant and it is this conception that will be considered in the 
subsequent analysis of homelessness. Indeed, it is precisely the aims of radical democracy, 
supported by Laclau and Mouffe's conception of social relations, which make it such an 
attractive and potentially useful tool for the analysis of homelessness. Most obviously, the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe offers a route past the impasse of structure/agency dualism. As 
seen in chapter 1, this dualism has represented a considerable obstacle to the analysis of 
homelessness, primarily because explanations rooted in either polarity are seen to offer an 
over-simplistic reading of the manner in which an individual becomes homeless. 
Homelessness cannot be reduced purely to a result of either coercive structural power or 
individual incompetence and any solutions based on either extreme are likely to be 
unreflective of social relations. In the following chapters, this dualism will be identified as 
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a central component of homeless policy, an indication of the manner in which previous 
research has been bound by the terms of official definitions of homelessness. 
However, to accept Radical democratic theory it is necessary to accept certain key 
propositions. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe present a relational theory in which identities are 
formed through reference to one another. As this section has shown, subject positions are 
temporarily constituted in opposition to a discursive `other', which negatively defines the 
identity. In this sense, Laclau and Mouffe site the emergence of meaning in a given context, 
rather than appealing to essential values, or concepts. 
The second proposition follows on from this, as if meaning is defined relationally 
through context, it is therefore unfixed and open to reassessment. In presenting this 
argument, Laclau and Mouffe accept the post-structuralist position with regard to 
totalization, in particular the Derridian notion of overdetermination. The idea that 
privileged positions are undermined by excluded elements is an attractive one for the study 
of homelessness, due to the possibilities that it presents. Laclau and Mouffe are careful not 
to underestimate entrenched political power and note that different groups may have to find 
equivalence with other like-minded groups in order to further their cause, such as in the 
earlier example of JCG. Consequently, in order to accept radical democratic theory, it is 
necessary to appreciate the possibility that antagonistic relationships can challenge existing 
hierarchies. 
The third proposition relates specifically to identity. Laclau and Mouffe adhere to a 
model of identity formation that stresses a diversity of associations for any one individual. 
Indeed, radical democratic theory proceeded on the understanding that multiple new social 
movements had made the goal of a class-based hegemony unsustainable. Individuals were 
likely to have interests beyond their concerns as member of a particular class, and as a 
result, any theory that failed to account for this multiplicity was likely to suppress 
individual liberty. In this instance, the issue of equivalence is also important, as whilst such 
a tactic may mean that some specific agendas are not pursued, this is deemed to be a 
worthwhile compromise in furthering a general political position. Therefore, in order to 
accept radical democratic theory, it necessary to accept that individuals have multiple 
82 
attachments to different causes, but may compromise on smaller details to pursue a wider, 
political agenda. 
If these conditions are accepted, then radical democratic theory offers an exacting 
critique of approaches to homelessness. In developing post-structuralist theory Laclau and 
Mouffe retain the positive aspects of this perspective, as identified by Neale (1997). The 
identification of meaning structured through binary opposition reveals the manner in which 
some identities, such as homeless identities, are excluded in relation to a privileged 
position. Neale's scepticism that post-structuralism, or post-modernism, can adequately 
address issues of structural power because of their focus on subjectivity is also addressed 
through the account of the formation of discourse. Chiefly this relates to overdetermination, 
the manner in which discourse produces truths about a given context through a precarious 
formation of equivalence. Thus discourse, although operating symbolically, produces a 
`real' effect in terms of bracketing together excluded identities against a privileged subject 
position. 
The conception of discourse as a structure destabilised by antagonism offers a view 
of power that is constructive as well as destructive and this offers the possibility of the re- 
formulation of discourse based on the affirmation of identities. Perversely, the view of 
discourse and discursively structured identities as negative (that is not fully constituted) 
concepts, offers the positive opportunity to restructure discourse through the 
encouragement of differential identities. The `voided' individual subject acts to disrupt 
boundaries and definitions formed by social and political power, a situation that holds 
profound implications for policy definitions of homelessness. In the following chapters the 
notion of antagonism as a force that disrupts the balance of hierarchies will be considered 
in relation to the changing definitions of homelessness, the manner in which the promotion 
of the interests of an excluded group can act to destabilise the terms of policy. 
Equally, the insistence that individuals can identify with a number of different 
identities reveals the impossibility of reducing a diverse group to a single, excluded 
identity. This is particularly relevant to homelessness, as a varied range of requirements and 
circumstances have to be considered in addressing housing need. Mouffe's (1992a, 1992b, 
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1993a, 1993b, 1996,2000) conception of citizenship allows for multiple associations, 
negotiated within the twin aims of liberty and equality. 
Consequently there are three main concepts that will be applied to examples in 
homelessness over the following chapters. Firstly, the notion of binary oppositions 
requiring an absolute judgement will be considered in relation to the conditional nature of 
homeless policy. The either/or nature of this framework will be seen to offer an un- 
reflexive policy that excludes individuals and cannot account for any diversity of 
experience. 
This is related to the second concept, concerning the position of normative 
boundaries, as the dividing line between deserving and undeserving identities will be 
shown to be overdetermined and therefore constructed according to the political and social 
conditions of their emergence. Both policy and parliamentary debates will be examined, as 
evidence of both the changing position of normative boundaries and the ideological 
influences that have led to their formation. This critique of the act of power required to 
form a binary definition will be applied in the following chapters with the expressed 
purpose of revealing the arbitrary distinction between deserving and undeserving identities 
in reference to historical examples of attitudes to homelessness. This idea will then be taken 
forward to more recent policy, to highlight the exclusion from the terms of citizenship that 
results an exclusive framework of this nature. 
Thirdly, the concept of antagonism will used in order to highlight the manner in 
which assumptions surrounding the homeless have an impact on both the nature of 
provision and the interpretation of policy. Antagonism will be considered as a force that 
both destabilises and constitutes identities, both in a positive or negative manner. Therefore 
stereotypes can be sustained or challenged by antagonism, and this will be seen to 
contribute to the contested nature of definitions. 
These concepts will not necessarily be applied in any particular order, but will be 
used in order to present a conception of discourse in which meaning is constantly re- 
negotiated and any objective measure of homelessness can be viewed as unsustainable. The 
next chapter will begin this analysis by considering the manner in which historical 
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perceptions of homelessness have belied this view and constructed deserving and 
undeserving subject positions. Following this initial examination of the historical 
development of approaches to homelessness, radical democratic theory will then be tested 
against modern policy. 
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Chapter 4- Judgement and Homelessness 
This chapter will consider one of the major charges levelled against homeless 
legislation; namely that it promotes and reflects a view of the homeless as a group that can 
be divided into cases that are either deserving or undeserving of assistance. This accusation 
is one that has been levelled against many legislative approaches to more general forms of 
poverty, as well as specifically to homelessness and dates back to the original formation of 
the Poor Laws. However, several writers have contended that although the 
deserving/undeserving view of the poor is generally associated with the Victorian era, more 
recent approaches to policy have retained the judgmental aspects of the New Poor Law 
system (Jacobs et al 1999, Somerville 1999). Consequently, modern homelessness policy 
has been seen to uphold similar assumptions about the homeless to those that existed two 
hundred years previously. 
This chapter will attempt to develop the implications of this division, considering 
the discursive conditions of its emergence as a prelude to a discussion of the claim that a 
conditional approach to homelessness survived in the formation of the Housing (Homeless 
Persons) Act 1977. This act is generally seen as providing the framework for the current 
legislative approach to homelessness and it developed the three conditional categories that 
remain the cornerstone of homeless legislation. It was exceptional as the first piece of 
legislation to be specifically concerned with homeless people and it is undeniable that its 
passing represented a huge addition to existing provision for the homeless. However, the 
completed act differed considerably from the proposals for the original private members 
bill, and it was this discrepancy that has led several writers to question the extent to which 
the bill was `watered down' in order to pacify opponents of a more comprehensive and 
therefore costly provision. The particular charge levelled against the act, that in its amended 
form it upheld the `deserving/undeserving' conception of the poor that had been seen to 
characterise Victorian approach to poverty, will be examined in this and subsequent 
chapters. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the construction of identities involves a 
necessarily excluded position, in this case `undeserving' applicants, which acts to both 
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affirm and undermine more privileged positions. In the context of this study it is the 
discursive construction of excluded positions that is of most interest, both in the manner 
that such positions are maintained and the reasons for excluding one particular group rather 
than another. The work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Laclau (1990) and Mouffe (2000) 
shows both the manner in which such exclusions are upheld and the precarious nature of 
this division. This chapter will apply this thinking to some of the dominant concerns in 
literature on homelessness and show how a binary nature of structural and agency based 
explanations of homelessness presents a polarised view of deserving or undeserving 
individuals in policy. 
This chapter will begin by presenting an overview of the deserving/undeserving 
opposition and consider its relationship with homeless policy. This section will attempt to 
define this opposition and consider its relationship to the theories of identity documented in 
previous chapters, highlighting the work of contextually specific discursive formations in 
maintaining such a separation. Having shown the importance of context in this framework, 
some historical examples of the different ways in which undeserving individuals have been 
constructed will be considered. Specifically this section will look at the initial emergence of 
the deserving/undeserving opposition, as documented in various literatures, examining the 
different labels that have been attributed to the homeless. This chapter will then conclude 
and lead into a discussion of the framework of the 1977 Act over the next three chapters. 
Deserving/Undeserving Positions in Discourse 
Initially it is important to be clear about what this division is and how its fits into 
the theoretical framework that has been developed above. The `deserving/undeserving' 
opposition is strongly linked to the structure/agency paradigm that has been discussed in 
the previous chapters. This association is one that can be attributed to culpability, the extent 
to which an individual can be judged responsible for their own position. As we have seen 
this relates to the contrasting influence of structure and agency on the formation of 
identities, as to consider an individual as a passive victim of social forces is to reduce 
considerably their own influence on their housing situation, whilst to consider identity as a 
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self-created phenomenon leaves little room for external influence and can lead to the 
`undeserving' label. In the previous chapter I presented an account of social relations and 
the formation of identity that attempted to question this polarity, the task from here is to test 
this theory against examples in policy and consider the extent to which legislation acts as a 
fixing mechanism in homeless discourse. 
It is also important to note that the deserving/undeserving opposition can refer to 
both the technical mechanisms in policy, the manner in which tangible judgements are 
made against homeless people (for example, Lowe 1997) and the wider discourse that 
surrounds the homeless and thus influences policy (for example, Liddiard 1999). The 
deserving/undeserving opposition has therefore been identified in both legalistic accounts 
of homelessness that examine the actual judgement that has to be made against homeless 
people and more discursive investigations that look at the influence of general assumptions 
and stereotypes about the homeless. The importance of this division lies in its effects; 
namely the exclusion through legislation of a significant proportion of the homeless 
population from provision. However, it is through the creation of discourse surrounding 
social issues such as homelessness that policy is justified and the duality is upheld. 
Therefore, the legalistic and discursive are inter-linked, coming together to form a general 
discourse around the context. Several studies have attempted to show the explicit links 
between this and ideological positions of governments; for example Daly (1996) notes that 
reference to this dualism has invariably produced state responses that attempt to enforce 
distinctions between deserving and undeserving cases, with an emphasis on the exclusion 
of the latter. More specifically, Jacobs et al (1999) consider the shift from a structuralist 
position, characterised by the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 and a more 
minimalist, narrow definition of homelessness contained within Housing Act 1996. 
Crucially, such shifts in policy are considered in relation to both political ideology and the 
discursive formations that provide a justification for ideological positions. The dominant 
conception of what constitutes a deserving individual is therefore seen to be instrumental in 
the eventual writing of legislation and a product of both dominant assumptions about the 
characteristics of the homeless and an ideological position concerning the proper role of 
government in providing assistance to individuals. The discursive construction of 
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undeserving individuals is governed by different factors at different historical moments and 
within different discursive contexts. 
The time-specific nature of assumptions about the homeless immediately suggests a 
parallel with the work of Foucault (1972), in particular the manner in which knowledge is 
constructed around a given subject. Foucault's historicized accounts emphasise that 
phenomenon such as homelessness exist in a material sense, but that meaning is produced 
within discourse at any given historical moment. Therefore, although the physical condition 
of being homeless (in its absolute roofless sense, rather than in terms of policy definitions 
which are bounded by discursively produced knowledge) retains a consistent meaning, 
knowledge about the homeless is constructed within discourse. Watson (1999) has begun to 
apply these arguments to the case of women and homelessness, although her work has 
focused on the manner in which the bodies of female rough sleepers represent a challenge 
to housed women; `a reminder to all women of what they might become if they step out of 
line' (p. 96). Watson's use of Foucault therefore takes the form of an exploratory 
investigation into the politics of representation within social space rather than looking at the 
changing meanings of homelessness specific to institutions across time. 
As stated in the previous chapter, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) concur with Foucault's 
position on the manner in which knowledge is constructed within discursive formations. In 
common with Foucault, they see meaning generated within given contexts, although they 
reject the distinction that he makes between discursive and non-discursive practices. For 
example, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) refer to Foucault's conception of institutions as non- 
discursive, but Laclau and Mouffe maintain that it is inconsistent to retain a model of 
institutions that discards the possibility that they are affected by the conditions that 
Foucault identifies in discursive formations. Thus, in Laclau and Mouffe's theory discourse 
includes both institutions and articulately practices; although variations may be subtle, 
discourse itself consists of practices from both institutional and wider social settings, 
specific to given historical contexts. 
Consequently Laclau and Mouffe share Foucault's rejection of a linear view of 
history. However, this emphasis on the discontinuity of discourse across history does not 
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mean that the division between deserving and undeserving individuals identified in 
homeless literature is redundant, as to entirely remove this dichotomy welfare policy would 
have to either apply universally and in a uniform manner, or be disbanded completely. 
Instead discontinuity implies that the distinction itself is modified through time, with the 
conception of an undeserving individual changing according to the dominant discursive 
features of a given historical period. For example, Pleace (2000) identifies a trend for rough 
sleeping to be connected with deviance, both in the public consciousness and in the Social 
Exclusion Unit's report on rough sleeping. In the same way Woodbridge (2001) points to 
the existence of a `rogue literature' in the Elizabethan period that created an image of the 
homeless as a highly organised criminal group, which both presented a number of false 
assumptions about the homeless and helped to justify punitive government measures 
against vagrancy. Although both of these accounts stress the links between homelessness 
and deviancy, it would be inaccurate to claim that there is a direct connection between the 
two, as such position would underestimate the extent to which the definition of 
homelessness and the nature and threat of deviancy differs between historical periods. 
It is therefore necessary to be cautious when considering the extent to which there is 
a direct lineage between Elizabethan or Victorian attitudes to homelessness and the 
eventual formation of conditional categories within the 1977 Act; as Lund (1996) notes, our 
current perceptions of homelessness differ vastly from those present in the 19th century. 
However, certain themes regarding the construction of undeserving individuals remain 
consistent and have been identified across different literatures. In this way Foucault (1972) 
has stated that the unity of discourse emerges not from reference to a fully constituted 
object, but from `the rules of formation' of discourse; `the interplay of the rules that define 
the transformations of these different objects, their non-identity through time, the break 
produced in them, the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence' (p. 36). 
Consequently it is the manner in which undeserving individuals are constructed by different 
criterion and indeed the belief that it is viable to treat some individuals as undeserving, that 
is of interest in forming a picture of how discourse excludes certain positions. This may be 
achieved by reference to different agendas through different discourses or time periods, for 
example the emphasis on morality in institutions such as the Salvation Army, or on 
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environmental hygiene in the context of the sanitary reforms of the Victorian era, but it is 
the emergence of an exclusion based on discursive formations that remains consistent. 
The following section will provide an overview of some of these agendas and begin 
to map the conditional attitudes to homeless provision and the discursive that eventually 
surfaced in a similar form within the framework of the 1977 Act. In presenting this 
material, it should be stressed that the aim of this chapter is to present an overview of 
thematic concerns related to the rules of formation of discourse, rather than a detailed 
historical account. Clearly an historical overview of any relevance would demand more 
space than is available in this chapter and as Jacobs (2001) has noted, it is important to be 
aware of the limitations of research when looking at historical material. Instead, the 
remainder of this chapter will seek to highlight some major contexts that the 
deserving/undeserving opposition has been identified in, as well as the formation of 
assumptions about the homeless that have justified its existence. 
This will begin with a consideration of the manner in which the homeless have been 
presented as a deviant population, both in terms of a threat to social order that demands a 
directly repressive response and as a justification for reduced provision. Secondly the 
emergence of a judgement based on morality, primarily in the Victorian era will be 
considered. Central to this analysis will be the discontinuous nature of discourse in this 
context, as whilst a moralistic agenda undoubtedly existed at this time, a considerable body 
of opinion stressed more structural causal factors in the continuation of homelessness. 
Finally, the move towards a genuinely structural view of homelessness in the 1970's will be 
highlighted as a prelude to the analysis of the three conditional categories contained in the 
eventual legislation. 
Homelessness, Deviancy and Political Unrest 
Even before the advent of a specific homeless policy, the homeless were generally 
viewed with fear and suspicion. The image of the homeless as a deviant population, a threat 
to the social order, first provoked legislation that prescribed the surveillance of vagrants in 
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1383 as a direct response to peasant's revolt of 1381. However, the connection between 
homelessness and deviance remains to the present day; Pleace (2000), Carlen (1996) and 
Daly (1996) have all identified a tendency for governments to portray the homeless, 
particularly rough sleepers, as a deviant population. The sense in which deviance is seen as 
a justification for the undeserving label varies considerably according to context. Firstly 
there is some evidence of a directly repressive response to a perceived threat from the 
unsettled poor in the Elizabethan era. It is in this context that both Beier and Woodbridge 
(2001) place the Elizabethan attitude to vagrancy and whilst their conclusions differ in 
several areas, official over-reaction to both scale and nature of vagrancy emerges as a 
consistent theme. 
In order to find a time when the poor, particularly the homeless poor, were not 
stigmatised in this way, Beier (1985) goes all the way back to the Middle Ages and the 
Franciscan belief that `beggars were holy' (p. 4). The reasons for the breakdown of this 
viewpoint are varied, but in general Beier attributes the shift to a more critical view of the 
homeless to a gradual growth in the scale of poverty. The chronology of historical events 
would tend to support this position. Firstly, although the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
saw the overall population fluctuate as a result of both the Black Death and various wars, 
the numbers of people in poverty rose steadily. Secondly, the impact of both disease and 
political uprising had a considerable effect on the social structure of Britain. The fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries are littered with examples of uprising, by the Scots and the Welsh as 
well as the aforementioned peasant revolt. The combined effects of these events led to a 
gradual break up of manorialism and the poor slowly acquired greater freedoms. However, 
the breaking of manorial ties also brought its own dangers, as whilst the poor could now 
sell their labour, they were also increasingly open to fluctuations in the economy. It was in 
this context of enhanced freedoms and growing hardship that the potentially volatile nature 
of the poor became recognised. 
Beier contends that by the sixteenth century the problem of the idle, able bodied 
poor had become central to officials and the fear of the influence of `masterless men' 
demanded coercive action. He documents a number of measures against vagrants, including 
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the use of martial law and proposals to send the able-bodied poor, including vagrants, 
overseas to work in the colonies. Transportation became a common theme in the reign of 
Elizabeth I; significantly vagrants were sent to work for colonial masters in a system that 
resembled the manorial framework of the Middle Ages (see Beier 1985, pp. 146-170). 
Beier attributes this harsher legislation to the growth of the number of people in poverty 
rather than any specific change of attitude, such as a `protestant ethic' stigmatising the able- 
bodied poor. Indeed, he analyses official measures against vagrancy in terms of their 
effectiveness in resolving the problem as it was perceived at the time. Thus, he is able to 
conclude that policy, although `inhumane and repressive', succeeded in its aim of 
containing the threat posed by the mobile poor (p. 5). 
However Woodbridge (2001), although drawing substantially on Beier's study, 
presents a more critical view of the Elizabethan period. Woodbridge's work is interesting in 
this context, as it seeks to explore what she sees as a `bizarre lack of fit' between 
contemporary representations of the homeless and historical, statutory records (p. 2). In 
particular, she attempts to investigate why legislation against the homeless appeared to 
overstate both the demographic scale and potential threat of the vagrant population. In this 
sense she presents a more interpretive view of the Elizabethan period, questioning the 
extent to which vagrants were a genuine political force. What is of interest here is manner 
in which discursive representations of the homeless were formed, as well as the extent to 
which they influenced both public perceptions of the issue and more importantly, the 
legislative response of governments. This approach, although `new historicist' due to its 
literary focus, shows a considerable debt to Foucault primarily because of its scepticism 
towards accepted versions of history. Woodbridge claims that `some of the assumptions 
about vagrant life long discredited by historians keep cropping up in scholarly writing- 
even historical writing' and attributes this to a reliance on contemporary literary material in 
the absence of other forms of historical records (p. 6). What is of particular interest to her is 
the extent to which `rogue literature', popular novels depicting the homeless as part of a 
deviant underworld, continues to inform our present day perceptions of homelessness in 
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this period. 4 She sees this genre as `the tabloids of its day', fostering a number of 
characteristics that represented the homeless as morally and politically subversive and more 
importantly, organized into distinct factions (p. 4). This account differs considerably to 
official documentation detailing the scale and nature of homelessness and Woodbridge 
explicitly denounces many of the myths that concerned vagrancy in this period. Of 
particular interest in this section is the extent to which Woodbridge sees an overestimation 
of the potential for the `idle' poor, especially the un-rooted vagrant population, to become 
political agitators. Such a conception is viewed as a misrepresentation, particularly as the 
recognised leaders in major uprisings, for example `The Rising in the North of 1569', were 
members of the settled poor (pp. 7-8). 
Discursive representations of the homeless in the Elizabethan period would seem 
therefore to encourage an image of deviancy at odds with reality. In this context the harsh 
legislative measures to combat homelessness can be seen as a response to the perceived 
threat to moral and social order. Woodbridge qualifies this by stating that it was not so 
much the immediate threat of vagrants that concerned governments, but rather that they 
appeared to cause concern across different discourses. Thus vagrants became targets, not 
because `they were the big bogeymen, but because they were everybody's bogeymen' 
(p. 13, my emphasis). 
However, whereas the Elizabethan attitude to the homeless can be characterised by 
a fear of the unruly idle poor, the onset of industrialisation reveals a second strand to the 
construction the undeserving position, that of morality. This does not mean that criminality 
of the homeless was not perceived, but merely that view of the undeserving poor shifted 
focus. Despite this, references to the potential threat of the un-housed poor occurred, such 
as this reference to the part played by chiffoniers (those who lived by using and selling 
what they could find amongst refuse) in provoking unrest in Paris: 
4 Interestingly, Beier notes that this genre of literature was pioneered in Britain by the translation of Sebastian 
Brandt's The Ship of Fools (1508), the same book that Foucault discusses in Madness and Civilisation 
(1967). 
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`They are like all men who live under such circumstances, prone to indulgence in 
ardent spirits; being degraded and savage, they are ready to throw away their lives 
on every occasion. There are nearly 2000 chiffoniers alone in Paris and they and the 
water carriers were conspicuous actors in the revolution of 1830... I believe that 
were the refuse of houses daily cast into the street in London in the same manner as 
in Paris, London would soon have as large and as dangerous population of 
chiffonier class' (Chadwick 1842, pp. 93-95). 
In spite of such instances, the industrial era and particularly the Victorians began to 
focus on deviancy in the form of the immorality of the undeserving poor. Thus, if the 
homeless became constructed as a threat it was generally to social morals, public sanitation 
and economic output rather than political structures. The appearance of the New Poor Law 
announced a second sense in which moral deviance could be used to defend exclusion; the 
fear that legislation could be manipulated by applicants in order to receive provision ahead 
of more `deserving' individuals. The following section will consider this change. 
Homelessness and the Different Contexts of Morality 
As noted above, the undeserving homeless are those deemed to be culpable in their 
own housing situation. In current legislation they are those who are not considered to be in 
priority need, or those who are seen to have made themselves homeless intentionally and 
therefore compromised their claim to assistance. Historically, as we have seen, this 
exclusion is based on the application of a criterion of eligibility that demands applicants 
meet certain standards in order to qualify for provision. In turn, this criterion determines 
eligibility by granting assistance to those who are seen to be homeless through no fault of 
their own, either because of individual vulnerability or personal circumstance. 
Within the literature on homelessness a number of different factors have been 
identified in explaining exclusion; most frequently the distinction between undeserving and 
deserving cases has been made on moral grounds. Cowan (1997) supports this point stating 
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that homeless policy `has always required us to oppress the homeless by making moral 
judgements, not about their housing need, but about why the homeless became homeless in 
the first place' (p. 21). Moral failing has therefore frequently been identified as a 
justification for the exclusion of homeless individuals, both from access to provision (as in 
current policy), or from the rights of citizenship. 
Watson and Austerberry (1986) claim that prior to the industrial revolution the 
homeless were not significantly stigmatised; a contention that assumes that the creation of 
the deserving/undeserving agenda was Victorian (p26). Other accounts (Somerville 1994, 
Lowe 1997) also identify the growth of conditional approaches to homeless in this period, 
particularly with regard to the `New Poor Law' of 1834 and its more punitive approach to 
poverty than had existed previously. Under this legislation the homeless were one of many 
groups who were under discussion and Scott claims this policy consciously stigmatised the 
disadvantaged. Scott (1994) quotes Digby on the politics of selection for the workhouse: 
"Those groups whose destitution was seen to be the result of individual moral 
failing- feckless adults such as the mothers of illegitimate children or vagrants- were 
given indoor relief in the workhouse. Other groups- widows, the temporarily 
disabled, the old - were seen as retaining their respectability since their poverty was 
not perceived as avoidable. These groups were not usually relieved in the 
workhouse. " (p. 8, my emphasis. ) 
The notion of the homeless as individuals in need of moral correction is a common one and 
frequently associated with the Victorian era. This idea, firmly rooted in individualistic 
explanations of homelessness, constructs individuals as undeserving for the reason that they 
have fallen below the moral standards expected of citizens. This individualistic conception 
maintains that individuals who fallen below this moral standard cannot reasonably expect 
assistance. 
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However, it is far from clear that this judgement of morality was an exclusively 
Victorian creation. Lowe (1997) qualifies the focus on the Victorian construction of 
deserving/undeserving opposition stating that the `old' Poor Law system was in no way 
generous, but the majority of homeless literature focuses on a period which began with 
amended Poor Law of 1834. Both Biere (1985) and Woodbridge (2001) refer to the 
perceived immorality of Vagrants in the 17th and 18th centuries; the `tabloid-style fantasies' 
concerning the immoral habits of the homeless (Woodbridge 2001, p. 9). What 
distinguished the Victorian era from previous historical periods was the advent of the New 
Poor Law and the institutionalisation of existing attitudes regarding the undeserving poor. 
This coupled with punitive principle of `less eligibility' lead Isin and Wood (1999) to note 
that `the Poor Laws and Factory Acts demonstrated that one could rely on the state's 
protection only when one abandoned one's civil and political rights' (p. 27). Thus, the 
perception that some individuals were undeserving of assistance because of their social or 
moral failing contributed to their loss of citizenship rights through the enactment of state 
policy. 
In this context it is the idea of a moral citizen that becomes central. Evidently we 
are not dealing with a clearly defined notion of morality, but rather one that was informed 
by a number of different discourses. Thus homeless literature contains references to the 
morality of cramped housing conditions, the political menace of the homeless and the threat 
to urban hygiene by the housed and un-housed poor throughout the sanitary reforms of the 
19th century. Morality in this sense is a construct that appears in a variety of different 
contexts and it should be noted that undeserving, `immoral' individuals were likely to be 
constructed in a variety of different ways. 
One of the ways that this division was enforced, both in terms of discursive 
formations and legislative impact, was through the campaigns for sanitary reform that 
dominated approaches to urban living in the 19th century. These campaigns, characterised 
by the work of reformers such as Chadwick and Kay-Shuttleworth, were based on an 
overwhelming desire to rid urban areas of conditions likely to lead to epidemics and 
recount the living conditions that allowed disease to prosper. In this context the issue of 
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preventing epidemics was seen as inextricably linked to ensuring sanitary living conditions 
for the poor, both in terms of the dwellings themselves and the cleanliness of the streets that 
surrounded them. However, whilst the object of reform was ostensibly the environmental 
conditions of urban areas, much of the literature that documents the living conditions of the 
poor contains distinctly moral overtones. 
One such example of this is Chadwick's Sanitary Report (1842). In this document a 
separate section is reserved for the residences of those who `traverse the country from one 
end to the other, and spread physical pestilence, as well as moral deprivation' (Chadwick, 
1842, p. 358). Whilst the majority of the report focuses on the effect of environment on 
behaviour and presents a case for reform based on improving living conditions for the poor, 
the homeless are considered in a separate section entitled Common Lodging Houses. This 
was not originally part of the enquiry, but Chadwick was persuaded as to its relevance by 
the possibility of disease being spread through the community by the transient population. 
The conditions in such establishments were the subject of official scrutiny 
throughout the 19th century and in many cases considerable concern was expressed for the 
moral well-being of inhabitants. For example: 
`We find it stated in Mr Burgess's return, that in 47 of these (lodging houses) the 
sexes indiscriminately sleep together. In the daytime the doors of these houses are 
generally thronged with dirty, half dressed women and children; and if visited in an 
evening, the inmates are found to be eating, drinking and smoking. ' (Chadwick 
1842, p. 357) 
Watson and Austerberry (1986) contend that `it was women who were constantly 
mentioned in discussions of these `dens of vice' and quote Mayhew (1851) to support their 
case. However, whilst homeless women were disproportionately highlighted in reports 
detailing immoral conditions within lodging houses, Chadwick's report details a disdain for 
the morality of residents of lodging houses in general. In this case it was not only the sexual 
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behaviour of the homeless that raised concerns, but also the perceived idleness reported by 
many of Chadwick's medical officers. It is in this context that the issue of vagrancy and the 
`idle' poor again becomes central and Chadwick presented the residents of lodging houses 
as receiving fraudulent medical assistance and dodging the workhouse by inventing 
fictitious professions. In Chadwick's report these are the uncontrollable elements of society 
and their very presence threatens to disrupt the program that he was attempting to 
introduce. 
`The greater number of these persons shelter themselves from apprehension and 
punishment under the Vagrant Act, by professing to be match sellers. This is made a 
cloak for begging alms, and the pretext for going from house to house, and pilfering 
as the opportunity offers' (p. 364) 
What is interesting about this document is the split between the main body of the 
report, which is generally sympathetic to the material causes of poverty, and the section 
reserved for common lodging houses. Indeed, Hamlin (1998) notes that Chadwick faced 
considerable opposition from many in government precisely because his general views on 
the impact of living conditions on poverty were felt to be contrary to the agenda of the New 
Poor Law. 
The Poor Law was intended to automatically deflect potential claimants of relief 
back to the labour market to accept the prevailing wage ... The presence of any 
destitution was an embarrassment; it showed that the balance had not been found, 
that the terror of the workhouse was too successful' (p. 90). 
Therefore Chadwick's views were treated with caution because they were not felt to 
highlight individual causal factors enough. Chadwick's focus on the impact of sanitation on 
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the living and working conditions of poor was seen to undermine the Poor Law system and 
propose that poverty was something other than a result of individual failing. 
This focus makes it all the more surprising that Chadwick abandons this perspective 
only for the section on common lodging houses. In this sense the report presents a `violent 
hierarchy' of the most overt type, as whilst the housed, working poor are presented as 
deserving of better conditions, those residing in common lodging houses are depicted as 
idle, immoral and a threat to the sanitary conditions surrounding their temporary home. 
Primarily, the housed working poor are presented as deserving because of their importance 
to industry; Chadwick frequently presents the benefits of sanitary reform in stark, economic 
terms. Conversely, the case presented for the reform of lodging houses can be seen to invert 
the overall thematic concerns of the Sanitary Report. Far from documenting the effects of 
environment on behaviour, Chadwick was effectively spelling out the effects of the 
behaviour of those in lodging houses on the environment of the labouring population. The 
lack of morals and the unsanitary practices that emanate from lodging houses are portrayed 
as unhealthy influences on the wider community and the individuals responsible are seen to 
be undeserving of the little assistance granted to them. 
The legislative impact of this act differed according to this division. The sanitary 
measures that made up the bulk of the report were in part implemented by the Public 
Health Act 1848, which went some way towards ensuring a clean water supply and sewage 
system (Finer 1952). In contrast, Chadwick's solution to the perceived problem of common 
lodging houses consisted of a licensing scheme, requiring regular inspections of the 
establishment and this measure was eventually adopted by Lord Shaftbury's Common 
Lodging Houses Acts 1851 and 1853. Consequently, this example illustrates a discursive 
influence on a more intrusive policy aimed specifically towards the un-housed, and more 
importantly, unemployed poor. 
Whilst this example shows a direct, repressive enforcement of 
deserving/undeserving opposition against the homeless, Watson and Austerberry (1986) 
document the effect of policy on social attitudes and the opposition that the official stance 
provoked. Watson and Austerberry are specifically concerned with the position of single, 
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homeless women in the Victorian era and the manner in which dominant attitudes as to the 
role of women in the home served to marginalize those without housing, or indeed family. 
In one such example they consider the extent to which the Poor Law system of `less 
eligibility' coupled with the wretched conditions within casual wards, led many woman to 
seek alternative forms of income through begging or prostitution. A situation is described 
in which economic hardship led to stigmatisation; single women were treated with 
suspicion and could often only find accommodation in the worst common lodging houses, 
due in part to many landlords reluctance to take in poor, single women. 
Watson and Austerberry's focus is on the position of homeless women, but many of 
the trends towards an exclusion of the homeless on moral grounds can apply to Victorian 
homelessness in general. This analysis is also interesting because of its focus on resistance 
to what they see as the `blame-orientated and moralistic approach which was rife at the 
time' (p. 41). In contrast to the majority of accounts of homelessness in the 19th century, 
which tend to focus on the punitive measures contained in the New Poor Law, they 
document a considerable opposition to legislation that appeared to stigmatise the homeless, 
particularly homeless women. In particular, they consider organisations that began to 
recognise structural causes of homelessness and campaign for increased provision for 
women. 
One such example was the frequently criticised Salvation Army. This organisation 
is often cited in accounts of homelessness as an example of the moralistic stance adopted 
by the Victorians, primarily because the emphasis placed on religion and the moral `reform' 
of the individual (Neale 1997, p. 53). Their charitable provision of accommodation is 
generally portrayed as a strict regime, conditional on the behaviour of residents. Orwell 
(1989) provides perhaps the most famous account of the accommodation, albeit from the 
1920's: 
"At seven another whistle blew, and the officers went round shaking those who did 
not get up at once. Since then I have slept in a number of Salvation Army shelters, 
and found that, though the different houses vary a little, this semi-military discipline 
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is the same in all of them ... The 
fact is that the Salvation Army are so in the habit of 
thinking themselves a charitable body that they cannot even run a lodging-house 
without making it stink of charity" (p. 159). 
Watson and Austerberry accept the moral hierarchy at the centre of this charge, but point to 
the influence of General Booth in the formation of the Salvation Army's policy. His 
emphasis on the moral was tempered by the early admission of structural causes in the roots 
of homelessness and a belief that material conditions played an important part in 
homelessness, as well as more behavioural aspects (for a full account see Watson and 
Austerberry pp. 35-7). 
Such examples illustrate that certain groups refused to recognise dominant attitudes 
towards the homeless and that several organisations sought to assist the homeless through 
both the provision of accommodation and repeal of repressive legislation. This is not to 
underestimate the considerable difficulties faced by the homeless in the Victorian era, or to 
underplay the extent to which the Poor Law system treated the un-housed poor as 
undeserving because of their perceived immorality. However, Watson and Austerberry's 
focus on the opposition to both dominant attitudes and government legislation demonstrates 
the `overdetermined' nature of discourse, as it was the presence of this opposition that 
precluded the possibility of unified discourse concerning the morality of the homeless and 
led to the development of, in Laclau and Mouffe's terms, antagonistic relationships 
between legislators and reforming groups. To refer back to Watson and Austerberry's 
earlier example of homeless women working as prostitutes, it was the intervention of a 
considerable body of opposition that eventually led to the repeal of the Contagious 
Diseases Acts 1864,1866 and 1869. This legislation required women working as prostitutes 
to register with the police and undergo regular medical examinations. Watson and 
Austerberry note that in practice this reduced the chances of women finding alternative 
employment, as once a woman had been registered it became difficult `to have her name 
removed unless she left the area or married' (p. 34). Opposition to this legislation stressed 
both the structural reasons behind the decision to work in this area, as well as the 
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stigmatising effect that registration had on the choices available to individual women. Thus 
it was the antagonistic relationship between campaigners, who met over 900 times between 
1870 and 1885, and officials that forced the eventual repeal of this legislation and 
renegotiated the opposition between deserving and undeserving individuals in this area. 
It is therefore difficult to trace an absolute thematic consistency to the notion of 
morality in the deserving/undeserving opposition. Where there is some continuity is in the 
notion of conditionality itself and more importantly, in the tangible exclusion of 
undeserving individuals. Foucault's notion of discourse as a discontinuous system unified 
by `rules of formation' applies neatly to this construction of undeserving individuals in the 
varied contexts of morality and demonstrate that whilst an object of discourse is re- 
constructed constantly, it is the overall framework that consistently produces new 
exclusions. In the next chapter I will develop this framework to look at the beginnings of 
homeless legislation, specifically the formation of the priority need category. 
Summary 
This chapter has attempted to provide a theoretical and contextual overview of the 
development of deserving/undeserving conceptions of the homeless poor. Initially 
Foucault's (1972) notion of discourse as discontinuous system in which normative 
boundaries change across time was seen to be helpful in this task, whilst his conception of 
`rules of formation' which states that whilst the content of discourse may change, the 
overall framework remains the same, was seen to fit in with Laclau and Mouffe's focus on 
the permeable, but not destructible, boundaries of exclusion. This notion was considered to 
be useful in documenting the different constructions of undeserving positions. 
To illustrate this, two examples were provided. The focus on the deviancy of 
vagrants in Elizabethan England was seen to be an example of the formation of a 
differentiated and feared `other', this formation provoking a coercive response in 
legislation. Secondly, the focus on the perceived immorality of the poor in the Victorian era 
was seen to inform a variety of repressive responses, from the New Poor Law, to the 
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differentiated attitude to the homeless within the sanitary campaigns. However, the 
contested nature of exclusionary boundaries was illustrated through reference to a number 
of movements that sought to advance the position of the homeless in a directly antagonistic 
relationship with legislators. 
The common element to these examples regards the theme of conditionality, the 
manner in which assistance to the homeless was only granted if the individual fulfilled 
certain criteria. This provides a `rule of formation' for this discourse, as whilst normative 
boundaries have been seen to change across time, this overall framework has remained 
intact. Thus whilst there have been different conceptions of an individual who is deserving 
of assistance, what has remained consistent is the exclusion of those who are deemed to be 
unworthy. 
This theme of conditionality will be seen to continue into more modern legislation 
and will be discussed more fully over the next three chapters. Chapter 5 will begin this 
analysis by examining the initial emergence of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 
and the manner in which this conditional framework came to form the bedrock of homeless 
policy. In particular this framework will be analysed with relation to the category of 
priority need and Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) critique of binary oppositions will be 
applied. 
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Chapter 5- Priority Need 
The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 was the first piece of legislation aimed 
specifically at re-housing homeless people and its framework remains the basis for policy 
in the present day. As such its achievements are numerous; it provided an official stamp to 
the growing belief that homelessness was not simply a result of individual pathology, it 
placed a duty on local authorities to re-house those deemed to be homeless and it 
effectively created a `right' to housing for those accepted as homeless. 
However, it can also be claimed that the Act created homelessness as the social 
phenomenon that we know today. This initially seems a harsh judgement for a piece of 
legislation that undoubtedly benefited many of the recipients of the provision granted under 
its terms. After all, prior to 1977 many homeless families were still being housed in 
lodgings that were used as workhouse accommodation under the New Poor Law and a re- 
housing duty only occurred in situations of absolute emergency (Glastonbury, 1971). The 
1977 Act changed this by its introduction of an obligation placed on local authorities to re- 
house the homeless. However, as this duty was not to be universal, the central question 
became `who are the homeless? ' 
In response a system of measurement was created; a way of deciding who should 
receive assistance. This is one of the central points surrounding this legislation, as defining 
who was actually homeless was determined by assessing which groups should be re- 
housed. The `right' to housing existed only for the statutory homeless and thus the act of 
defining this group assumed central importance. It is in this sense that the act constructed 
homelessness as the social phenomenon that we can recognise today, not because the 
definition has remained entirely consistent across time, but because the act introduced a 
system for determining who was eligible for inclusion within the terms of the definition 
itself. As we have seen this was achieved through the formation of three `tests' of 
eligibility, namely priority need, intentionality and local connection. 
The next three chapters will examine these categories in turn and investigate the 
extent to which Laclau and Mouffe's focus on the antagonistic relationship inherent to 
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binary oppositions undermines the legitimacy of the definition of homelessness that these 
tests construct. These chapters will attempt to place the concept of a `conditional' approach 
to homelessness within the theoretical framework outlined in chapters 2 and 3, showing 
how homeless identities are constructed differently across time and location. Central to this 
analysis will be the proposition that statutory homelessness cannot be considered to be an 
objective measure of housing need, that the category of homelessness forms subject 
positions whose legitimacy is undermined by the nature of their exclusion. 
This chapter will begin by looking at the debates surrounding the adoptions of a 
statutory definition of homelessness; analysis will then move on to look specifically at 
priority need. This category will first be defined and the reasons behind its initial inception 
in the 1977 act will be considered. The politics of the division demanded by the category of 
priority need will then be considered in relation to the exclusion inherent to binary 
oppositions. The analysis will then move to the notion of overdetermination, applied to 
both the changes to priority need categories since the 1977 act and the recent challenges by 
the Scottish parliament to the category itself. 
The Right to Housing 
Whilst the preceding chapter demonstrates that structural influences on 
homelessness were identified in the Victorian era, it was only in the late 1960's that the 
campaign to introduce legislation to recognise homelessness as housing not a welfare issue 
began to gather real momentum. This campaign led to the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 
1977, the first legislation in this area and the framework for current policy. 
The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 was introduced to update the conditions 
of the National Assistance Act 1948. In turn, this legislation abolished the provision of the 
s New Poor Law, but focused on those made homeless through emergencies. Consequently, 
5 Richards (1981) claims that in practice, many local authorities enforced a provision that retained some of the 
de-humanising traits of the workhouse. She writes that `Communal facilities, segregation according to sex and 
restricted contact between husband and wife were the norm' and also highlights that many of the former 
workhouses were being used as hostel accommodation. (p. 15). 
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the individualistic agenda that characterised Victorian responses remained to some extent, 
an indication that homelessness was seen as an issue that would be remedied by the 
completion of post-war housing programmes and most residual cases would be properly 
handled by welfare departments. Provision for the remainder of cases would be judged by 
the agenda of `less eligibility', a residual measure from the New Poor Law. 
It has been well documented that the profile of homeless issues was elevated 
considerably during the mid-to late 1960's and the campaign for a statutory duty to re- 
house the homeless has its roots in this period (Richards 1981, Jacobs et al. 1999). 
Thompson (1988) points to a number of studies that document the rise in the number of 
homeless applications received by local authorities and the gradual recognition of homeless 
issues was furthered by the television adaptation of Jeremy Sandford's play Cathy Come 
Home, following its initial screening in 1966. Sandford had been a consistent commentator 
on the conditions faced by the homeless throughout the decade and existing research has 
focused on the importance of his work in raising both public awareness and the political 
profile of homelessness. 
Richards (1981) presents a comprehensive account of both the public concern 
provoked by this programme and the political response that followed. In particular, she 
draws attention to the launch of Shelter, the National Campaign for the Homeless; a mere 
two weeks after the screening (p. 27-28). This was orchestrated to capitalise on the publicity 
generated by Cathy Come Home and Shelter became central in the campaign to consider 
homelessness as an issue attributable to a shortage of housing rather than a product of 
individual choices. This structural focus became integral in the attempts to introduce 
legislation recognising that victims of emergencies were not the only group with legitimate 
claims for housing assistance (Jacobs et al, 1999). 
The Local Government Act 1972 reduced the limited re-housing duty contained 
within the National Assistance Act 1948 to a discretionary power; a move that provoked the 
formation of the Joint Charities Group (JCG) in 1973. Supportive of the findings from the 
various working parties, this group pressurised the government into including a review of 
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homeless procedures in a 1973 white paper, a proposal that finally found its way into 
government circular 18/74. 
The 18/74 circular became a forerunner for the 1977 Act and drew heavily on 
Grieve's (1971) contention that homeless strategies should concentrate on providing 
`homes' rather than the settling for temporary, stop-gap solutions. Most notably, the re- 
housing function was seen as a task best performed by housing departments, with 
applicants selected according to a fledgling list of `priority need' categories. This list 
represented a more inclusive definition of those entitled to accommodation than that in the 
1948 Act. Furthermore, the punitive practices allowed by the terms of the 1948 Act (such 
as splitting families according to rules of segregated accommodation) were condemned, as 
was the use of temporary, hotel-type accommodation as anything other than a last resort 
(Richards 1981). 
The Joint Charities Group gained an assurance from both major parties that the 
prospect of homelessness legislation would be considered following the general election of 
1974. Their proposals centred on translating the provisions of circular 18/74 into 
legislation, placing a statutory responsibility on local authorities for re-housing those 
adjudged to be homeless. In addition to this, the JCG's approach to definition revealed an 
inclusive stance that incorporated the `single' homeless into the priority need grouping. 6 
Fundamentally, their position represented a belief that the homeless had a `right to housing' 
and that it was properly the role of the state to provide for this. 
However, the Labour party were reluctant to place any further demands on 
government resources and parliamentary time. Prior to the IMF loan of 1976 the economy 
was extremely stretched following the trade union disputes of the early 1970's, coupled 
with a developing world-wide recession (Sked and Cook 1993). The decade saw the 
development of various `overload' theories (Beer 1975, King 1975) whereby the wisdom of 
`big' government came under scrutiny in the wake of the huge subsidies for nationalised 
industries and welfare payments that led to a large balance of payment deficit in the macro 
6 In policy terms, the grouping `single homeless' is quite misleading. In the eventual act, the single homeless 
included families with children over 16 and couples with no children. Effectively, this grouping referred to 
those who fall outside of the priority need categories. 
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economy. Consequently although it would be inaccurate to suggest that the Wilson and 
Callaghan administrations adhered to the doctrine proposed by this body of opinion, the 
government had a vested interest in controlling welfare spending and policies that 
demanded an increased expenditure were likely to be greeted with a degree of caution. 
Certainly, as debates progressed a number of MP's from both sides of the house expressed 
concern over the possibility that homeless legislation may be used by those looking to 
`jump' council waiting lists or avoid taking responsibility for rent arrears. 
In addition to this, local authorities retained an opposition to a statutory 
responsibility to re-house the homeless throughout the consultation period, although they 
agreed with the objectives of the proposed legislation. Chiefly, their opposition could be 
attributed to a desire to retain autonomy in prioritising local need; a practice that would be 
undermined by a law that would dictate their housing policy. However, Richards (1981) 
notes that local authorities were suspicious of the agenda proposed by the JCG and refused 
to enter into talks with them as a result of previous disputes over local government practice. 
In the event, a consultation paper was published in 1975 that stated that the 
government was `not persuaded that the present is necessarily the time to introduce a major 
change in legislation' (DOE, 1975 quoted in Richards 1981, p. 43). Consequently, although 
the JCG worked to gain the support of a number of MP's, the priorities of the government 
coupled with a new Secretary of State for the Environment, led to the draft bill being 
omitted from the 1976/7 Queen's Speech. This omission resulted in a sustained period of 
public pressure from the JCG, centred on the pre-election promises they received from the 
Labour party. The government were forced into accepting a private members bill by the 
public and political reaction afforded to their omission. Steven Ross, a Liberal MP was 
chosen to promote this bill, which was now in the happy position of receiving cross-party 
support, at least in principle. 
The debates and pressure that came out of the consultation period were crucial in 
the eventual content of the legislation. For example, the JCG proposed the DOE drafted bill 
rather than their own document, as it was felt that the government's own draft had a better 
chance of becoming legislation. This represented something of compromise, particularly 
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with regard to the groups that would be accepted as homeless, as the government's initial 
definition of homelessness was far tighter than that proposed by the JCG. The 
parliamentary progress of the bill represented a continuation of this agenda, with a 
significant number of opposition MP's proposing amendments based on unease over the 
potential for a `scroungers charter'. By the time of the third reading there were also real 
concerns over the future of the bill; particularly when the government's seemingly 
disinterested stance was considered. Consequently, the JCG had to adapt their original 
plans as the definitions were tightened and a disparate group of interests had to be 
appeased. 
The impact of these changes will now be examined, both in terms of the original 
agenda of the bill and the version that finally appeared on the statute books. In particular, 
the next section will examine one of the key concepts introduced through the various 
readings of the bill, namely priority need, and assess the extent to which the original 
objectives of the JCG were realised. Finally, the extent to which the conditional categories 
contained within the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 represent a continuation of the 
deserving/undeserving conception of homelessness will be analysed. 
The Emergence of Priority Need 
The idea of priority need is the cornerstone of homeless policy, setting up a 
hierarchy through which administrators can judge the relative merits of applications. As 
highlighted above, the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 arrived at this concept after a 
lengthy period of negotiation; eventually settling on a list of groups in a move that saw the 
JCG compromise their original position. This section will examine the politics of the 
separation effected by the formation of a priority need list; the extent to which the creation 
of such a hierarchy serves to construct privileged identities, as well as the extent to which 
these subject positions serve as sustainable representation of housing need. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to dismiss the concept of priority need 
unnecessarily. There are many justifiable reasons for the existence of the category, not least 
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the need to discriminate between cases in order to allocate scant resources. In this sense 
priority need can be seen as a practical measure, a way of ensuring that limited housing 
resources can be allocated in the fairest way possible, rather than a mechanism whose sole 
purpose is to deter unwarranted applications. 
The concept of priority need is one that can also be seen as necessary for 
humanitarian reasons. Few would disagree that for individuals in certain situations or with 
certain characteristics, immediate assistance in finding housing is imperative. However, in 
prioritising the needs of some groups over others, a number of groups remain effectively 
outside the terms of this definition. In the case of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 
1977, Thompson (1988) draws attention to the plight of those deemed to have 
`intentionally' made themselves homeless and single homeless people; those who have 
respectively been excluded from provision and found themselves outside local authority 
responsibility. The nature of intentionality will be examined later, but this section will 
concentrate on the politics of the concept of priority need in reference to those who are 
excluded by its terms. 
This highlights a second point concerning priority need; namely that it is not an 
isolated gateway to provision. An applicant who is deemed to be in priority need may still 
be refused access to permanent housing as a result of an intentionality ruling, or because of 
insufficient ties to the local area. For example, the Welsh assembly's report on the 
implementation of the 2001 priority need order found that although certain individuals were 
considered to be in priority need under the new legislation, local authorities did not 
necessarily accept all applicants as homeless.? A typical example of this concerned a man 
leaving the armed services, who would therefore be considered to be priority need. 
However, when it became apparent that he had been discharged from army for failing a 
drugs test, he was ruled to be `intentionally' homeless and therefore ineligible for full 
provision (WAG 2004, p. 31). It is in this sense that priority need should be seen as a 
`hurdle' rather than a `gateway', as simply falling into one of it categories does not 
invalidate other tests of eligibility. 
' The Homeless Persons (Priority Need) (Wales) Order 2001 will be considered in more depth on page 109. 
Following these points it becomes clear that a discussion of priority need is not 
definitive in assessing the extent to which definitions of homelessness are inclusive. 
Nevertheless as the first test of eligibility it demands further consideration as a useful and 
accurate indicator of need, particularly in terms of the relationship between the manner in 
which subject positions are created and the effects of their construction. Initially the priority 
need `list' was not written into the bill and there were fears throughout the negotiations that 
such categorisation could work against borderline applicants. 8 The final list stated that 
victims of emergencies, those with dependent children and pregnant women and their 
partners should all be considered as having an immediate requirement for re-housing and 
that local authorities had a duty towards individuals in these situations. In this light the 
priority need list offers the most overt indicator of privileged subject positions by virtue of 
the list itself; an explicit statement of the groups deemed to be deserving of local authority 
assistance. 
As we have seen, the constitution of identity is based on opposition. Laclau (1990) 
points to the exclusion that is at the heart of this situation, the negative `other' that is 
necessary for an identity to be formed. Consequently, we can view the boundaries of 
priority need in this manner; the implication being that the need of priority groups 
establishes what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) term a `violent hierarchy', a relationship 
whereby the need of one group justifies the exclusion of another. Torfing (1999) illustrates 
this point by citing the example of apartheid-era South Africa, where the exclusion of the 
black community `helped to unify and sustain the identity of both Afrikaners and English 
as a white people' (p. 132). In relating these terms to the position of single homeless, the 
position of the single homeless is constituted below priority groups in a hierarchy of need; 
this opposition being sustained by the perceived need of priority groups. 
This is a relatively simple proposition and if we concentrate on the `marked' pole of 
identity, the single homeless, then it becomes apparent that formation of priority need 
within the 1977 Act effectively depends on this either/or opposition. However, when we 
consider that the single homeless fall entirely outside of provision, that there is no 
8 In the draft bill the Secretary of State had the power to denote priority need groups, which were written in 
the code of guidance (Richards 1981). 
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responsibility placed on local authorities beyond a requirement to provide advice and 
assistance on a discretionary basis, then we begin to see the true nature of this exclusion. 
For those who are not considered to be in priority need, the original terms of the 1977 Act 
dictated that the local authority could provide `advice and such assistance as they consider 
appropriate in the circumstances', a measure that effectively freed local authorities from a 
duty to those not deemed to be in priority need (DOE 1977, Section 4 (2)). In part this 
exclusion was justified on the grounds of the material; local authorities have finite stock 
and staff time and consequently those in the greatest need should be housed without fail. 
Nevertheless, the chief opposition to the bill was not that some applicants will not be 
housed, but rather that some applicants will be housed when they are undeserving of 
assistance. In particular, there were concerns over the proposed legislation becoming `a 
charter for the queue jumper' and definitions were tightened to protect those waiting to 
receive housing from the local authorities (Jesse] quoted in Richards 1981, p. 63). In other 
words, the first point that can be made about priority need is that the category itself was 
partially justified on the grounds that it was believed to be necessary to exclude those 
applicants who were felt to be unworthy of assistance in finding housing. 
This assumes that the opposition between accepted and rejected positions is a 
genuine one, a real contradiction. As we have seen in chapter 3, Laclau and Mouffe reject 
the possibility of real opposition and contradiction, not because contradictory relationships 
between physical objects or concepts do not exist in reality, but because these types of 
relationship assume an opposition between a fully constituted identity and its `other'. The 
presence of such a relationship would negate the possibility of transformation, as the 
privileged position would become an objective reality. Thus, the point concerning Laclau 
and Mouffe's approach to categorisation is that the imperfect `fit' of social and political 
identities, the impossibility of a fully constituted social object or its other, effectively 
demands that the content of identities is open to constant re-appraisal. Laclau and Mouffe's 
work on discursive formations is therefore useful in this context as it attempts to destabilise 
the relationship between the poles of identity. In this branch of theory although an identity 
is defined by its opposite, it is also destabilised by what it lacks. The opposition inherent in 
any given position is that which simultaneously characterizes it as distinctive and also 
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prevents it from being a fully constituted identity. The dichotomy between the two poles of 
identity is therefore not a genuine, essential fact, but a contingent relationship between two 
mutually dependent opposites. 
If we apply this idea back to binary concept of priority need we see a reduced 
justification for the absolute judgement required by the category. The logical endpoint of 
this concept is one that `prevents society from constituting an objective, rational and fully 
intelligible reality' by effectively undermining the notion of absolute categorisation 
(Torfang 1999, p. 44). Such oppositions as the priority need/single homeless dichotomy are 
seen to be unsustainable because neither position is fully constituted and thus, each 
effectively undermines the other's legitimacy. The attempt to `fix' meaning in policy by 
introducing a binary opposition is consequently seen as a reductionist strategy that cannot 
fully represent the contingent nature of social relations. The nature of this split can be 
illustrated by reference to the practical exclusion demanded by priority need. In this sense 
we need to examine the feasibility of a policy that can exclude in such a seemingly arbitrary 
manner as the age of a family's children. In the hypothetical case of two families one of 
whom has a child of sixteen or older, is there a real distinction in terms of their relative 
need? Is it realistic to assume that one family has a complete dependence on the local 
authority, whilst the other does not? There are any number of other examples of those who 
fall into the category of single homeless that could be highlighted, the central consideration 
being the `cut-off that occurs as a result of this categorisation. 
Consequently the initial conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis concerns 
the nature of the critique, rather than the prescription of future policy. Laclau and Mouffe's 
notion of an open-ended structure presents a challenge to the idea of priority need by 
undermining the idea of fixed, justifiable oppositions. The dividing line that separates 
prioritised groups from the single homeless is shown to be a construction that artificially 
divides cases into categories whose effects cannot adequately reflect the complexity of 
circumstance. However, in legislative terms, this division is straddled by the concept of 
`vulnerability' and it is important to note that the criterion for inclusion is to some extent 
determined within the local area. The next section will examine the implications of such 
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discretionary exemptions and begin to suggest how this fits into the theoretical framework 
that is being developed. 
Vulnerability and the Expansion of Priority Need 
Whilst the analysis above highlights a binary division between deserving and 
undeserving cases created by the category of priority need, it would be inaccurate to 
suggest that priority need is implemented in a consistent and objective manner. This 
opposition, although common in its effects, can be variously influenced by any number of 
factors, from available supply of housing to the case history of individual applicants. In 
part this inconsistency is a result of legislative measures to accommodate both `borderline' 
applications and to allow local authorities to retain control over their housing stock. In this 
respect the 1977 Act contained some scope for discretion on the part of local authorities by 
its use of the term 'vulnerability'. The wording of section 2 (1) (c) stated that any person 
may be entitled to assistance if they are `vulnerable as a result of old age, mental illness or 
physical disability or other special reason' (DOE 1977). It was initially hoped that this 
would provide local authorities with the necessary leeway to provide for borderline priority 
cases, but in practice the judgement of `vulnerability' has proved to be problematic for 
local authorities and homeless officers alike. 
The criterion for the judgement of vulnerability itself has not been contained in 
legislation; the working definition has arisen through case law. In the debates surrounding 
the Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002, concerns 
were expressed surrounding the unwritten nature of this definition. 
`I return to the vulnerability test. It seems tendentious and highly subjective, and it 
will be difficult to achieve conformity. The only example that I can give is that 
given in the explanatory notes-in the paragraph on page 2 that deals with article 6: 
, In deciding whether a person is vulnerable, a local housing authority must decide 
whether a person is less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person 
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so that injury or detriment would result where a less vulnerable applicant would be 
able to cope without harmful effect. ' (HOC Debates, column 10) 
The judgement of vulnerability is therefore, strictly speaking, a relative one. This working 
definition suggests that such a judgement should be made using an `ordinary' homeless 
person as a benchmark. Of course the judgement of what constitutes an ordinary homeless 
person is likely to differ over geographical areas, as well as between individual homeless 
officers. Moreover, the subjective nature of this assessment means that it is possible for 
individual prejudices or local economic or social environments to influence the judgement 
of whether an individual applicant is vulnerable. 
The Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 
marked a considerable expansion of the Priority Need grouping. This followed the original 
pledge in the 2000 green paper to extend these categories, particularly in relation to those 
who have an institutional background or are escaping violence. For these groups the test of 
vulnerability applies and thus the acceptance of individuals remains dependent on the 
discretion of local authorities. In addition to the aforementioned groups, 16 and 17 year 
olds would now be considered to be in `automatic' priority need, as proposed in the 2000 
green paper. The one change to the 2000 proposal was the inclusion of those aged 18 to 21 
who were in care as a child, a group that would be automatically considered to be in 
priority need, as opposed to those over the age of 21 who would be considered on the basis 
of their `vulnerability'. The key changes to the category of priority need are outlined in Fig 
5.1. 
The most obvious aspect to these changes is the expansion to the groups considered 
to be in priority need, a move that was broadly welcomed by groups working with the 
homeless. However, as shown in Fig 5.1, the majority of the new groups were not be 
considered to be in automatic priority need, but were to be assessed according to their 
individual vulnerability. In terms of the theoretical framework that is being developed, the 
concept of vulnerability highlights the variable criterion for inclusion or exclusion and the 
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Prior to 2002 New 2002 Categories 
(England) 
New 2001 Categories 
(Wales) 
  Pregnant As prior to 2002, but As prior to 2002, but 
Have with: with: 
dependent   16 and 17 year   16 and 17 years 
children olds old 
  Homeless as a   Young people   Care leaver, or 
result of a under 21, who person at 
disaster (eg. were fostered particular risk of 
fire or flood) between the ages financial or 
of 16-18 and are sexual 
no longer fostered exploitation, aged 
or accommodated 18,19 or 20 
by the LA . Fleeing domestic 
  Vulnerable as a   Fleeing domestic violence or 
result of old violence or threats of 
age, mental threats of violence 
illness or violence   Homeless after 
handicap, 
. Persons who have leaving the armed 
physical reached the age of services disability or 
other special 
21 and are Former prisoner 




  Homeless after 
leaving the armed 
services 
  Homeless after 
leaving police 
custody or having 
served custodial 
sentence 
9 Whilst this group receives priority need automatically in Wales, a test of 
local connection still applies. 
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increased use of this test following the Priority Need Order 2002 clearly shows it continued 
relevance to the legislative approach to homelessness. Clearly the important factor in this 
division remains the point of exclusion, the location at which a subject position provides a 
constructed, `fixed' identity. In terms of the analysis above, the crucial point emerges in the 
discrepancy between objective and subjective measures of homelessness. As we have seen 
through the initial analysis of priority need, the construction of a `hierarchy of need' based 
on binary oppositions demands that subject positions become a representation of a real 
opposition. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) refute the claim that social identities can ever be in 
fully constituted opposition, as such a relationship demands two fixed, stable extremes; a 
reliable `other' for each position to be defined against. 
Initially I presented the claim that priority need categories create subject positions 
that categorise homeless identities as either privileged or excluded. Both positions 
correspond to a local authority duty to re-house in the former case and dispense advice in 
the latter case. The initial analysis of this situation drew the conclusion that such a 
categorisation was likely to exclude many applicants who would be considered to be in 
housing need, but for a particular characteristic that disqualified them from full provision. 
In theoretical terms, the fix that creates privileged identities also constructs a dividing line, 
a division that is likely to exclude many applicants whose social reality ostensibly differs 
very little from those accepted as in priority need. 
The consideration of vulnerability alters this framework only slightly. In many 
ways, the vague definition of vulnerability would appear to suit Laclau and Mouffe's 
concern with the subjective, a variable, possibly localised definition seems more in keeping 
with their objections to a totalised view of social relations. However, the subjective nature 
of vulnerability does not negate the division at the heart of priority need. It is the content of 
judgement required by vulnerability that is variable. In this sense the absolute judgement 
remains, whilst the criterion for determining inclusion/exclusion may differ between 
local 
authorities. The concept of a real opposition is still intact and although a test of 
vulnerability may be operated on a subjective basis the model of social relations that 
it 
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represents is still an objectified one. The extended priority need listings in England 
therefore retain the same framework as previous legislation, particularly as the majority of 
the new categories demand a test of vulnerability. 
The Homeless Act 2002 does attempt to take the `edge' off the separation between 
priority and non-priority cases by increasing the provision for individuals deemed not to be 
in priority need. This was an attempt to soften the divide between inclusion and exclusion; 
a measure that granted local authorities the power to secure accommodation for those not 
deemed to be priority cases. As noted above, the local authority's previous duty to the non- 
priority homeless only extended as far as giving advice and assistance as was considered 
appropriate to the circumstances, but in a proposed amendment this discretionary provision 
was increased to a duty. The debates surrounding the original Homes Bill cast doubt as to 
the practical effect of the first measure, as in effect it was felt that the lack of available 
housing in high-demand areas would mean that this power would be rarely used (SCD, 30th 
January 2001 cc 337-41). 
Despite these changes the basic exclusionary framework of the priority/non priority 
division remains in English legislation. However, it is worth comparing the Homeless 
Persons (Priority Need) (Wales) Order 2001 with its English counterpart, as although the 
Welsh order retains the discursive `rules of formation' inherent to homeless legislation, it 
presented a considerably more inclusive priority need list (Foucault 1972, p. 42). Ostensibly 
the list is very similar to the English equivalent, but the key difference lies in the omission 
of the `vulnerability' clause. Those with institutional backgrounds or fleeing violence are 
accepted as homeless automatically and are thus entitled to full provision, unless they are 
found to be intentionally homeless. As highlighted earlier, this does not mean that provision 
is automatically granted to those in priority need groups, but a review of the 
implementation of homeless legislation found that the percentage of presentations resulting 
in acceptances went up from 33% in 2000 to 38% in 2001 (WAG 2004, p. 15). 
Clearly, the expansion of priority need in Wales has had an effect on the number of 
applicants accepted as homeless and it would be inaccurate to suggest that this has not 
resulted in some problems for Welsh local authorities. Primarily these have been of a 
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practical nature, particularly with regard a shortage of housing stock. Local authorities also 
noted that a longer period of adjustment prior to the order, as well as ring fenced funding to 
assist with the greater caseload, would have been beneficial. To some extent these 
difficulties are to be expected and the experience of the Welsh may well assist the Scottish 
in the implementation of their proposed changes to the priority need category. 1° In this 
respect, the Welsh example illustrates the value of planning and permitting local authorities 
to update their own budgets in order to allow for changes to the law. 
However, whilst some of the problems of implementation have been attributed to 
insufficient planning, the commission's report also highlighted struggles of a more 
ideological nature. Generally, these amounted to clashes of interests regarding the location 
of the homeless, both with regard to placement of projects working with those with support 
needs and more relevantly, the re-housing of some individuals who fall into the new 
priority need categories. Concerns were voiced regarding potential tension between 
initiatives for community regeneration and safety, and the need to re-house from a variety 
of different backgrounds, in particular the report notes the unpopularity of the homeless 
with `communities, the media, or elected members' (WAG, 2004, p. 22). In this sense the 
omission of the concept of vulnerability from the Welsh priority need test does not appear 
to have created a uniform response to homeless applications, although it has clearly 
removed a layer of subjective judgement. What becomes apparent through the creation of 
newly privileged identities is the irreducibility of antagonistic relationships, in this case 
between those wishing to re-house the homeless and those professing a concern for the 
safety or reputation of the local community. The antagonism stems from a conflict of 
interest concerning the `deserving' nature of some homeless applicants, for example former 
prisoners released from custody; a group whose re-housing has a tradition of provoking 
tension within a local area (for example, Cowan and Gilroy, 1999). The privileged nature of 
such subject positions can therefore be considered to be overdetermined, in that the re- 
housing of certain groups within a local area is likely to present a challenge to both 
allocations policy of the local authority and the very nature of a policy that provides 
10 See page 111 for details of the Scottish proposals 
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support for those not deemed to be worthy of provision by the popular consciousness. In 
the case of antagonistic relationships such as these, the `intentionality' category often 
provides local authorities with the necessary leeway to exclude individuals who may be 
received with hostility or fear by the community at large. l' 
The Welsh example illustrates that whilst the `opening up' of priority need can lead 
to an increased acceptance rate (albeit an increase of only 5% between 2000 and 2001), the 
multi-layered nature of homeless legislation allows local authorities a considerable amount 
of autonomy in determining the extent of their provision. Indeed, one of the key features of 
the report is the continued variability in provision, both in terms of acceptances and 
assistance to those not deemed to be in priority need (WAG, 2004, p. 23). Such examples 
demonstrate that even absolute local authority duties may be met with an inconsistent 
efficiency across geographical areas. Ultimately however, it is the binary divide at the heart 
of priority need, its twofold response to a multitude of circumstances that remains the 
central concern of analysis and the root cause of exclusion from provision. The erratic 
nature of administration only alters this situation insofar as the `split' between privileged 
and excluded identities occurs at different points; the division itself being the major 
concern for the construction of identities that can represent housing need. The next section 
will examine the response of the Scottish parliament to this dichotomy and assess the 
impact of these proposals on the theoretical framework proposed thus far. 
The Scottish Example 
The Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 marks a significant moment in homeless 
legislation, primarily because it alters the conditional framework that has been identified as 
the guiding principle of homeless law. The act has attracted considerable support from 
groups working with the homeless and following the approval of the bill, the Scottish 
parliament was awarded the `Housing Rights Protector Award' by the Centre for Housing 
Rights and Evictions. In general terms the Act presents a revision of the approach to 
" The nature of antagonism, with specific reference to intentionality will be examined in greater detail in 
chapter 6. 
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intentionality, a suspension of the need for applicants to prove a local connection and 
commitment to end priority need tests by 2012. In the context of this chapter it is the last of 
these proposals that holds the most relevance, particularly as advocates of the bill presented 
a critique of priority need that was powerful enough to sustain such legislation. 
In comparison to the legislation discussed throughout this chapter, the proposals 
concerning priority need for Scotland are remarkably straightforward. The Act sets out an 
expanded priority need list, again focused by a test of vulnerability, but with the expressed 
purpose of gradually widening this definition. The legislation sets out a loose time 
framework to allow local authorities to prepare fully for an increased caseload and a more 
specific schedule has to be announced before 31 't December 2005. In this sense it is hoped 
that some of problems identified by the Welsh assembly can be avoided and that the 
legislation will act to make new accommodation and services available. This schedule is 
open to amendment, but the overall commitment to remove the priority need test remains 
the objective of legislation. 
In the context of this chapter the justification for the removal of priority need that 
was presented to the Scottish parliament assumes some importance. The legislation itself 
represented the enactment of proposals contained within the final report of the Homeless 
Task Force, a group whose membership comprised representatives from a variety of 
different backgrounds. Primarily their justification centred on the claims of those excluded 
by existing priority need categories, this corresponding to the stated aim of expanding legal 
rights for the homeless. For example, the contribution of Margaret Curran MSP: 
`Just as the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 raised the minimum rights for homeless 
people so that all were entitled to at least temporary accommodation and advice and 
assistance, the bill progresses further the rights of people who find themselves 
homeless.... Those changes will not be rushed or undertaken lightly and they will 
happen with full consultation over the coming months and years. If the changes are 
to succeed, partnership working with local authorities and other landlords will be 
essential. However, the changes will enable a shift of emphasis away from the 
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barriers between a homeless person and a home and towards facilitating solutions. ' 
(SPOR, 5'h March 2003, col. 19029). 
However, the debates surrounding the bill saw some opposition based on the increased 
resources that the bill's provision will demand and in particular, the lack of a costing 
framework. For example, the comments of Lyndsay McIntosh MSP: 
`I support the bill's aims but, without the proper financial backing, local authorities 
will not meet the high expectations of the bill. That is a bit like free personal care- 
we have the high expectation and then all the dither and delay about whether the 
policy will be achieved, yet the issue still remains a problem for some people. ' 
(SPOR, 5thMarch 2003, col. 19034). 
The removal of priority need from the statute books is clearly dependent on the ability of 
local authorities to fulfil their increased duties, but the emergent nature of the legislation 
demands that priority need is phased out in consultation with local authorities. It is this 
loose framework that precludes the possibility of accurate forecasting, a situation that led 
Ms McIntosh to advise Conservatives to abstain from supporting the bill. 
A second point follows on from this, in that the abolition of priority need leaves no 
criterion by which to judge the allocation of scant resources. When assessing the theoretical 
impact of this measure it is worth remembering Laclau's (1990) contention that `destroying 
the hierarchies on which sexual or racial discrimination is based will, at some point, always 
require the construction of other exclusions for collective identities to be able to emerge' 
(p. 33). Social identities are therefore considered to be competitive, as to present a more 
harmonious relationship removes the concept of antagonism. Without this conflict, 
identities remain uncontested and therefore stable, a clear affront to Laclau and Mouffe's 
(1985) rejection of totalisation. There is a fundamental issue of the relative merit of 
applications here, an issue highlighted by Ian Robertson. 
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`If a woman is fleeing violence with a couple of kids, and she has clearly been 
abused, most people would recognise that as a number 1 priority. How can that be 
done if 10 or 15 people are present at one time and nobody has any priority? In 
operational terms, the people who apply tend to be prioritised. '(Official Report, 
Social Justice Committee, 13 November 2002, col. 3269-70). 
In this light it is possible to see challenges to the proposed inclusive stance of the Scottish 
parliament. Whilst the removal of priority need tests would undoubtedly grant applicants 
similar rights, it would also invert the relationship between privileged and subordinated 
positions. Therefore a new totalised view of provision emerges, one in which an 
essentialised view of structure cannot allow for the diverse experiences of homelessness. 
This is clearly a problem of relativism, in that without an external criterion, each case can 
be seen to be as urgent as another. In this case Laclau's point is critical; a hierarchy of need 
is required, if not as a means to judge inclusion within housing, then as criterion to 
determine who is housed first. 
This also means that local authorities would eventually have a considerable portion 
of their discretionary power over acceptance removed; a situation that could well lead to 
delays in the expansion of priority need. Another Conservative member of the executive, 
Murray Tosh, noted this potential in debates and whilst it did not diminish his support for 
the bill, he stated that the bill demanded a leap of faith in that `if the bill is passed, the 
consequence will be that the Executive must provide the resources' (col. 19039). It will be 
interesting therefore, to see the pace of changes to the priority need groupings in Scotland. 
The Scottish Council for the Single Homeless (2002) demanded that whilst the changes to 
legislation may present challenges for local authorities, the `abolition should not be held up 
by the speed of the slowest' (p. 2). In practice however, it remains to be seen whether local 
authorities are able to maintain the pace of change demanded by the legislation. 
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The Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 represents a brave attempt to address the 
problem of exclusion through priority need by aiming to place all applicants on an equal 
footing. However, without a corresponding increase in provision the necessity to judge 
between cases remains as a mechanism to ensure that those in the greatest need are re- 
housed as quickly as possible. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the major issues involved in the 
judgement of priority need. Beginning with an overview of the formation of the 1977 Act, 
this chapter noted a gradual tightening of definitions, enforced by a critique that focused on 
the possibility of legislation being abused. This was followed by an examination of the 
issues specific to priority need, primarily the manner in which the category divides 
applicants into deserving and undeserving cases. Crucially this division acts to exclude the 
undeserving, a situation that was seen to create a violent hierarchy. Using Laclau and 
Mouffe's (1985) critique of binary oppositions, this section attempted to highlight the 
exclusionary nature of this judgement. The concept of vulnerability was seen to `soften' the 
divide between the two poles of identity and allow for some diversity of experience, but 
ultimately the excluded, undeserving pole was seen to undermine privileged positions. 
Finally, the abolition of priority need in Scotland was considered. The aim of overcoming 
exclusion was supported, but some reservations were expressed regarding the allocation of 
resources, should insufficient stock be available after 2012. 
In the next chapter I will develop this analysis by considering the way in which this 
conditional framework is supported by the category of intentionality. This will involve a 
discussion of the manner in which a specific undeserving identity, that of the intentionally 
homeless individual, has been created. In particular, the notion of antagonism will be used 
in order to show how subject positions are created and sustained, and how this construction 
acts in conjunction with the conditional framework identified in this chapter 
in order to 
exclude individuals from citizenship rights. 
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Chapter 6- Intentionality 
The test of intentionality is perhaps the most controversial measure of 
homelessness. It is the most obvious governmental protection against fraudulent claims for 
assistance, as it seeks to test the motives of an individual in leaving their last place of 
residence. The contentious nature of this assessment stems from the perceived moral 
judgement that local authorities are required to make of homeless applicants, a measure that 
leads Cowan (1997) to suggest that the measurement of housing need is replaced by a 
judgement `about why the homeless become homeless in the first place' (p. 21). 
The nature of intentionality therefore makes it an overt example of a conditional 
approach driven by a moralistic criterion. In this sense it is possible to challenge the claim 
made on behalf of the 1977 Act, that `homelessness was, at last, officially recognised as a 
housing problem' (Neale 1997, p. 50). This chapter will attempt to assess the extent to 
which the category of intentionality undermines the structuralist position, by examining the 
nature of such a judgement in relation to Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) work on discourse 
and antagonism. The central claim of this section relates to the idea that the presence of a 
ruling concerning the intention of an applicant enforces a judgement of an individual's 
behaviour, a judgement that may have little to do with the assessment of housing need. In 
this sense the category of intentionality constructs undeserving identities by reference to a 
code that is based on the culpability of the individual and cannot fully account for the 
influence of social forces. 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the continued existence of this 
category is justified purely as a deterrent to those seeking to jump housing waiting lists. 
This chapter will also attempt to demonstrate that whilst this was the key motivation in the 
initial formation of the concept of intentionality, a more current approach concerns the 
particular needs of those applicants who repeatedly become homeless. In particular, the 
needs of those individuals who repeatedly become homeless are seen to be better addressed 
through a targeted approach, rather than through blanket acceptances. 
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Nevertheless, intentionality is at its root an exclusionary measure and this chapter 
will attempt to evaluate the nature of this judgement. Beginning with a definition of 
intentionality and a brief look at the circumstances surrounding its initial formation, this 
chapter will then focus on the theoretical implications of a judgement of this nature. 
Finally, the changes to provision for applicants deemed to be intentionally homeless in 
Scotland will be examined. 
Defining Intentionality 
In the previous chapter, the category of priority need was examined with reference 
to Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) contention that identities are formed negatively, temporarily 
constituted by the exclusion of an `other', but whilst this account of the discursive 
formation of identity highlights that negation is a central component of open-ended 
structures, it offers few clues as to the context in which this might occur. To examine this 
set of issues, Laclau and Mouffe introduce a discussion of the politics involved in 
constructing a violent hierarchy and the function that this serves in maintaining hegemony. 
What is of particular interest in this discussion is the manner in which discursive limits are 
constructed. It is this `framing' that allows certain positions to be constituted as outside the 
differential system of discourse. As we have already seen, this distinction involves an 
inevitable judgement, a judgement that is necessarily ideological in its nature. 
To relate this idea to the concept of intentionality we first have to provide a 
definition of the term. The text of the 1977 Act states that an individual is deemed to have 
become homeless intentionally if `he deliberately does or fails to do anything in 
consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which is available for his 
occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy' (DOE 
1977 s. 17 (1)). Certain qualifications are made to this definition, including provision for an 
`act or omission in good faith' that leads the applicant to become homeless (s. 17 (3)). 
Equally, discretionary powers give local authorities the possibility of judging what 
accommodation is `reasonable' for an individual to inhabit; the wording of section 17 (4) 
gives a clear implication that this judgement is a relative one, made against the quality and 
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availability of other local authority stock. The conditions of this test have been retained by 
subsequent housing acts. 
Unsurprisingly, this idea is one that was included in the bill after the initial draft. In 
fact it resulted from a concession to the `anti-bill' wing of the standing committee, the 
faction that was in favour of legislation based on emergency provision for victims of 
accidents. There was considerable debate over the possibility of homeless legislation being 
abused, a position that led to W. R. Rees-Davies calling the bill `a charter for scroungers 
and scrimshankers' (HOC Debates, Vol 926, col. 905). This led to a number of 
amendments to the draft bill, most of which were aimed towards ensuring that the 
legislation could not be used to jump existing housing waiting lists. 
In practical terms, the thinking behind the intentionality clause was that there were a 
significant number of potential applicants who would effectively make themselves 
homeless through their failure to pay rent. Richards (1981) draws attention to the 
discrepancy between this line of reasoning and official homeless statistics of the time, 
stating that only 7% of homeless cases in the preceding year were attributable to rent 
arrears (p. 69). Despite this, there remained a general agreement through the various 
readings of the bill that it was desirable to penalise those whose situation was seen to be a 
result of their own decision making. 
As with the case of priority need, the real concerns over this category have arisen 
over the `all or nothing' nature of provision and the level of subjective judgement required 
by local authorities in assessing need. If we consider the binary nature of choices inherent 
in the first point, a similar line of critique emerges to the case of priority need. In this 
instance it is the opposed position of identities that is open to question, the idea that 
intention alone is all that separates one case from another. As with priority need, the 
destabilised nature of identity leads to a questioning of the possibility of drawing a line 
between applicants in this manner. 
The second point follows on from this position, in that if categorisation occurs, is 
the judgement of an individual's intention an effective criterion by which to assess need? It 
is evident from both the concept itself and the debates that led to its inclusion in the bill, 
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that intentionality was originally conceived as a punitive measure, a safety valve to both 
deter unscrupulous applicants and reassure those on housing waiting lists. Again we can 
question whether the two positions constructed by the judgement of intentionality represent 
a genuine contradiction, but to further this analysis we need to consider the theoretical 
function that this attempt to `fix' one pole of identity as a normalised position performs. In 
particular we need to consider the function and motives behind the symbolic force that 
operates to construct one position as a worthy, deserving identity. 
Through the debates that led to the tightening of definitions in the bill it is easy to 
see the concerns of the politicians and local authority representatives, who wanted to ensure 
that any legislation would not offer a `back door' route into housing. From the local 
authorities perspective there was a practical concern over workload and the subsequent 
effect on budgets. However, whilst these were also concerns for the politicians on the 
standing committee, the wording of their objections to a more universal definition of 
homelessness suggests a strong ideological element. Much of the discourse on this matter 
highlights the differing interpretation of the state's function in determining the proper role 
of individuals and the role of policy in protecting this code. 
Consequently it is possible to see an adversarial position being developed, between 
those seeking to establish a more universal `right to housing' and those whose primary 
concern lay in the protection of the state from unnecessary claims for housing assistance. 
Equally, a conditional criterion such as intentionality effectively produces an exclusionary 
barrier between those accepted as homeless and those deemed to be culpable in their own 
situation; a dichotomy that is driven by a political perception of responsibility. It is in this 
sense that the relationship between the deserving and the intentionally homeless can be 
seen to be a direct opposition, an adversarial position. As we have seen, it is at the location 
of this conflict that Laclau and Mouffe site the dislocation of identities; the friction that 
leads to the reformation of privileged identities. The following sections will therefore 
examine the politics of intentionality by considering the concept of antagonism and the 
extent to which deserving identities are constituted through temporary ideological 
identification. 
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Antagonism and Intentionality 
Following the discussion of the role of binary oppositions in identity formation, 
highlighted in the previous chapter with reference to priority need, the next stage of Laclau 
and Mouffe's argument introduces the concept of social antagonism; one which refers to 
the oppositions that result from the implementation of a political agenda. Antagonism stems 
from the exclusion of identities and the construction of those identities as an impediment or 
threat to the wider society. Perhaps the most succinct definition of antagonism is to see it as 
the force that prevents an identity becoming fully constituted in relation to its discursive 
`other'. It is thus the force that can either `dislocate' discursive formations or provide a 
temporary stability for a given identity, the force that leads to every identity's 
overdetermination (Torfang 1999, p. 131). 
A discussion of the antagonistic forces that suppress excluded identities can 
highlight the role that these play in constituting an accepted, normalised position. In this 
relationship, it is important to note that social antagonism is not inevitably the cause of the 
exclusion of an identity, this exclusion may result from any number of factors that are not 
considered by policy. It is this collection of factors that Laclau (1990) refers to as the 
`constitutive outside', an extra-discursive set of influences that may have little to do with 
the environment in question, in this case the judgement of homelessness against what we 
can loosely described as a moral criterion (p. 9). The consideration of the `outside' calls into 
question a number of issues that may include macro-economic factors or personal histories, 
circumstances that are not necessarily considered to be adequate justification for 
homelessness 
Nevertheless, it is precisely this `outside' that intentionality judges. For example, it 
may be the choice to spend money on things other than rent, other demands that may or 
may not be deemed to be absolutely imperative, that can be considered in the assessment of 
intentionality. Consequently it follows that there is a necessary dislocation between the 
accepted and excluded poles of identity in this context. This is because the `outside', the 
causal factors that are external to discourse are directly attributable to individuals under the 
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terms of intentionality. External factors are seen to be linked to the eventual homelessness 
of individual applicants by a chain of events, the practice of judging intentionality being a 
subjective assessment of the individual's competence in negotiating between external and 
discursive demands. 
The judgement of intentionality is therefore dependent on `fixing' a point in what 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) refer to as a `chain of equivalence'. It is this chain that 
constitutes an identity under an externalised banner, the differentiated outside grouped 
together in opposition to the legitimate homeless. At this point the excluded pole of identity 
becomes constructed as directly opposed to a legitimate position. In discussions of social 
policy, this has often been referred to as the deserving/undeserving opposition, a directly 
antagonistic relationship. Consequently, we can see that the varying causal factors, the 
differential `outsides', are grouped together not necessarily as a threat to those deemed to 
be deserving of assistance, but as a threat to the provision itself. This has frequently proved 
problematic for local authorities, who have to consider how far back on such a `chain of 
equivalence' the issue of intentionality should be judged. For example, to refer back to the 
example of the soldier leaving the armed forces and claiming accommodation in Wales, his 
intentional homeless ruling referred to his discharge from the army for failing a drugs test 
(WAG, 2004). 
If we accept this proposition, that the judgement of intentionality effectively 
demands the judgement of the `constitutive outside', then a fundamental question arises 
about the nature of the 1977 Act. As we have seen, the JCG's agenda of shifting 
responsibility for provision from welfare to housing was central to the process of 
transposing the conditions of circular 18/74 into law. In essence, this agenda proposed that 
homelessness was a phenomena caused by structural failure to provide decent, plentiful 
housing, rather than a result of individual choices. 
However, the analysis that has been provided of the judgement of the `outside' 
within the terms of intentionality casts doubt on this conclusion. Clearly, the consideration 
of factors that may well be only linked to housing by the failure to pay rent goes 
beyond the 
structural remit and into the realm normally assessed by social services. 
In this respect we 
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can view the 1977 Act as a departure from previous legislation for the homeless, but a 
departure that does not so much invalidate the deserving/undeserving oppositions of 
previous policy as move the responsibility of judgement from welfare to housing offices. 
The antagonistic relationship between deserving or undeserving applicant therefore remains 
enforced by legislation, despite what can be referred to as a structuralist agenda. 
It is at this point that the cultural construction of undeserving positions becomes 
central to analysis. Whilst the availability of housing stock clearly impacts on local 
authority decision making, it would be inaccurate to suggest that this is the only variable in 
a process governed by a consistent application of a nationally constructed stereotype. The 
judgement of the intentionally homeless is likely to be influenced by local cultural 
understandings as well as local structural differences and it is for this reason that the next 
section will concentrate on the framework that differentially constructs undeserving 
positions across geographical areas. 
Cultural Norms and Political Exclusion 
The construction of stereotypes surrounding homelessness is well documented in 
existing research. For example, Cowan (1997) draws attention to media portrayals of 
`scrounging' welfare recipients and notes that such stories tend to increase in both volume 
and severity in times of housing crisis. 
`.. by castigating certain sections and portraying them as the most undeserving, one 
is also arguing that they are not deserving of accommodation; so the issue of supply 
was routinely avoided in debates. It seemed that the implicit belief was that there 
would be enough accommodation to meet the need of other, more worthy, groups' 
(p. 160). 
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In this sense intentionality, moral culpability, becomes a justification in itself for exclusion. 
Cowan draws attention to three major groups: squatters and travellers, beggars and asylum 
seekers. He examines the coverage of these groups by the press (particularly the right-wing 
press) and documents a coverage of homeless issues which portrayed these groups within 
the context of a debate on welfare `scrounging', a popular issue in the press during the 
1990's. Thus the focus on individualistic factors is seen to detract attention from a real 
structural deficit and form an identikit picture of what Cowan calls an `inappropriate' 
applicant (p. 141). 
This account therefore reflects the extent to which a dominant perception of the 
homeless in both popular and political discourse led to the formation of more punitive 
legislation. The key issue in this account concerns the manner in which popular stereotypes 
served to justify a particular type of social policy; the extent to which there was a direct 
correlation between the groups warned against in debates and the trends legislated against 
in the eventual Housing Act 1996. In particular, this points to the political influence of 
certain stereotypes, the extent to which the perceived characteristics of individuals and 
groups are used to justify a `minimalist' stance regarding provision. As we have seen, the 
chief justification that was given for this agenda was the alleged abuse of homeless 
legislation by those seeking to gain accommodation by intentionally becoming homeless. 
However, the central concern of this section is not the content of stereotypes, but the 
manner in which they are formed and the influence that they hold over the construction of 
social identities. This is not to say that representations of the homeless on a national scale 
are unimportant; clearly this is not the case. Instead, this section will accept the findings of 
previous research and attempt to place these constructions within a theoretical framework 
that will account for differential interpretation of individual responsibility for 
homelessness. In this sense the competition between individualistic and structural 
conceptions of homelessness is important, but it is the `play' between these two poles that 
allows normative boundaries to be (temporarily) formed and a dominant discourse on 
homeless issues to begin to emerge. 
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Because the judgement of intentionality is ultimately subject to the local authority's 
discretion, the formation of social identities is unlikely to be solely governed by political 
rhetoric or media stereotypes. These factors are undoubtedly connected to policy, either as 
an influence or a justification, but it would seem unlikely that stereotypes are interpreted in 
uniform manner, particularly by those who work with the homeless. Cowan (1997) has 
noted the outcome of such decisions are likely to be influenced by a combination of stock 
availability and cultural expectations, but the important point for this section is that whilst 
stock availability differs between local areas, so do cultural understandings. 
Intentionality decisions are therefore relative, in the sense that the merits of 
applications are considered with reference to both the availability of local housing and the 
local cultural norms. Such a judgement can be seen to be an act of power, as to deem 
certain situations to be constitutive of a deserving position requires that a temporary 
boundary divides this position from other cases. As we have seen, this is the condition for 
revealing antagonisms, as the contested nature of this exclusion can only be partially 
resolved. As Mouffe (2000) notes: 
`If collective identities can only be established on the mode of us/them, it is clear 
that, under certain conditions, they can always be transformed into antagonistic 
relations. Antagonism, then, can never be eliminated and constitutes an ever present 
possibility in politics' (p. 13). 
One can therefore refer to local antagonisms as the conditions that govern the formation 
and re-formation of social identities within a given area. It is at this point that we return to 
construction of privileged and subjugated identities, but what is important to note is that the 
act of power necessary to form such positions is driven in part by a differential normative 
criterion; a local cultural understanding of acceptable reasons for homelessness. It is 
therefore important to consider the working of a discursive system that constructs social 
norms. It is through the consideration of such a model that behaviour can be judged to be 
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acceptable or unacceptable, this consideration being the bedrock of intentionality rulings. 
The work of Foucault (1967,1972) is useful in this task as the model of discourse that he 
presents is the model that Laclau and Mouffe adhere to. As such, this model focuses on the 
discontinuity of discourse, the breaks and ruptures that characterise a differential system. 
Foucault's accounts of discursive formations concentrate on the manner in which 
dominant ideas about a given subject emerge, primarily across different historical periods. 
For instance, in Madness and Civilization (1967), Foucault charts the development of forms 
of knowledge surrounding madness that produce a discursive subject or identity. What is 
central to this account is the idea that such discursive knowledge is accepted as truth, that 
the characteristics attributed to mental illness become `common sense' within the context of 
a historically specific discourse. This `constructivist' position is of course a familiar one, its 
basic proposition being that identities are formed by reference to social norms that are 
temporarily constituted and require the framework of a given discourse to be meaningful, or 
indeed acceptable. By extension, the construction of the intentionally homeless requires 
reference to discursive knowledge, in this instance the stereotypes that Cowan refers to, the 
same set of beliefs and differences that were instrumental in the formation of the test for the 
1977 Act. 
Madness and Civilization therefore holds a certain amount of resonance when 
discussing perceptions of normal behaviour, but for the purposes of this analysis, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) has a more direct significance. It is in this study that 
Foucault attempts to set down the methodology of his previous work and discuss the 
discursive patterns and rules that lead to the development of a form of normative 
knowledge. Central to this work is Foucault's conception of the `rules of formation' of a 
given discourse, the relationship between discontinuous elements of a discursive system 
(p. 44). These rules impose a temporal unity onto discourse, its constitution based on the 
dependent relationship between elements, which Foucault labels as objects, statements, 
concepts and strategies. A discourse is therefore characterised by the links between its 
various elements, each linked to and dependent on each other. 
135 
However what is critical for this section is the manner in which these relationships 
are modified, as a change to individual elements demands a new series of connections. 
Thus discourse cannot be considered to be fixed in its content: 
`A discursive formation, then, does not play the role of a figure that arrests time and 
freezes it for decades, or centuries; it determines a regularity proper to temporal 
processes; it presents the principle of articulation between a series of discursive 
events and other series of events, transformations, mutations and processes. It is not 
an atemporal form, but a schema of correspondence between several temporal 
series' (p. 83). 
This is an important point, as it highlights both the changeable content of discourse and the 
way in which elements from other discursive formations can have an influence. This refers 
back to the manner in which the `constitutive outside' influences the formation of 
discursive knowledge, as to include a new concept or statement necessarily influences the 
connections and inference within the formation. 
Thus within Foucault's theory there is the proposition that different discourses may 
influence each other at certain points. This clearly has implications for a theoretical 
approach to the analysis of intentionality, as various forms of knowledge surrounding the 
homeless are likely to differ according to various links between related discourses. 
However, whilst Foucault generally connects this theory to historical periods, the system of 
discourse that he presents can equally apply to varying values across geographical 
locations. Indeed, in an interview with geographers from the journal Herodote, he 
acknowledges that the logical conclusion of a circular conception of power is that 
discursive knowledge is not only constructed across time, but also across space: 
`The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of 
power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces. There is 
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much that could be said on the problems of regional identity and its conflicts with 
national identity' (Foucault, quoted in Gordon, 1980, p. 74). 
It is in this way that it is possible to identify a discursive framework to the 
judgement of intentionality that is not totally driven by legislation, political statements, 
press representation or available housing, but rather a combination of these factors. The 
implications of Foucault's conception of discourse point to a knowledge that is informed by 
too many elements to be totally unified, or to be interpreted uniformly through different 
regional environments. The crucial factor in this theory is the loose and flexible formation 
of elements; the tenuous links that impose a structure on an otherwise discontinuous 
collection of positions. By this reasoning, intentionality appears to demand an extremely 
relative judgement; one that is subject to discursive demands that are beyond the control of 
the applicant. 
Intentionality in the Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 
The Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 has made widespread changes to the 
judgment of intentionality in Scotland and offered an alternative to the framework 
described above. Firstly, it is has removed the obligation placed on local authorities to 
investigate an applicants intention to become homeless and replaced this with a power to do 
so in certain circumstances. This is primarily a practical measure, a mechanism whereby 
local authorities can save time and resources by not investigating the intention of an 
applicant in cases where it is deemed to be unnecessary. 
This measure clearly illustrates that in the view of the Scottish parliament, the 
judgement of intentionality is irrelevant in many cases. In addition to this, the act also 
increases the duty of local authorities towards those who are deemed to be intentionally 
homeless. Those in this situation are offered a short Scottish secure tenancy, a conditional 
agreement that sets out the obligations of the applicant and the support that will be provided 
for this period. Subject to the applicant fulfilling his/her responsibilities during this time, 
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the short tenancy will be `upgraded' to a full Scottish secure tenancy. Should the individual 
fail to meet their responsibilities in any way the local authority only has a duty to provide 
temporary accommodation. 
In relation to these changes the concept of the `constitutive outside' assumes a 
slightly more complex character. The changes to the intentionality ruling in Scotland differ 
from those concerning priority need, as whilst the latter presents a relatively simple 
alteration supported by a realisation that priority need demands a false distinction between 
applicants, the changes to intentionality propose that for those deemed to be intentionally 
homeless the consideration of the reasons for that homelessness is a proper and practically 
efficient course of action. Thus the `constitutive outside' becomes central, not in a 
prohibitive manner as a measure to enable the exclusion of the undeserving, but as a 
yardstick against which future behaviour can be judged. 
The previous sections of this chapter highlight the extra-discursive nature of the 
judgement required by intentionality, the establishment of a criterion of eligibility based on 
factors that lie beyond the boundaries of what could be referred to as housing discourse and 
the underlying assumptions of the legal changes in Scotland do not alter this position. In 
many ways, the changes to Scottish legislation present a selective view of homelessness as 
a phenomenon that is essentially agency-based, as the underlying assumption is that 
individuals can modify their behaviour when faced with their `last chance'. As we have 
seen throughout this chapter, the intentionally homeless have always been considered to be 
responsible for their own housing situation by the very nature of the category and the 
changes to Scottish law do not alter this position. 
However, the act as a whole is reflective of the belief that homelessness cannot be 
considered to be a phenomenon that can be explained by structural or agency based factors 
in isolation. As we have seen, the overall tenor of the act is one of increased rights for the 
homeless, the dissolution of exclusionary categories. This is contrasted with the approach to 
intentionality which, although unquestionably more inclusive than its predecessor, 
ultimately retains a focus on individual conduct and accepts that some applicants will 
require support and behavioural boundaries in order to sustain a tenancy. In this way the act 
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accepts the relevance of agency-based factors, reflecting the views of Neale (1997), Pleace 
(2000) and others, but retaining an overall focus on preventing exclusion. It is also 
significant for the part that individuals can play in promoting their own claims to housing; 
the formation of a short secure tenancy offers the chance for the homeless to negotiate their 
own housing rights. I will refer back to this point in chapter 8, but for the moment I want to 
continue to focus on the extent to which these changes offer a re-evaluation of the 
conditional nature of homeless policy. 
Indeed, opponents of the changes to intentionality were generally apprehensive 
because the proposals weren't conditional enough. One concern frequently voiced in 
debates on the bill related to the possible conflict between the national focus on anti-social 
behaviour and the new rules on intentionality. Early objections from the Social Justice 
Committee centred on a perceived imbalance between rights and responsibilities, in that 
those made homeless following eviction for anti-social behaviour would effectively receive 
no punishment for their improprieties, as the local authority would still have an obligation 
to offer a secure, albeit conditional, tenancy. This situation was eventually amended, as 
Margaret Curran MSP stated in the final debates: 
`The committee's report emphasised two areas: resources to support the bill and the 
general housing supply, and the need to balance rights and responsibilities. On the 
latter point, we lodged stage 2 amendments making it clear that the small minority 
of people who have a proven history of anti-social behaviour will not have an 
automatic right to access a short Scottish secure tenancy with support. Instead, they 
will be able to access only non-tenancy accommodation as a matter of course' 
(SPOR, 5thMarch 2003, col. 19030). 
Theoretically, the passage of this amendment presents an interesting further 
illustration of Foucault's (1972) `rules of formation'. Chiefly, the change to the proposal 
resulted from a clash between different departments; it is notable that the Scottish 
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Conservatives did not oppose the stage 1 version of intentionality, indeed they supported its 
proposed decentralisation of decision making. The opposition to this measure came from 
those in the Social Justice Committee who feared that the homeless legislation could 
undermine their work on anti-social behaviour, a sentiment that led Margaret Curran MSP 
to counter: 
`I assure the Parliament of my view that anti-social behaviour is wholly 
unacceptable. We are determined to tackle anti-social behaviour and to reclaim our 
neighbourhoods for the decent, law-abiding majority' (SPOR, 18th December 2002, 
col. 16457). 
From this point on the preventative agenda concerning anti-social behaviour appeared in 
the form of the aforementioned stage 2 amendment, detailing that local authorities would 
have no duty to re-house, despite Shelter's contention that this consideration was 
inappropriate in homeless legislation. 
As noted in the previous section, Foucault (1972) contends that discursive 
formations do not develop in isolation of one another. 
`.. discursive practices modify the domains that they relate to one another. It is no 
use establishing specific relations that can only be analysed at their own level- the 
effect of these relations is not confined to discourse alone: it is also felt in the 
elements that they articulate upon one another' (pp. 83-4). 
In this instance, it is the relationship between the domains of the Social Justice Committee 
and the Homelessness Committee that led to the eventual amendment. What is notable is 
the perceived opposition between the two discursive formations, the inclusive agenda of 
proposed homelessness legislation on the one hand and the punitive action of anti-social 
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behaviour orders on the other. It was this clash, in Laclau and Mouffe's terms, this 
antagonism that resulted in the exclusion of anti-social tenants from automatic homeless 
provision. 
It is also interesting that this amendment centred on one particular subject position, 
the anti-social tenant. No other groups received such special attention, which is particularly 
notable when it is considered that anti-social tenants make up an extremely small 
proportion of overall homeless cases. The Scottish Council for the Single Homeless (2002) 
state that, on average, a Scottish local authority may expect to handle seven cases of this 
nature each year. 
Again, the decision to exclude those who become homeless through anti-social 
behaviour can properly be described as a political concession, driven by an external 
criterion. As noted above, the changes to intentionality are intended to correct behaviour, to 
allow individuals a `second chance' to sustain a tenancy, and as Margaret Curran MSP 
noted, this is precisely the opportunity to be denied to this group. 
`We will ensure that tenants who have specifically been identified as anti-social 
cannot play the system of second chances through our provisions on 
intentionality .... 
However, in so doing, I am anxious not to devise a system whereby 
anti-social tenants can disappear into the private sector or into sub-let properties to 
cause misery among another community of neighbours' (SPOR, 18th December 
2002, col. 16458). 
The point here is not to comment on ethical implications of anti-social behaviour, but to 
note that the judgement required in this instance is of a realm beyond a pure housing 
discourse, whereas the `punishment' for this form of behaviour is a probable spell in 
temporary accommodation. This exclusion potentially lasts for three years from an eviction, 
which may simply displace the problem, rather than offering the possible solution of 
Scottish secure tenancies. 
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Despite the inconsistency in the treatment of applicants evicted for anti-social 
behaviour, the Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 considerably increases the rights and 
life-chances of those deemed to be intentionally homeless. Its approach to intentionality 
uses the `constitutive outside' not as a justification for exclusion, but as a basis for 
negotiation. In this way, the act properly considers both structural and agency based causes 
of homelessness, and uses these to allow individuals to collaborate in improving their 
housing situation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an overview of the theoretical issues inherent to the 
concept of intentionality. Beginning with a definition of this test, together with the 
conditions of its emergence, this chapter again noted the formation of a binary opposition 
which resulted in the exclusion of those deemed to be responsible for their own 
homelessness. The concept of antagonism, the force that can dislocate or stabilise identities, 
was then introduced into this discussion. In particular, the judgement of the constitutive 
outside of housing discourse was seen to be instrumental in sustaining an exclusionary 
framework. Furthermore, the judgement of this outside was seen to be differential across 
both time and geographical locations. Following this, the changes to Scottish law were 
considered. Again the role of the constitutive outside was seen to be relevant, with 
reference to the separate rules for those evicted following anti-social behaviour orders. 
However, the overall structure of provision for the intentionally homeless was seen to 
extend the boundaries of inclusion and allow individual applicants a greater stake within 
the housing system. 
So far the analysis of a conditional system of homeless policy has detailed the 
manner in which applicants have to fulfil certain criterion regarding both their individual 
characteristics and past behaviour, in order to qualify for housing assistance. The nature of 
this policy, the manner in which it divides applicants according to a politically constructed 
agenda, has been analysed through the application of Radical Democratic Theory. In the 
next chapter, the final category, that of local connection, will be discussed and the manner 
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in which this conditional framework is continued through the judgement of geographical 
location will be highlighted. 
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Chapter 7- Local Connection 
The third category to be examined is that of local connection. As the name suggests 
this is a measure whereby a local authority may refer an applicant to a different authority 
depending on their ties to the area in which they are applying. As such, local connection 
works in conjunction with two tests described in the previous two chapters; its chief 
function is to determine the location of re-housing for those applicants accepted as 
homeless. 
The test of local connection differs to the previous categories in two important 
ways. Firstly, the test of local connection is overtly descended from the systems of parish 
relief going back to the Elizabethan Poor Laws. Arden (1988), for instance, cites Lord 
Denning's contention that this measure is `curiously reminiscent of one of the features of 
the old Poor Law 1601, whereby paupers could be sent back to the parishes where they had 
a settlement' (p. 85). Thus, whilst priority need and intentionality requires a judgement of 
circumstance and behaviour respectively, the requirement of a connection to a local area 
demands a judgement concerning the proper location of an individual. 
In this way it is possible to see local connection as a measure of structural control, a 
mechanism for the geographical regulation of provision, and as an addition to the 
conditional agenda identified in the previous two chapters. As with the previous two 
categories, an individual local authority's duty does not extend to those deemed to have 
`failed'; those who have an insufficient tie to the area to justify re-housing. In contrast to 
the previous two categories, the local authority discharges it duty by referring the applicant 
to what is deemed to be the appropriate authority. Ostensibly at least, the stakes are not as 
high because as one authority's duty ends, another's begins. 
Therefore in contrast to the measures discussed in the two previous chapters, the test 
of local connection is not one that leads to exclusion by itself. However, as we will see, a 
referral to another local authority may result in a different ruling with regard to the 
applicant's intention to become homeless. It is at this point that the chain can come to an 
end and the situation reverts to that described in chapter 6. However, any exclusion from 
144 
provision is achieved in conjunction with other categories and not as a direct result of the 
test of local connection. 
This process has some implications for the differential nature of decision making 
described in the last chapter, as clearly geographical difference has an impact on the 
uniformity of provision. In addition to this, the issue of location is also one that impacts 
heavily on the potential success of re-housing, obviously an individual is more likely to 
sustain a tenancy when in proximity to available services, employment and support 
networks. However, the success of re-housing may also be dependent on acceptance within 
a new local area and therefore a consideration of the impact of antagonism is necessary. 
This chapter will therefore study the politics of local connection, beginning with an 
examination of its historical roots. In particular, the connections between the early forms of 
local connection will be considered in relation to the reasons for the inclusion of the local 
connection test within the 1977 Act. Following this the framework of geographical 
difference identified in the last chapter will be related to local connection and the practical 
and theoretical implications will be considered, particularly with relation to the manner in 
which discursive formations can be dislocated by antagonistic relationships between the 
homeless and the local community. Finally, current policy developments in the Scottish 
parliament will be placed within this paradigm. 
Space, Power and the History of Local Connection 
The issue of geographical location has a long history in approaches to vagrancy and 
homelessness. This agenda was continued in two senses by the 1977 act, both by the 
inclusion of a need for applicants to prove a `local connection' and by the opportunity for 
variation in decision making between local authorities. This variation actually has wider 
implications than a simple concern over local connection, it incorporates the differences in 
housing stock between local authorities and the previous decisions over such issues as 
`vulnerability' or `intentionality' that have set precedence in a given area. The extent to 
which local connection acts as a conditional test in the manner described in the previous 
145 
two chapters will be considered later in this chapter; initially I want to set out the historical 
and political grounding of a need to prove a connection to a local area. 
The legal enforcement of a connection to the area in order to qualify for assistance 
dates back to the parish relief systems of the old Poor Law, as does the reluctance of local 
authorities to provide assistance to those not directly linked to the local area. Those not 
deemed to be affiliated with the parish ran the risk of punishment under the various 
vagrancy acts of the time, punishments that frequently resulted in slavery and sometimes 
hanging for persistent offenders. Indeed, Woodbridge (2001) notes that from 1547 `poor 
laws came in pairs, one setting down penalties for the vagrant poor, the other providing 
relief for the settled poor' (p. 15). It is through this practice that it is possible to see the roots 
of the distinction between the housed poor and the homeless, a duality that was identified as 
a theme of current research in chapter 1. 
The undeserving/deserving opposition in Elizabethan England was therefore upheld 
through reference to a criterion of mobility. Contemporary fears about vagrants spreading 
sedition have been noted in chapter 4, but the initial point in this chapter concerns the 
punitive approach to the unsettled poor, in contrast to the relief granted to those settled in a 
particular area. In its most basic form this trend highlights a political construction of a 
normative boundary, the norm in this case being an affiliation with a local area in 
opposition to a discursive `other', the subversive, promiscuous and criminal vagrant. 
Woodbridge's comments on the response to the problems of vagrancy in Elizabethan 
England are interesting in this context, as she notes the manner in which the undeserving 
were so-labelled because of the perceived `aimless' nature of their movement (p. 254). In 
this way she proposes that vagrancy was seen as `the dark side of the Renaissance'; in that 
the homeless were viewed as symptomatic of a society in which the dominant cultural 
values were changing and society wished to restore a degree of normality (p. 254). 
It is possible to draw a parallel between an agenda that places emphasis on a rational 
motive for travel and the reasoning behind the modem category of local connection. The 
local connection clause in the 1977 Act stresses that in order to qualify for assistance, the 
applicant first has prove a degree of affiliation with the area through either 
family, 
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employment, personal history or `special circumstances' (DOE 1977, s 18). Thus the 
emphasis is placed on an applicant's reason for applying in a particular location, as well as 
their reason for leaving the previous area. 
Certainly, the assessment of motivation for travel was a key issue in the consultation 
period of the 1977 Act and the consideration of local connection resulted from a concern 
that certain authorities acted as `magnets', due to their location. Partington (1978) notes 
that this conclusion was not backed up by statistics of the time and points to figures that 
showed 92% of accepted applicants in 1976 had applied in their area of residence (p. 48). 
Furthermore, an amendment was proposed to exclude gypsies from re-housing over fears 
that the bill could provide `a charter for someone to buy a second-hand caravan and move 
around the country to the area that they liked most' (quoted in Richards 1981, p. 72). This 
amendment was eventually dropped, as the inclusion of a need to prove a local connection 
made its measures redundant, but clearly a judgment remained concerning the motives for 
travel. 
It would appear therefore that `aimless' wandering of Elizabethan vagrants was re- 
interpreted as a conscious decision, by some homeless applicants, to move to certain areas. 
What remains consistent between the two periods is the judgment of stimulus for mobility. 
As we have seen, the Elizabethans disapproved of `aimless' wandering not necessarily 
because it was unmotivated, but because it could mask a criminal or political motivation. In 
the same way, local connection prevents movement to guard against certain local 
authorities becoming overwhelmed by applications; those who do not have what is 
considered to be a legitimate reason to be in a certain place are treated the same as those 
who may be seeking to abuse homeless legislation. Thus whilst local connection ostensibly 
judges movement, it is ultimately the intention of the applicant that is under scrutiny. As in 
the case of intentionality, this bears some resemblance to Foucault's (1972) `rules of 
formation', as whilst the definition of `acceptable' movement has changed through time, 
the ultimate formation based on an either/or judgement that excludes the discursive `other' 
remains the same. 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, the judgement of intention requires a normative 
criterion to be judged against. In this case, the reasons for a local connection hold some 
significance as they form the normative guidelines by which an individual's claim for 
assistance can be assessed. Fundamentally these guidelines attempt to return an applicant to 
their `home'; this being assessed in respect of a family connection, or a long standing 
residence in an area. However, such considerations are overlooked if the applicant has 
employment in the area to which they are applying. Thus if the applicant can be considered 
to be an economic asset to the area, then no further proof of local connection is required. 12 
As in the case of priority need, local connection also allows for some local authority 
discretion is assessing claims. `Special circumstances' in this case was designed to include 
those who may have had reason to move to area, but for whom events dictated that 
assistance would be needed. Consequently, we can see a similar situation to vulnerability, 
as whilst local authorities were given set criteria against which applications could be 
judged, the interpretation of `special circumstances' determined whether discretionary cases 
could be accommodated. 
Initially we can see local connection as a tool by which local authorities could limit 
their responsibility to re-house applicants through defining the boundaries of their area and 
the criteria by which an individual can be said to belong in that area. Indeed, Richards 
(1981) claims that the introduction of local connection effectively removed the 
responsibility for provision that was enforced by the National Assistance Act 1948. Further 
back in history, Beier (1985) highlights that under the old poor law, assistance was granted 
to the poor in both their `birthplace or their last place of residence (p. 11 author's emphasis). 
Whilst it would inaccurate to suggest that the levels of provision available at these times 
were in any way comparable to those granted under the 1977 act, the stipulations over 
where an individual qualified for assistance appeared to have tightened. 
However, whilst the above indicates the development of a structural system of spatial 
control, the operation of local connection offers more subtle variations than can be 
accounted for within such a rigid framework. The next section will begin to outline some of 
12 This issue will be considered further in relation to homelessness and citizenship. 
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these variations and place local connection within the theoretical model that has been 
advanced thus far, assessing the extent to which a differential model of discourse highlights 
the capricious effect of local connection in determining deserving and undeserving 
identities in a particular area. 
The Constitutive Outside and Local Connection 
In one sense, and as in the case of intentionality, the inclusion of local connection 
lends a further conditional aspect to the `right to housing' proposed by the JCG. To relate 
this concept to the earlier application of the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985,1990), we 
need to return to the role of the constitutive outside in `blocking' the realisation of an 
identity. In this case, the role of the outside is more literal, as applications can be judged on 
geographical grounds. The outside in this sense considers the personal history of the 
individual's location, relating this to criteria under which a local authority has a 
responsibility to re-house. Thus we can see this measure operating in conjunction with 
priority need and intentionality, producing a judgement of individual characteristics, 
individual behaviour and proper location. 
This variation in decision making also applies to rulings on intentionality, particularly 
with regard to the manner in which local authorities exercise their discretion over 
interpreting individual cases. As noted in the previous chapter, the availability of local 
housing stock, as well as local interpretation of intention, is likely to hold considerable 
influence over the authority's decision making. Again this situation has a tradition 
stretching back to the Poor laws, for example Beier (1985) highlights the variable 
interpretation of poor relief by different parishes, stating `a beggar relieved as a poor 
traveller in one village might be arrested (for vagrancy) in the next' (p. 32). 
This also highlights the central facet of identity construction, namely its contingent 
nature. As we have seen, the various `outsides' that are considered in the judgement of 
intentionality are likely to be interpreted differently across different geographical locations, 
with the boundaries of what constitutes a legitimate position negotiated through a number 
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of localised factors. The point on the chain of equivalence at which the judgement of 
intentionality occurs is therefore likely to vary, but the net result of this decision remains 
the same. Thus, it is possible to speculate that whilst different `outsides' are judged by 
different authorities, the underlying moral judgment of intention differs only by degrees. 
Therefore, the judgement of the proper location of an applicant's claim for assistance 
is dependent on the consideration of the constitutive outside, the applicant's intention in 
coming to the area. However, this framework can be inverted in cases where applicant 
cannot return to the area in which they have a local connection. In the original terms of the 
1977 Act an applicant who is deemed to be at risk of domestic violence does not have to 
prove a local connection, provided the local authority to which they are applying is satisfied 
that there is a risk of the continuation of domestic violence if the applicant returns to their 
`home' area. 
This exemption from local connection was increased by the Homelessness Act 2002 to 
include victims of violence in a more general sense, with the expressed intention to include 
victims of racial harassment or anti-social behaviour within provision. 
`.. the perpetrators (of violence) are not always members or ex-members of the family. 
Racially motivated violence in particular can be a depressingly familiar fact of life for 
far too many people... No one should have to live under the shadow of violence, 
whatever its motivation. There is no rationale for distinguishing between a risk of 
domestic violence and any other form of violence' (Ms. Keeble MP, SCD, 10th July 
2001, clause 10 ). 
In such cases the test of local connection demands that the authority in receipt of the 
original application enters into negotiations with the authority to which the applicant has a 
local connection, to determine the likelihood of the violence reoccurring if they return to 
the area. In this case the constitutive outside can be used as a criterion for inclusion within a 
particular area, an instance in which the status of the applicant as a victim of violence can 
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lead to an acceptance of their own choice in the location of their assistance. As noted in the 
introduction, this measure also exemplifies the time-specific nature of definitions as racial 
violence was not considered as a justification for applying to a different area in 1977. 
Consequently it is possible to identify a judgement of the constitutive outside, of 
personal circumstance and history, in the same way as it is with regard to intentionality. 
However, as with intentionality and priority need, this judgment is not a fixed construct to 
be applied universally to all homeless applicants, it is subject to external pressure with 
respect to the location of the homeless. The next section will examine a particularly 
contentious example, that of asylum seekers, and highlight the role of political and social 
antagonism in influencing the proper location of applicants. 
Asylum Seekers and Local Antagonism 
As we have seen, the test of a local connection necessarily demands that an individual 
can claim a right to be in a certain area. This may be because of employment, family or 
length of residence, but ultimately the test determines the proper location of provision and, 
by extension, the proper location of the individual applicant. However, as the above case of 
those fleeing violence illustrates, for some applicants it is not possible to return to the area 
in which they may normally be housed. 
The negotiations that establish the eventual location of provision therefore determine 
local authority duty. In this case a conflict of interests may occur, between authorities who 
are short of stock, or who receive external pressure to re-house those who may be seen as 
undeserving applicants. This can result in the formation of antagonistic relationships 
between homeless applicants, who may be seen as `scroungers' or may be unwelcome in 
the area for some personal characteristic, and the local community. 
One of the more controversial examples of this relationship concerns the re-housing 
of asylum seekers. This category refers to those who are waiting to have their claim for 
asylum judged. Initially housing and benefits for this group are handled by the National 
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Asylum Support Service (NASS). 13 This service provides accommodation for asylum 
seekers, either in the controversial `detention centres', or in temporary accommodation 
provided through arrangements with local authorities. 
The relationship between asylum seekers and the communities to which they are sent 
can properly be classed as antagonistic in many cases. Asylum seekers are not classed as 
homeless and are only housed temporarily whilst their claims are processed. Nevertheless, 
their presence still provokes considerable unrest on both national and local levels. The issue 
of location is central in this instance and is one that can result in an antagonistic 
relationship between the local community and the asylum seekers. 
Examples of hostility towards asylum seekers are widespread. Perhaps the most high 
profile of these cases emerged in Kent during the late 1990's. The ports along the south 
coast experienced an influx of asylum seekers during and after the end of the Bosnian- 
Serbian-Croatian War in 1995, and this provoked some racial tension. In 1998, the Dover 
Express ran an editorial that caused national controversy: 
`Illegal immigration, asylum seekers, scum of the earth drug smugglers, have targeted 
our beloved coastline. We are left with a nation's human sewage and no cash to wash 
it down the drain' (Dover Express, I" October 1998). 
This was not an isolated sentiment, further stories emerged documenting clashes between 
locals and asylum seekers and in 1999 the National Front organised a march through the 
streets of Dover which resulted in confrontation between marchers and anti-fascist groups. 
This occurred against a background of rising concern surrounding asylum issues, with 
opposition politicians accusing the government of accommodating too many asylum 
seekers. Following this, the Homelessness (Asylum-Seekers) (Interim Period) (England) 
13 This provision has a varied history over recent years. The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 removed 
asylum seekers right to standard benefits, placing these payments in the hands of NASS. The support payment 
equals about 70% of income support. 
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Order 1999 introduced powers to allow asylum seekers to be dispersed, with particular 
reference to reducing the numbers in London and Kent. 
For those individuals sent around the country, the situation can be very similar. A 
Kenyan woman, Kamwaura Nygothi writing in The Guardian, documented a series of 
racist incidents following her dispersal to Middlesbrough. On her arrival she was presented 
with a leaflet that warned of potential racist abuse and attacks, but stated that `while 
members of the team are happy to listen your concerns, they can't deal with non- 
emergencies' (The Guardian, Thursday 8thJuly 2004). Other incidents, such as the murder 
of an asylum seeker in Glasgow, would appear to suggest that antagonism exists in areas 
beyond London and Kent; indeed Nygothi states that: 
`In London, where I was initially placed, I felt safe for the first time in years. There is 
a large Kenyan community there: it's an environment where people from many 
different backgrounds mostly live peacefully together and where there are support 
services for traumatised asylum seekers, including the only services in the country for 
female asylum seekers who have been raped' (The Guardian, Thursday 8t' July 
2004). 
Such cases illustrate what Mouffe (2000) refers to as the `ineradicable character' of 
antagonism and power (p. 21). As we have seen, the idea of radical democracy is based on 
multiplicity; antagonism being the force that prevents a `total' vision of society. In this 
case, the emphasis on irreducible social relations can seem like a dangerous idea, After all 
if antagonism is an ever-present feature of social relations then there appears to be no 
theoretical grounds to condemn the type of discrimination experienced by asylum seekers 
themselves. 
Mouffe (2000) attempts to clarify this position, by distancing herself form the post- 
modem perspective that views democracy as pluralism without limits; as an endless 
conversation. Whilst she accepts that antagonism cannot eliminated she contends that a 
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limitless perception of pluralism underestimates the role of power in producing 
subordinated identities. Antagonistic relationships do not necessarily emerge between 
parties of equal influence and to ignore these inequalities is tantamount to supporting 
existing hierarchies. In such a position: 
`There is only a multiplicity of identities without any common denominator, and it is 
impossible to distinguish between differences that exist but should not exist and 
differences that do not exist but should exist' (p. 20). 
Thus in the case of Kamwaura Nygothi such a perspective would not be able to distinguish 
between the rights of the asylum seeker to live free from discrimination, and the attempts of 
racists to constitute their own particular nationalistic identity, by ridding their community 
of immigrants. 
Therefore Mouffe is mindful that `no social agent should be able to claim any mastery 
of the foundation of society' and the limit of pluralism necessarily occurs at the point where 
one group attempts to assert this claim (p. 21, author's emphasis). Whilst antagonism is ever 
present and can only be suppressed by the domination of particular identities, the project of 
radical democracy should provide a set of institutions through which claims can be `limited 
and negotiated' (p. 22). In this way antagonisms can be judged against an external, 
institutional, ethical criterion. 
The example of asylum seekers provides an extremely visible illustration of the 
antagonistic politics involved in placing a group within a certain locality, of the opposition 
that may arise within local communities. What is really at stake in these cases are the 
different interpretations of a legitimate reason to become part of a given community, a 
judgement of the constitutive outside that can also apply to more conventional homeless 
cases, for example offenders housed within local communities. The work of Mouffe 
highlights the need for institutional support for subordinated groups, crucially noting the 
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irreducible nature of antagonism in this context and the importance of the role of the state 
in mediating between opponents. 
The Suspension of Local Connection in Scotland 
The previous sections have highlighted the role of the constitutive outside in the 
judgement of an applicant's proper location, both in terms of local authority decision 
making and the opposition of local communities that may influence decision making. With 
respect to these issues it is worth dwelling on the potential impact of policy changes in 
Scotland, as this legislation attempts to dispense with judgments of this nature. 
The previous discussions of the Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 show a piece 
of legislation that has attempted to abolish, or at least reformulate, the conditional nature of 
homeless policy. In this light it is hardly surprising that the act suspends the local 
connection test, with the option to re-activate it if an area is seen to attract a 
disproportionate number of applications. The reasons behind this suspension are varied, but 
chiefly the change is geared to the overall aim of the act; namely increasing the rights of 
homeless people. In particular, it was felt that suspending the local connection test would 
enable applicants greater choice in choosing a location where they had the greatest chance 
of settling and sustaining a tenancy. 
Interestingly this measure was undertaken on the assumption that most applicants, 
faced with greater choice, would simply apply to their own local authority: 
`In 2001-02, only 2.1 per cent of all homeless applications were referred to another 
local authority. The homelessness task force found that the greatest cause of 
dissatisfaction concerned where people were housed, which could be a huge barrier to 
feeling settled, particularly among those who were housed away from their home 
areas' (Mr. Kenneth Gibson MSP, SPOR, 180' December 2002, col. 16463). 
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Therefore, the homeless task force were able to recommend the suspension of local 
connection in the knowledge that relatively few applicants would take advantage of the 
greater choice on offer. This is in some ways reminiscent of `Tenant's Choice', a scheme 
introduced by the Conservative government through the Housing Act 1988, in which 
tenants were given the opportunity to transfer from the local authority to a private landlord. 
The scheme failed, as the majority of tenants felt they had little incentive to change and 
exercise their new rights. Thus, the difference between the two instances is related to the 
expectation of the government, as whilst the Conservatives felt that most would want to 
exercise choice, the changes to local connection in Scotland were introduced on the 
understanding that very few applicants would actually move out of their local area. In this 
light it is revealing that the local connection test is suspended rather than repealed, and 
should too many applicants want to switch areas, there remains the opportunity to re- 
introduce the test at either a national or local level; an option explicitly referred to during 
debates. This echoes King's (2003) concern that the application of the concept of choice 
within third way housing policy can be misleading; in the case of choice based letting 
offering the applicant an illusion of choice whilst retaining the hierarchical structure of 
landlord/tenant relationship that existed under points based schemes. 
Opponents of the suspension generally ignored the issue of choice and focused on the 
same issues that were prevalent during debates prior to the 1977 act. Again the notion of 
certain local authorities attracting an unworkable number of applications was referred to: 
`For example, in its evidence to the committee, Highland Council talked about the 
lack of available housing in our less-populated rural areas. Highland and island life 
can be particularly attractive to many, but one or two families can deplete the stock of 
social housing' (Mrs Lyndsay McIntosh MSP, SPOR, 18th December 2002, col. 
16467). 
156 
The response to this point highlighted that of the few homeless people that apply outside of 
their local area, a very small proportion head to the highlands and islands of Scotland, in 
fact the majority head for Glasgow where there are more services and a perceived greater 
chance of employment. 
A point more pertinent to the concerns of this chapter relates to the possible local 
effect of any increase in applications from outside a given area. 
`Local authorities will no longer be able to investigate the local connection of an 
applicant or refer that applicant to another locality where they are deemed to have a 
connection. COSLA stated that some of its members: 
".. have expressed concerns regarding the impact of the suspension of the local 
connection and the potential impact on the balance and sustainability of local 
communities"' (Mr. Kenneth Gibson MSP, SPOR, 18th December 2002, col. 
16463). 14 
In one way this statement refers back to the issue of supply and demand, but the reference 
to `balance' in the community can be seen as revealing in the context of this chapter. 
Specifically the concerns of the local authority relate to potential disruption in local 
communities as a result of an influx of homeless applicants. 
The implications of this position connect to the earlier discussion on antagonism 
between homeless applicants applying outside their local area and some people within that 
local area. The notion of balance in this sense is central, as it is the balance of an identity, 
its temporary constitution; that is ruptured by antagonism. This is not to suggest that those 
from outside of the community necessarily act as aggressors, indeed the reverse is more 
likely to be the case. However, in the case of an ex-offender being housed within a local 
area, any aggressive reaction to that individual is likely to polarise the relationships 
14 COSLA- Committee of Scottish Local Authorities 
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between community members in a similar manner to which it polarises the relationship 
between the community and the applicant. 
Therefore, in the view of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), COSLA is correct to imagine 
that such an influx may alter the `balance' of the community. However, the re-instatement 
of local connection would not resolve this conflict, but merely move it to a different 
location. Here it is useful to refer back Mouffe's (2000) conception of radical democracy, 
where institutions are supposed to act in order to restrict this `surplus' of difference and 
prevent discrimination. It is in this sense that the local authorities themselves have a role to 
play in ensuring the integration, or at least safety, of the applicant, as well as allaying the 
fears of some within the community. Clearly this is a resource intensive task and thus it is 
easy to see the root of local authority objections, as the suspension of local connection 
removes a measure by which an authority may discharge their duty to an applicant who 
may demand budget money and staff time. 
The suspension of local connection offers the possibility of greater access to 
sustainable housing for homeless people in Scotland, although it is debatable how much 
difference it will actually make given that the majority apply within their local area. It is 
also merely a suspension, there are no commitments to repeal as in the case of priority need 
and indeed, the suspension was partially enacted on the understanding that it would not 
make a great deal of difference. Consequently it remains to be seen if there will be an influx 
of applications to certain local areas, or if this relocation brings about more of the type of 
antagonistic situations highlighted throughout this chapter. In that case, the local 
connection test may be reinstated and legislation may return to its pre-2003 state. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the major issues involved in the judgement of local 
connection, with particular reference to the theoretical framework put forward thus 
far. 
Initially local connection was defined in relation to the parish relief systems of the old Poor 
laws. A common assessment of the intention behind mobility was noted in both time 
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periods, a judgement that again can be seen as a normative judgement. The concept of 
antagonism was again used to illustrate the problems faced by many applicants who are 
bound to a local area, with specific reference to asylum seekers. Such instances were seen 
to be important, as they illustrate how the confines of local connection can exacerbate 
antagonisms. Equally, the response of Mouffe (2000) to such a situation was seen to be 
important, as she advocates an imposed limit to antagonism in this context. Finally, the 
suspension of local connection in Scotland was seen to be a beneficial step in allowing 
applicants to pursue their best chance of sustaining a tenancy, either through proximity to 
friends or services, or the possibility of employment. However, this endorsement was 
tempered by a degree of caution, as heavy mobility is likely to lead to the reintroduction of 
the local connection test. 
The previous three chapters have sought to identify a conditional approach to 
homeless policy, in which applicants who do not fulfil particular criterion with regard to 
circumstance, behaviour and location are excluded from housing assistance. However, 
when the 1977 Act's `right to housing' is considered, we can also view this as an exclusion 
from the rights of citizenship. In the final chapter I want to consider the nature of this 
exclusion in more detail and offer an alternative framework to conditional categories that 
have identified in the previous three chapters. Specifically this will involve a discussion of 
radical democratic citizenship and the potential that this model holds for progressing 
beyond a policy based on the dualism of structure and agency. 
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Chapter 8- Citizenship and Homelessness 
The preceding analysis has attempted to deconstruct homeless policy using the 
social theory of Laclau and Mouffe, highlighting the exclusionary practices that are 
inherent to identity formation, as well as the normative assumptions that have led to certain 
identities being positioned above others in a hierarchy of need. 
However, as noted in chapter 3, this theoretical approach has been criticised for the 
lack of alternative solutions proposed. This is a general problem of the deconstructive 
approach, for instance Hall (1996) notes that the process of putting essentialist concepts 
`under eraser' is tempered by the knowledge that there are `no other, entirely different 
concepts with which to replace them, there is nothing to do, but continue to think with 
them' (p. 1). Laclau (1990) makes a similar point when he notes that whilst privileging the 
excluded `other' in identity formation can lead to the destruction of hierarchies, these 
hierarchies are simply re-built with new exclusions. 
In terms of homelessness, this argument manifests itself through reference to 
deserving/undeserving duality. As we have seen, any attempt to privilege the homeless 
`other' in housing discourse has been met by concerns surrounding the effect on deserving 
identities; for instance, throughout debates on the 1977 Act opponents of the bill 
maintained that homeless legislation would effectively exclude those on housing waiting 
lists by favouring cases of homelessness. Thus, privileging undeserving identities is seen to 
exclude deserving identities, an inversion that gives rise to the possibility of new 
antagonisms. To some extent this possibility has been negated by the Homeless etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2003, but as we have seen these changes are to be implemented on a 
provisional timetable and the reactions of local authorities to their increased duties remain 
to be seen. 
If identities are defined against their discursive `other'; if the irreducibility of 
antagonism prevents the possibility of a fully constituted position, then the theoretical focus 
shifts to the point of temporary constitution. If we are to avoid Neale's (1997) `circular 
arguments' with regard to homelessness, then it is necessary to allow for the multiplicity of 
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identities whilst ensuring that claims are judged against an external ethical criterion. The 
practical limitations imposed by the availability of housing stock may mean that a complete 
departure from conditional homeless policy is unlikely; indeed it may be viewed as 
ethically undesirable. Therefore the point of temporary constitution, the criterion by which 
an identity is judged to be deserving or undeserving, becomes central to analysis. 
The key question for this chapter therefore concerns the alternative to conditional 
categories that is suggested by this position; specifically what kind of approach to 
homelessness does radical democracy imply? As I have noted in chapter 3, Mouffe (1992a, 
1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 1996,2000) has attempted to address these issues and re-negotiate 
the relationship between the universal and the particular, specifically through reference to 
notions of inclusion within the concept of citizenship. This chapter will therefore analyse 
the manner in which identities can be constituted within the boundaries of citizenship, the 
consideration of the proper role of individuals in identity formation. 
This chapter will begin by providing a brief overview of theories of citizenship and 
placing Mouffe's work within this context. Following this, the points of association 
between radical democratic citizenship and the issues discussed in the preceding chapters 
will be considered along with Mouffe's approach to ethics and its implications for homeless 
policy. Finally, this model will be tested with reference to Kennet's (1999) account of the 
version of citizenship implied by the current Labour government. 
Perspectives on Citizenship 
Notions of citizenship have assumed some importance in social theory in recent 
years, a development that Isin and Wood (1999) attribute to the increased awareness of 
identity politics. They identify an increased awareness of group rights and note struggles to 
include issues of ecology, sexuality, gender or ethnicity within the national polity. Debates 
over citizenship therefore reflect struggles over identity, as the increased prominence of 
claims for group rights highlight the existence of exclusions from the political sphere. As 
we have seen in chapter 3, Marx (1977) suggested that citizenship is a concept that attempts 
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to formalise rights in order to separate the public and private spheres, this severance acting 
to present the illusion of equality in legal terms, whilst preserving sources of power within 
the private realm. However, the emergence of rights claims from diverse and differentiated 
groups would appear to cast doubt on this conclusion, as a demand for rights based on an 
assertion of a group identity suggests a challenge to the hierarchies of `private' power. 
Although recent discussions of citizenship frequently spill over into debates on 
identity, the two concepts retain significant differences. Firstly, citizenship is a legal 
concept that sets out who is covered by its terms. It is frequently pointed out that 
citizenship should encompass debates surrounding inclusion and belonging, but `ultimately 
citizenship allows or disallows civil, political and social rights and obligations in a polity' 
(Isin and Wood 1999, p. 19). This is the first point in discussing citizenship, namely that at 
its base it is a concept that results in a tangible inclusion or exclusion from legal rights. As 
Turner (1990) notes, sociological and legal conceptions of citizenship are inextricably 
linked, the former acting as a `gateway' to universal rights and duties. 
Theories of citizenship are ultimately concerned with who qualifies for these legal 
rights. The issue of inclusion has been the red thread running through this thesis and 
therefore conceptions of citizenship hold some significance for the discussion of 
homelessness. For example Rowe et al. (2001) document the need to integrate homeless 
people suffering from mental illness within housed communities and the beneficial effects 
that this inclusion may have for individuals. In this sense they are referring to `citizenship 
opportunities'; opening up the possibilities for citizenship to foster a sense of belonging for 
the homeless within the community (p. 18). Alternatively one can point to the exclusion 
from the legal rights of citizenship that homelessness can present, for example the 1977 
act's proposed `right to housing' suggests a natural entitlement for citizens, an entitlement 
that can be prevented by the conditional nature of housing policy. However, this example 
also highlights the precarious nature of inclusion within the terms of citizenship, as such a 
right did not exist before the 1977 act and the terms of qualification within homeless policy 
have altered in subsequent years. Consequently the extent of citizenship, the role of 
individuals suggested by differing perspectives, deserves some consideration. 
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Broadly speaking, theories of citizenship can be divided into communitarian and 
liberal perspectives, although these two labels mask a diverse range of thought in both 
schools. To begin with liberalism, Isin and Wood (1999) note four common features of 
liberal thought. Firstly, they point to they point to the `moral primacy of the person against 
any claims to social collectivity', a view that stresses an equality of opportunity rather than 
outcomes (p. 143). Therefore, liberalism is democratic in allowing all citizens equal rights 
regardless of social position, and universal in that it emphasizes the common features of 
human nature over social and cultural specificities. This view is also progressive; `it affirms 
the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements' 
(p. 143). Consequently, at the heart of liberal conceptions of citizenship lies a view of 
individuals endowed with natural democratic rights; the manner in which these rights are 
conceptualised assuming some importance. 
Liberal thinkers such as Nozick (1974) place an emphasis on negative rights, in that 
individuals are entitled to be free from coercion. As King (2003) notes, this emphasis has 
the advantage of ensuring that rights `do not clash', as whilst state interference impinges on 
the rights of all citizens, `these thinkers would argue that the enjoyment of life, liberty and 
property by one does not deny it to others' (p. 53). However, this view can be challenged, 
albeit in an indirect way, by reference to the declining stocks of social housing in the wake 
of the `right to buy' initiatives of the 1980's. In committee debates for the Homeless etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2003 the issue of resources provoked some concern, as dwindling stocks of 
local authority housing threatened the proposals to re-house the homeless. 
`Does the member agree that, during the Conservatives' term of office, about 
350,000 houses were taken out of the social rented market through the right to buy? 
Does she recognise that the incidence of homelessness went up to a record level 
during that time? Does she recognise the correlation between the lack of housing 
and the length of housing queues? ' (Tricia Marwick MSP, SPOR, 18th December 
2002, col. 16469) 
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In this case, it was state interference that allowed some individuals to enjoy `life, liberty 
and property', whilst simultaneously denying this possibility to others in the future. This 
highlights a central problem for the liberal perspective, as the emphasis on individuality 
over social or historical factors means that this perspective ignores the role of power in 
privileging some identities over others. 
As we have seen, King's (2003) use of Waldron's arguments has shown that the 
concept of negative rights is useful as a defence against the coercive tactics employed 
against rough sleepers, but there is also a major drawback to its application in this instance. 
Negative rights can only allow for the protection of an individual to pursue their own ends; 
the liberal rejection of equality of outcome prevents citizenship meaning anything beyond a 
universal freedom from coercion. In this sense, Marx's earlier critique of the concept still 
applies, as whilst the protection of negative rights for rough sleepers provides a legal 
equality with the housed population, this equality is strictly limited to the public sphere. For 
many rough sleepers attempting to pursue their own ends within the private sphere, for 
instance to find housing or employment, a whole host of difficulties, prejudices and issues 
of individual competence are likely to dictate. Thus, in this context the liberal acceptance of 
inequality coupled with the promotion of negative rights is likely to lead to the continued 
exclusion of the homeless. 
In this sense a more inclusive citizenship for the homeless demands a corresponding 
focus on positive rights; the legal entitlement to services or goods. Perhaps the most famous 
account of citizenship in this context is that of Marshall (1992), who attempts to address the 
issue of social inequalities within liberalism. Turner (1992) notes that the basis of 
Marshall's thought lies in the `liberal tradition of James Mill and J. S. Mill' and his 
fundamental concern lay in the perceived gap between social equality and individual 
freedom (p. 35). 
Marshall divided citizenship rights into three spheres; those of civil rights, political 
rights and social rights. He identified the emergence of civil rights in Britain around the 
eighteenth century, this sphere corresponding to the liberal concern of freedom from 
coercion, protected by equal access to the legal system. The second sphere, political rights, 
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concerns individual involvement in the political process. The strengthening of political 
rights is situated at the around the end of the nineteenth century, illustrated by increased 
electoral rights for workers. Finally, social rights are conceptualised as rights of 
entitlement, specifically to welfare provision in post-war Britain. It is in this final sense that 
the advent of homeless legislation can be considered to promote `a right to housing', as it is 
a social right of homeless citizens to be re-housed. However, as we have seen this right is 
far from universal and therefore illustrative of Marshall's contention that social rights exist 
in conflict with the minimal liberalism of capitalist society. In some ways it is this conflict 
that provides the site for struggles over homeless identities, as we have seen definitions of 
homelessness emerge at the point of compromise between those seeking to enforce the 
social rights of the homeless, and those whose primary concern is to prevent the 
unwarranted applications and therefore limit state spending. The re-housing of the homeless 
therefore requires a focus on positive rights, an idea that appears to sit uneasily with the 
liberal perspective, due to the tension between positive and negative forms of liberty. 
A second perspective on citizenship, that of communitarianism, has developed an 
extensive critique of liberalism, although Delaney (2003) notes that this perspective has 
developed in opposition to Rawls (1971) rather than classical liberalism. The chief 
disagreement between the communitarians and liberals occurs in the different conceptions 
of the purpose of citizenship, as whilst we have seen the liberal emphasis on the freedom of 
the individual, communitarians believe that individual citizens should act in such a way as 
to further the `common good'. Therefore the conflict between liberals and communitarians 
lies in their respective prioritisation of individual liberty and utilitarian aims. The 
communitarian perspective dispenses with the idea of an autonomous individual, whose 
identity is formed prior to policy and who should be free to pursue their own diverse 
interests. Instead, this perspective adheres to a version of citizenship that presents an 
individual who is embedded in the social practices of their specific culture, and for whom 
citizenship represents a common identity that overrides all other associations or 
desires. As 
Sandal (1998) states: 
165 
`.. to say that the members of a society are bound by a sense of community is not 
simply to say that a great many of them profess communitarian sentiments and 
pursue communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their identity- the subject 
and not just the object of their feelings and aspirations- as defined to some extent by 
the community of which they are a part' (quoted in Isin and Wood, 1999, p. 8). 
In some respects this perspective is closer to Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) than the 
individual bias of liberalism, as identities are culturally defined rather than autonomously 
chosen. However, the central problem with this perspective relates to the issue of defining 
the `common good' and the corresponding erosion of individual liberty that this entails. If 
we relate this idea back to King's (2003) use of Waldron's analysis of the rights of rough 
sleepers, it is possible to see a justification for the exclusion of rough sleepers from certain 
public places based on an idea of the common good, whether it is expressed in terms of 
damage to business, tourism, or the sensitivity of the community. The current Labour 
government have used such arguments, both against the rights of rough sleepers to be in 
certain places (SEU, 1998) and the practice of begging with the recent white paper on anti- 
social behaviour (Home Office, 2003). 
In this way it is possible to see both liberalism and communitarianism as universal 
conceptions, as whilst liberalism proposes an initial equality of individuals, who are then 
left alone to arrive at different outcomes, communitarianism envisages a diversity of 
identities which should be superseded by a common goal. Consequently, 
communitarianism proposes a citizenship that is not only universal in terms of individual 
outcomes, but also in terms of individual aspirations. The desire to protect communities 
through reference to a common good promotes a necessarily exclusive vision of who 
should belong within such communities. It is at this point that the communitarian model 
ceases to be useful for the study of homelessness, as we saw in the case of local connection 
it was concerns over community stability that formed a justification for the exclusion of 
homeless people from particular areas. In this very literal sense, the notion community is 
destabilised by what it lacks and efforts to preserve community identity will therefore be 
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overdetermined boundaries, with the expressed aim of excluding those who are perceived 
to be `other' to a particular notion of the common good. 
Both liberalism and communitarianism contain elements of a citizenship that may 
be helpfully applied to homelessness. The liberal emphasis on freedom from coercion 
draws attention to the manner in which the homeless can be discriminated against, whilst 
the communitarian critique highlights the need to take account of group rights. However, 
the weaknesses of these perspectives discussed in this section, the liberal disregard for the 
role of power in constructing subjugated identities and the communitarian repression of 
difference, highlight the need to move beyond this model. In the next section I want to 
consider how Mouffe's (1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 1996,2000) notion of citizenship and 
belonging within a political community may be useful in overcoming these difficulties and 
providing a framework whereby the needs and rights of the homeless can be adequately 
addressed. 
Radical Democratic Citizenship and Homelessness 
In chapter 31 began to outline Mouffe's approach to citizenship in order to bring 
her development of radical democratic theory to its current point. In this section I want to 
expand on this position and highlight the manner in which Mouffe's later work attempts to 
address the tension between individual rights and the common good, as well as the early 
criticisms aimed at radical democratic theory. In order to begin this analysis I will briefly 
re-state the development of this idea of citizenship and situate it within the debate outlined 
above, before applying it to some the issues in homeless policy identified thus far. 
The central thesis of Mouffe's approach to citizenship rests on the idea of 
antagonism. In Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) approach to social identity, antagonism was the 
force that caused the re-negotiation of privileged identities in relation to the discursive 
other, either to reassert the existing hierarchy or to negotiate a new one. The antagonism of 
Mouffe's concept of citizenship has the same binary roots; two opposite poles compete for 
ascendancy within a political community. In the previous section we saw how the 
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communitarian notion of equality of outcome conflicts with the liberal acceptance of 
agency-based inequalities, the resulting balance between the two perspectives having 
profound implications for inclusion within the terms of citizenship. 
Mouffe (2000) takes this duality a step further and applies it to the notion of liberal 
democracy. By their very nature the two constituent parts of this concept are opposed, the 
rights of the individual represented by liberalism against the common good of the people 
within a democracy. Thus any attempt to assert the dominance of one side results in the 
subordination of the other, and the possibility of antagonistic reprisals. Throughout this 
thesis this situation has revealed itself as the very possibility of homeless policy, the 
adversarial relationship between advocates of minimal or comprehensive legislation, 
individual rights or the common good, agency-based or structural explanations of 
homelessness. 
Mouffe's starting point is Rawls' contention that individual rights cannot be 
overridden for the sake of the common good. However, she stops short of endorsing what 
she sees as Rawls' absolute prioritisation of individual rights, as `it is only through 
participation in a community which defines the good in a certain way that we can acquire a 
sense of the right and a conception of justice' (Mouffe 1992a, pp. 230-1). In this way 
Mouffe recognises that the content of rights are specific to a particular political 
arrangement, that of liberal democracy. It is at the point of identification with this system 
that Mouffe sites the concept of citizenship, although crucially she believes that citizenship 
should not be seen as an identity in the sense that it dominates over social allegiances. 
Rather it is seen as a common point of appeal, guaranteed through reference to the opposed 
aims of liberty and equality, for individuals to be able forward claims for positive rights. 
The advantage of this form of allegiance for the study of homelessness is that it 
stresses the pluralism inherent to the liberal model whilst retaining a semblance of the 
communitarian adherence to the concept of equality. The emphasis on plurality retains an 
important feature of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy's (1985) critique of Marxism, 
namely a distrust of oppressive and authoritarian measures. This can be seen to be 
important for the study of homelessness in sense that it protects freedom rights and guards 
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against the type of coercion identified by Waldron (1993). Indeed it is possible to compare 
this element of radical democratic citizenship to Marshall's (1992) conception of civil and 
political rights, in the sense of an appeal to the liberty element of liberal democracy. 
Mouffe considers this to be the platform by which groups can negotiate more positive, 
social rights, but her portrayal of the manner in which inclusion can be achieved has 
provoked some criticism. Isin and Wood (1999) highlight this point when they accuse 
Mouffe of conflating citizenship and identity, as despite her intention to avoid exclusion 
they claim that citizenship becomes an identity that trumps all other associations. Mouffe's 
refusal to insist on differentiated citizenship for subordinated groups provokes particular 
criticism, as by ignoring the particular demands of specific groups she is seen to fall into 
the liberal trap of ignoring power relations. 
This is of central importance to the study of homelessness, as a model of 
citizenship that cannot adequately address existing inequalities is of little use in this 
context. Certainly Mouffe (1992a) is adamant in her criticisms of the liberal disregard of 
power, of the manner in which inclusion and the expansion of citizenship rights is viewed 
as a painless transition. Equally, Mouffe insists on a universal allegiance for subjugated 
groups, formed on the basis of the equivalence of their exclusion. Her refusal to insist on a 
differentiated citizenship is justified on the grounds that such a concept would essentialize 
identity and constitute it in opposition to a `normal' citizenship. 
Isin and Wood (1999) claim that this highlights the manner which Mouffe fails to 
recognise that `certain identities are built as durable dispositions via practices that should 
be used as resources rather than differences to be effaced' (p. 13). In this way Mouffe's 
refusal to differentiate identities through the concept of citizenship is seen to be a 
suppression of difference. However, she maintains that the promotion of difference should 
be encouraged, not through a formalised, differential citizenship, but as a consequence of 
multiple interpretations of the common values of liberal democracy. 
`In a liberal democratic regime we can conceive of the respublica as constituted by 
the political principles of such a regime: equality and liberty for all. If we put such a 
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content in Oakeshott's notion of respublica we can confirm that the conditions to be 
subscribed to and taken into account in acting are to be understood as the exigency 
of treating others as free and equal persons. This is clearly open to potentially very 
radical interpretations. For instance, a radical democratic interpretation will 
emphasise the numerous social relations where relations of domination exist and 
must be challenged if the principles of liberty and equality are to apply' (Mouffe 
1992a, p. 236) 
In this sense citizenship does not represent a differential set of rights and duties by which 
an excluded group may achieve inclusion, but rather a set of rules, a commitment to a 
political system which allows differences to flourish within certain limits. As shown in 
chapter 7, certain situations, such as the example of the antagonistic relationship between 
asylum seekers and local communities, require that institutions intervene on the basis of 
these rules in order to prevent discrimination. 
As I noted in chapter 3, it is the relationship between the universal agenda of liberal 
democracy and the particular demands of citizenship that leads Mouffe to reformulate the 
association between the public and private realms of citizenship. Instead of the distinction 
between the two spheres supported by liberal doctrines, or the collapse of the private into 
the public that is implied by the communitarian position, Mouffe (1992a) considers a 
perspective in which the `wants, choices and decisions are private because they are the 
responsibility of each individual but the performances are public because they are required 
to subscribe to the conditions specified in respublica' (p. 238). As shown in chapter 3, this 
position has the effect of expanding the political arena as the assertion of identities can be 
viewed as political and challenges to power relations can be instigated from within the 
cultural or social spheres. 
This notion of private informing the public is potentially useful for the study of 
homelessness and can be illustrated by reference to the provision for the intentionally 
homeless in the Homeless etc. (Scotland) Act 2003. As we saw in chapter 6 this mechanism 
judges the private decisions of applicants in the same way as its English equivalent, but it is 
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the public results of those decisions that are relevant. The central difference between these 
two cases is that whilst both systems consider that intentional homelessness is a 
transgression of the terms of citizenship, in that it is seen to constitute an illegitimate claim 
against the state and therefore an infringement against the liberty of individual tax payers, 
the Scottish example does not consider this to be a justification for exclusion. In such a 
case, the judgement of the public results of private decisions is seen to hold the key to the 
prevention of future homelessness for that individual and therefore provide the framework 
by which that individual can negotiate a positive right to housing. The conditionality of 
short secure tenancies is therefore imposed as a necessary limit to endless re-negotiation 
and the individual applicant is given a chance to address the reasons their homelessness. 
The Scottish approach to intentionality can therefore be seen to address some of the 
issues highlighted in this chapter; furthermore it provides an illustration of some potential 
benefits in applying Mouffe's model to homelessness. The desire to overcome exclusionary 
practices is illustrated through the refusal to immediately bar the intentionally homeless. 
Equally, applicants are afforded the opportunity to negotiate their own rights, admittedly 
against a criterion of responsibility rather than need. Finally, the conditionality of the short 
tenure implements the necessary limits to pluralism that Mouffe discusses. 
Radical democratic citizenship therefore holds a number of advantages in 
overcoming the shortcomings of perspectives on homelessness identified in chapter 1. It 
attempts to marry a focus on equality with an encouragement of plurality, in the knowledge 
that the nature of antagonism prevents the final resolution of the conflict between these two 
ideas. Instead citizenship acts to provide the rules of negotiation between the two poles, 
effectively offering the opportunity to overturn existing hierarchies. In the last section I 
want to test these ideas by examining one of the few pieces of relatively current research on 
homelessness and citizenship, written with reference to the current government. 
171 
Kennet and Radical Democratic Citizenship 
Kennet's (1999) analysis of homelessness, citizenship and social exclusion presents 
a thorough investigation of renegotiation of citizenship rights in the wake of the breakdown 
of the post-war consensus and identifies the emergence of a conditional citizenship based 
on the assumption of active citizens. Drawing on the example of `welfare to work' 
programs under the Labour government, she identifies the goal of citizenship as the 
promotion of `entrepreneurial' values and highlights the situations of those who fail to 
attain the economic standards prescribed by policy. In particular she focuses on the 
coercive response to rough sleepers, who she argues are perceived as a threat to the 
prosperity of the city precisely by their presence in spaces that are intended for encouraging 
investment. Such tactics as the `zero tolerance' of street homelessness and begging are 
perceived as symptomatic of the wider focus on responsibility within citizenship. 
In relation to this work, Mouffe's account of identity formation provides a useful 
critique in clarifying the changing balance between rights and responsibilities that Kennet 
identifies. Central to this account is the consideration of the extent to which subjugated 
identities destabilise more privileged positions. In this case, the coercive tactics employed 
against rough sleepers can be seen as an attempt to fix the positive position of the business 
community against the corresponding negative identity of the homeless. This in turn can be 
seen to be justified by the wider focus on responsibility within welfare discourse and a 
conception of social rights based on `contractual relations and coercion' (Kennet 1999, 
p. 53). 
Superficially, the model of citizenship that Kennet criticises holds a number of 
similarities to Mouffe's perspective, in particular the requirement for `active' citizens as 
opposed to the `passive' recipients of welfare rights implied by the post-war consensus. 
However, Mouffe's activism is based on political participation, whilst Kennet notes that 
citizenship rights are denied to rough sleepers as a consequence of their failure to contribute 
economically, an ethos that Kennet links to the conditional nature of rights under new 
Labour's `welfare to work' schemes. This is an important point, as Mouffe is damning in 
her criticism of economic liberalism, hypothesising that the neutral state 
has emptied 
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politics of `its ethical components' through its focus on economics (Mouffe 1996, p. 22). 
Mouffe's conception of an active citizen therefore demands inclusion based on political 
activity, situated within a broader definition of the terrain that is considered political. 
The central objection to existing models of citizenship and social exclusion that 
Kennet expresses relates to an inability of policy to relate to `the multidimensional nature 
of contemporary homelessness' (p. 54). Mouffe's conception of citizenship as a forum 
through which debates over identity and belonging are (temporarily) resolved, addresses 
this situation through a focus on plural identities and competing rights claims. It is 
important in this context to view each identity, not as a total, fully formed position, but as 
an overdetermination, a position that is destabilised by its `lack' (Mouffe 1992b, p. 11). It is 
this approach that avoids the exclusion inherent in unitary identities and invites the 
possibility of negotiation between subject positions, a framework that allows for the 
acknowledgement of differential causes of homelessness. 
Related to this point is Kennet's assertion that existing policy does not `utilise the 
existing social networks and (limited) resources that exist among the homeless themselves' 
(p. 54). As we have seen, Mouffe's critique of the utilitarian aims of communitarianism 
stresses that the negotiation of terms of citizenship should occur through the assertion of 
identity politics. This means that the very terrain on which identities are contested becomes 
political and therefore constitutive of citizenship. In this sense, projects that attempt to 
allow individuals to develop their own sense of self-identity can play an important role, in 
that through the constitution of an identity an individual can assess their own priorities with 
regard to citizenship. One such project is the arts centre set up by Newport Action for the 
Single Homeless, a centre set up with the aim of helping the homeless re-integrate 
themselves back into the community through art based activities, or more vocational 
training aimed at increasing the prospect of employment. The fundamental concern of such 
projects is to provide an environment that stresses the multiplicity of associations, as well 
as aspirations. Likewise, whilst such projects take account of plural identities, they also 
encourage the use of the `existing social networks' that Kennet refers to. The separation of 
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public and private spheres that Marx criticised as a central facet of citizenship is negated, 
precisely because the affirmation of identities constitutes political involvement. 
This is why this version of citizenship can be potentially useful in addressing 
homelessness. The insistence on applying unstable, overdetermined identities overcomes 
some of the exclusionary and coercive practices that Kennet identifies. Likewise, the 
expansion of the political develops the possibility of allowing social networks to develop, 
with the negotiation of identity representing the first step in an improvement of actual 
social positions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to ally a focus on contingent identities to universal 
political concept, with the aim of suggesting a theoretical framework which can best 
represent the needs of the homeless. Citizenship was considered to be useful term in this 
context, as it is an individual's status as a citizen that entitles them to certain rights. This 
can be seen to mirror the central concern of this thesis, namely access to the `right to 
housing' promised by homeless legislation. 
The notions of inclusion and belonging were therefore seen to be central to both a 
discussion of citizenship and the aims of this thesis. The key perspectives on citizenship 
were therefore discussed and the implied roles of individuals outlined. A liberal perspective 
was seen to be helpful due to its emphasis on individual liberty and the corresponding 
acceptance of diversity. However, this focus on individuals was also seen to ignore power 
relations and it was felt that homeless issues needed to be considered from within a 
perspective with a more positive conception of rights. The communitarian perspective 
allowed for such a conception, but the adherence to a `common good' was seen to be 
potentially troublesome, particularly as it is the construction of such normative boundaries 
that have been seen to exist at the root of the exclusion of `undeserving' identities. 
Radical Democratic citizenship was therefore suggested as a framework to reconcile 
the aims of the liberal and communitarian positions. This perspective takes the tension 
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between the individual liberty of liberalism and acknowledgement of social power within 
communitarianism, and proposes that this is site of citizenship. In particular, the 
competitive nature of rights claims is emphasised within the ethical boundaries of liberal 
democracy, a perspective that suggests an empowering position for the homeless. This 
perspective was then tested against Kennet's (1999) critique of citizenship under New 
Labour, the key advantages being an emphasis on preventing coercion and a corresponding 
allowance for diversity of identities. In this way, such a perspective suggests a less 
repressive approach to homelessness, one that recognizes different circumstances and 
allegiances and uses these as basis for differential rights claims. It is through the 
recognition of such claims that the exclusion of the homeless can be challenged and 
homeless policy can become a more contextually sympathetic vehicle. 
175 
Conclusion 
`Here, take this purse, thou who the heavens' plagues 
Have humbled to all strokes. That I am wretched 
Makes thee the happier. Heavens, deal so still! 
Let the superfluous and lust-dieted man, 
That slaves your ordinance, that will not see, 
Because he does not feel, feel your pow'r quickly! 
So distribution should undo excess 
And each man have enough' (King Lear, 4.1,63-70) 
Gloucester's identification with the homeless represents an inversion of his opinion 
exhibited through the early acts of King Lear. His imprisonment and torture for assisting 
the traitorous Lear lead to him to understand the precarious nature of privilege and reassess 
his attitude towards the poor. He is blinded and made homeless, but his initial shock in 
finding Lear being cared for by a beggar is eventually replaced by a more compassionate 
position. Thus, Gloucester's (and indeed Lear's) reappraisal of the nature of poverty leads 
them both to advocate `distribution', if not through the state then through private charity. 
This illustrates a central point of this thesis, namely that the extent of provision is 
inextricably linked to the common assumptions surrounding the homeless, that definitions 
of homelessness are a product of the context of their formation. This thesis has aimed to 
critique the possibility of an objective measure of homelessness, as such a judgement has 
been seen to be dictated by social and political forces, be they on a national level in terms 
of policy definitions, or the local interpretation of such boundaries. In particular, this thesis 
has shown how such judgements are invariably based on binary oppositions and that the 
application of such a framework can lead to seemingly arbitrary exclusions. 
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Therefore a crucial aspect to this thesis has been the production of meaning in a 
political context, the manner in which the normative boundaries of homelessness have 
changed according to dominant beliefs surrounding the personal responsibility of 
individuals and the extent and nature of state assistance. This is the central tenet of the 
social constructionist perspective and as such is not in itself a new insight into 
homelessness. As we have seen throughout this thesis, both Cowan (1997) and Jacobs et al 
(1999) have drawn attention to the manner in which homeless policy is not created in a 
vacuum, but is both constrained and influenced by public and political conceptions of 
homelessness. However, this thesis has built on such previous research and placed such 
insights within an explicit theoretical fiamework, addressing the lack of theoretical research 
on homelessness identified in chapter 1. 
In this conclusion the major points of the thesis will be outlined in relation to the 
three key characteristics of identity formation as presented by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). 1 
then want to highlight the main strengths of a theoretical analysis of homelessness and look 
at some of the areas that are left untouched by an investigation of this nature. Part of this 
analysis should reflect on the suitability of radical democratic theory for the study of 
homelessness, as well as considering other contexts to which this theory might be usefully 
applied. 
Summary of Findings 
At the end of chapter 31 outlined three main characteristics of identity formation 
and used homeless policy in subsequent chapters to illustrate their function and contextual 
effects. The central feature of this account concerned the manner in which discourse frames 
a given context within a binary opposition, with each side defined against its polar 
opposite. Laclau (1990) notes the influence of power in the temporary constitution of 
meaning, the way that one side becomes privileged in relation to its `marked' other and it is 
this process that can illustrate the role of social or political power in the continued 
exclusion of certain groups. 
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In relation to homelessness Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) critique of the necessary act 
of power required to sustain a hierarchical binary opposition was applied to the three major 
conditional concepts in homeless policy. The central objection to these categories was that 
in dividing applicants into deserving or undeserving subject positions, homeless policy acts 
to present an objectified view of homelessness that cannot represent the contingent nature 
of social relations. Whilst the criterion for inclusion within the categories of priority need, 
intentionality and local connection have changed over time, what has remained consistent is 
the conditional framework itself. 
Therefore the changes to policy definition appear to negate the possibility of an 
objective view of homelessness, as privileged subject positions are overdetermined and 
therefore destabilised by the elements that they lack. For example, in chapter 4 we saw how 
the differentiated presentation of the homeless in Elizabethan England justified both their 
exclusion from relief and continued punitive measures against vagrancy. It is this formation 
that is the site of overdetermination, as the excluded position acts to destabilize its opposite 
and therefore this proposition was used to show how the excluded, undeserving identity 
undermines the legitimacy of deserving positions. 
Social antagonism was also seen to be useful in this context, as the force that 
disrupts temporarily constituted identities. It is this concept that was seen to reveal the 
precarious nature of privileged identities and provide the basis to overturn existing 
hierarchies. The relationship between these two concepts can be seen in the re-negotiation 
of definitions of homelessness. For instance with reference to priority need categories, the 
original terms of the 1977 act prioritised a parent with dependent children, whilst the 
Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 expanded this 
grouping to include sixteen and seventeen year olds in their own right. In this case the 
original category is destabilised by what it lacks, namely children who are too old to be 
housed by social services, but do not have a parent to qualify them for housing. In this case 
the privileged position is overdetermined, as it is possible to argue that the child without a 
parent is in greater need of accommodation. It was the explanation of the tension 
between 
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these two positions that led to the identification of an antagonistic relationship and resulted 
in the reformulation of definitions. 
These three concepts were therefore central to this thesis, in that they explain how 
boundaries are both constructed and re-negotiated. The consistent reformulation of 
definitions was seen to be evidence of both the overdetermined nature of identities, as well 
as the antagonism that results from excluding an ostensibly similar subject position. Radical 
democratic theory therefore offers the possibility of analysing the changing normative 
boundaries that dictate the terms of inclusion within a polity. A focus on identities as 
temporarily constituted through social power allows radical democratic theory to negate 
binary opposition by highlighting the tension between the rival poles, and the instability 
that is inherent to any resulting position. 
The two concepts of antagonism and overdetermination were applied to various 
examples in homeless policy, with the particular aim of criticising the manner in which an 
essentialized, objective definition of homelessness leads to the formation of a conditional 
framework. In this way, the 1977 Act was criticised for the manner in which a political 
agenda influenced the formation of definitions, leading to limits being placed on provision. 
In particular, an essentialist view of individuals led to the development of a framework in 
which the circumstances, personal history and location of applicants were subject to official 
judgement. It is the exclusion that results from a judgment of this nature that is important in 
this context, as it is this factor that reveals the overdetermination of identities. 
This critique was then applied to the three conditional categories in homeless policy 
with the aim of showing how overdetermined subject positions allowed individuals to be 
perceived as deserving or undeserving of assistance. The criterion for inclusion was 
revealed to be an unstable construction, interpreted differently across different locations. 
This phenomenon was seen to be illustrative of Foucault's (1972) account of discourse, the 
model of discourse endorsed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), in which different elements 
relate to each other in different ways, but are ultimately unified by `rules of formation'. 
Therefore, the different factors that may be present in the judgement of homelessness, for 
example the available housing stock of a given area, may result in different decisions. What 
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remains consistent is the framework of that decision making, a conditional approach 
resulting in the exclusion of undeserving applicants. 
It was also proposed that a key factor in this differential interpretation was the 
influence of other discourses on housing issues. Therefore, in the example of the Scottish 
reformulation of intentionality, it was the concern over anti-social behaviour that led to a 
completely different provision for those who become homeless after receiving an anti- 
social behaviour order. It was this form of intervention that was seen to further illustrate 
Foucault's vision of unstable discursive formations, united by certain rules of formation, 
but with influence beyond their own discursive boundaries. From this analysis it is possible 
to determine several characteristics regarding the relationship between definitions of 
homelessness and the formation of political identities. Firstly, definitions of homelessness 
are formulated within a consistent structure, a conditional model which operates through 
the construction of a binary opposition. Therefore applicants can be classified according a 
deserving/undeserving criterion, the consistency revealed through the exclusion of 
subjugated identities. 
Secondly this analysis reveals the content of definitions of homelessness as unstable 
paradigms; the ultimate formation of an identity is seen to be governed by contrasting and 
fluctuating elements. This contingency applies to both the emergence of policy definitions 
and their eventual interpretation by local authorities. With respect to policy, this thesis has 
revealed the various influences on the criterion for inclusion within provision, these 
influences ranging from the ideological standpoints of individual politicians, the dominant 
concepts in political discourse at a given time, the strength of public opinion, or even 
macro-economic factors. What is important is that these elements do not exist 
independently of each other; they form a specific discourse on homeless issues from within 
which a particular perspective on definition emerges. Contingency can also be seen to be 
the dominant ethic in the interpretation of these definitions; such decisions are likely to be 
informed by the availability of housing stock, the prosperity of local authority budgets, the 
historical relationship between elements of the community and certain homeless applicants 
and even the opinions of homeless decision makers. 
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From this it is possible to see that definitions of homelessness emerge from a 
diverse range of areas, from which a number of perspectives can be seen to be influential. It 
is because definitions represent a loose amalgamation of interests that this thesis has 
questioned the extent to which it is possible to form an objective definition of 
homelessness. It has been seen throughout this thesis that such a measure represents an 
overdetermination, a limit to the diversity of experiences amongst different applicants. 
Such a system invariably produces judgements, be they of an inclusive or exclusionary 
nature, that cannot be justified in relation to other cases of a similar nature. Therefore, the 
essentialist vision of agency identified in English policy could be seen to exclude on a 
seeming arbitrary basis, whilst Scottish policy reveals a structuralist agenda in which the 
dissolution of priority need may result some applicants being accepted ahead of those 
whose need may be greater. 
However, whilst this thesis has presented a critique based on the idea that 
temporary fixing of identities represents a suppressive approach to meaning, chapter 8 
attempted to consider a framework through which homelessness could best be considered. 
In particular this was a task that was seen to be best accomplished by reference to the 
concept of citizenship, as it is the boundaries of citizenship that determine an individuals 
inclusion within a polity. The two major perspectives on citizenship, liberalism and 
communitarianism, were considered in relation to the critique of homeless policy developed 
through the thesis. In common with theories of identity, the two perspectives were seen to 
be unhelpful in this context, because of their essentialist view of structure and agency. In 
particular, a useful approach to citizenship in the context of homelessness was seen to 
demand recognition of the diversity of individual circumstances, as well as the existing 
inequalities inherent to such diverse positions. 
Radical democratic citizenship was therefore considered for its suitability in this 
context. Mouffe's (1993) focus on the contingency of identity was seen to allow a 
necessary flexibility to the concept, which would incorporate a variety of 
different 
identities within its terms. The second point; that of combating existing 
inequalities is less 
explicitly addressed, but Mouffe's (2000) contention that no 
individual should be `able to 
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claim mastery of the foundation of society' adds some guidance in this context (p. 21). It is 
in this sense that antagonism can be assessed within ethical boundaries and existing 
inequalities can be exposed as the result of power relations. It is through such a 
consideration that this thesis has attempted to relate what can loosely be termed a post- 
structuralist critique to a more universal concept. The key advantage of this is that it allows 
an alternative framework, that of radical democratic citizenship, to replace that conditional, 
exclusionary agenda identified as the guiding principle of most homeless legislation. This 
involves a model of citizenship that requires active participation and therefore demands that 
the homeless have a role in their own re-housing. It is this requirement that shifts this 
model beyond the structure/agency dichotomy and presents a theory in which individuals 
can posit their own claim to a right to housing. 
Theory and Homelessness 
In reflecting on the findings of this thesis it is important to outline why an approach 
such as discourse analysis has been pursued, the key insights provided by this 
methodology, as well as the areas left untouched by such an analysis. For example, an 
obvious limitation to discourse analysis is that whilst this approach can critique the 
assumptions that lead to the privileging of certain identities over others, it cannot show the 
effects of exclusion or quantify the number of people involved. Such issues are beyond the 
scope of this investigation, although as I have shown through this thesis the reaction of 
those excluded from the terms of citizenship can result in antagonistic relationships and can 
therefore be influential on the balance of discursive formations. However, this thesis has 
analysed the formation and re-formation of homeless identities through the examination of 
political discourse; the possibility of future research that looks beyond the confines of 
traditional political institutions into the expanded terrain of radical democratic politics will 
be examined in the next section. The choice of text based analysis rather than undertaking 
empirical fieldwork is a central issue and in this section I want to reflect on this choice of 
methods. 
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In an interview originally published in L'Express, Foucault (1995) claimed to be an 
empiricist. He saw his strategy of advancing theoretical concepts within the context of 
historical instances as a tactic that did `not try to advance things without seeing whether 
they are applicable' (p. 40). As I stated in the introduction to this thesis, empirical research 
and theoretical investigations should not be seen as opposed to each other. Just as empirical 
facts or observations require interpretation to become meaningful, so a theory has to be 
applied to a context to be of any practical use. With regard to this thesis it is possible to 
apply Foucault's argument, as the theoretical framework of radical democracy has been 
illustrated by what could be seen as empirical examples from policy and debate. However, 
it is also possible to claim that Foucault underestimated the influence of his own 
preconceptions with regard to both the interpretation of empirical material, and indeed the 
selection of which historical examples to investigate. It is for this reason that I stressed the 
subjective nature of discourse analysis in the introduction, as the key aim of this thesis has 
not been to outline an objective truth concerning homelessness, but to show how 
perspectives on homelessness differ across time and space. 
This is the major reason why this thesis has contained text-based research rather 
than empirical fieldwork. The analysis of the formation of normative boundaries requires 
that the political conditions of emergence are considered. In the context of homelessness, 
the best indicators of these conditions are to be found in the debates that preceded the 
formation of policy, the topics discussed and the objections voiced. It is this evidence that 
provides an insight into the thinking behind a piece of legislation, as well the compromises 
that are made in its passage to the statute books. 
In this respect the selection of theory had an important influence on the use of 
methods within the thesis, as in the practice of discourse analysis the 
distinction between 
theory and method is not always apparent. In his account of discourse theory, 
Torfing 
(1999) describes a method that is based firmly within the tradition of textual 
deconstruction, but where discourse is an entity that is broader than individual texts. 
Policy 
documents cannot be considered in isolation of the context 
from which they emerged; 
legislation is adapted to suit both the ideological and practical 
demands of the time that it is 
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effective. There is something beyond the text and it is the influence of discursive 
formations on both policy and its interpretation that this thesis has attempted to highlight. 
It is at this point that it becomes necessary to evaluate the usefulness of radical 
democratic theory as a tool for the analysis of homelessness. As I have shown throughout 
this thesis, the theory has a number of characteristics that are ideally suited to this context. 
Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) conception of identity as an entity formed through difference 
in a system of binary oppositions can be applied meaningfully to the context of homeless 
policy and reveal the manner in which subject positions are constructed. Of particular 
importance in this process is that one position becomes privileged over its binary opposite 
in a `violent hierarchy'. Through the analysis of conditional categories in homeless policy, 
this model has proved to be useful in illustrating the manner in which policy demands that 
applications are divided according to this hierarchical structure. 
As I have already noted, this is not a new insight; the deserving/undeserving 
dichotomy is well used in studies of homelessness. However, Laclau and Mouffe's work 
advances a conception of social relations that moves beyond such rigid distinctions and is 
therefore incompatible with a model of policy that separates individuals in this manner. It is 
the notion of antagonism that is crucial in this context and separates Laclau and Mouffe's 
work from other constructivist accounts, as the preceding analysis has shown how 
antagonism is an ever-present possibility in the formation of privileged positions. It is this 
power that can disrupt existing hierarchies and force the reformation of definitions of 
homelessness. There have been several examples through the thesis of instances where 
policy definitions have been re-negotiated, due to the reaction of those in subordinated 
positions, or those working on their behalf. The key instances highlighted in this thesis are 
the formation of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 and the formation of the 
Homeless etc. (Scotland) Act 2003. 
One possible criticism of Laclau and Mouffe arises from these examples, as whilst 
radical democratic theory presents a framework that stresses the possibility of change 
through social antagonism, their refusal to distinguish between 
discursive and non- 
discursive objects means that it is difficult to isolate influential 
factors in process of social 
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change. Whilst the theory advanced through this thesis has the capacity to place social 
change within in a conceptual framework, the reasons behind, for example, the difference 
between current Scottish and English homeless policy, remain undisclosed. In this case, 
Laclau and Mouffe's insistence on the irreducibility of antagonism would appear to 
preclude any attempt to identify and limit influential factors, such as the greater availability 
of social housing stock in Scotland, or the greater proportion of Labour MSP's. Hall (1988) 
concurs with this critique, stating that the problem with this thinking is that limitations of 
entrenched political positions are not acknowledged. In his view, Laclau and Mouffe 
advance a theory where `just anything can be articulated with anything else' and the 
limitations imposed by traditional power structures are unrepresented (p. 10). In effect, Hall 
portrays radical democratic theory as a functionalist perspective, in which social change is 
unrestricted by existing political contexts. 
However, Smith (1998) refutes this claim and notes that Laclau and Mouffe devote 
a significant portion of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) to an explanation of why 
antagonism does not always overturn existing hierarchies. Central to this account is Laclau 
and Mouffe's belief in the multiplicity of social movements, this diversity demanding that 
each movement is considered in its specific political context. It therefore follows that 
specific antagonisms should be considered within political contexts, and that some contexts 
may be more resistant to change than others. As I have already noted, Mouffe (2000), has 
expanded this position to present an explicit critique of the post-modern notion of 
democracy as an `endless conversation', maintaining that certain limits are inevitably 
placed on the transformative process (p. 129). 
The twin concepts of difference and equivalence are also influential in the success 
of overturning hierarchies and this thesis has attempted to show examples of this in relation 
to homeless legislation. The most famous of these, the work of Joint Charities Group 
promoting the need for homeless legislation, offers a useful illustration of how the strength 
of an antagonistic force can have an impact on its eventual success, or otherwise. 
It was 
through the formation of a joint group that these charities amalgamated their interests in 
order to promote the case for legislation, therefore 
forming a temporary equivalence that 
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helped create a more effective political campaign. It should be recognised that there were 
several other contextual factors that may have been influential in the formation of the 
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 which have been considered in chapter 5, but the 
logic of equivalence demonstrates that radical democratic theory does not portray social 
change as an inevitable, functional process. 
The charge that Radical democratic theory does not recognise power of certain 
entrenched discourses would therefore appear to be overstated. However, the complexity of 
this conception of discourse does mean that any application of radical democratic theory is 
unable to offer any form of prediction as to future change. Smith (1998) develops this 
theme: 
`... there is no guarantee that one specific discourse will defeat all its rivals and 
become the predominant interpretive framework. The struggles between discourses 
to become the predominant interpretive framework do tend to reflect the 
configuration of power relations in a given historical moment, but they are so 
complex that they we cannot predict their exact outcomes' (p. 57). 
In this respect, radical democratic theory cannot predict the direction of social change, or 
the particular influences that allow existing hierarchies to be overturned. Crucially, Laclau 
and Mouffe's conception of discourse of is too broad to enable any conjecture with regard 
to the likely direction of approaches to homelessness. However, this does not mean that 
radical democratic theory has nothing to offer policy, as whilst Laclau and Mouffe's model 
of social relations is too contingent to offer an accurate forecast of 
future developments, 
their model of democracy offers a possible framework to allow citizens to promote their 
own interests within a polity. This is the framework of 
Mouffe's radical democratic 
citizenship that has been advanced in chapter 
8 and its usefulness for the context of 
homelessness will be assessed below. 
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With regard to the practical institutions required to operationalise this framework, 
Daly (1999) rightly points out that radical democratic theory is vague. Likewise, Mouffe's 
work on citizenship focuses on issues of inclusion and individual liberty, rather than 
documenting the institutional conditions that would facilitate this. The closest that Mouffe 
(2000) comes to outlining a conception of institutions, is when the role of the state in 
providing ethical limits is discussed, with particular reference to its function in mediating 
between opposed groups (pp. 21-2). The state is seen as an arbitrator in this regard, 
accepting the multiplicity of antagonisms, but stepping in ensure that the claims of 
oppressed groups are heard. 
This could be read merely as support for the institutions of liberal democracy, albeit 
with an overriding concern for social inclusion. However, Daly (1999) points out that 
whilst Laclau and Mouffe assert the importance of liberal democratic institutions, they 
maintain that they can be `limited and even constraining of democratic advance' (p. 80). 
Furthermore, they are concerned to emphasise that radical democracy demands a growth of 
the `spaces' of democracy, which is shown through an expansion of the terrain that is 
considered to be political (Daly 1999, p. 81). Again, the proposed expansion of the spaces of 
democracy has been shown throughout this thesis, particularly with regard to Mouffe's 
(1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 1996,2000) notion of the role of citizens in a radical 
democracy. 
Despite this concern for expansion of democratic participation, it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that radical democracy presents a highly developed idea of 
institutions. This means that any suggestions for the future directions of policy can only 
recommend a theoretical framework for developments, rather than having an institutional 
model to propose. In this sense, radical democratic theory is somewhat non-committal, 
although Smith (1998) maintains; 
`It is entirely appropriate, then, that Mouffe's vision does not take the form of a 
complete blueprint for a new society; there will always be extensive 
debate on the 
meaning of freedom and equality and on the boundaries 
between the private 
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individual's liberty and the citizen's obligation, and every general theory will have 
to be reconsidered to some extent in the light of historical contingencies' (p. 128). 
This position is certainly representative of the general thrust of radical democracy, but 
when faced with Mouffe's demand to impose `ethico-political' limits on debate, the lack of 
an institutional framework means that it is unclear how these limits could be enforced, or 
even decided upon (p. 238). It is at this point that Daly's (1999) call for the development of 
more explicit institutional arrangements retains its importance. To some extent, the 
example of the Scottish approach to intentionality cited in this thesis provides an 
illustration of how the theoretical insights provided by Laclau and Mouffe may be put into 
practice, as citizens have a chance to negotiate their inclusion, whilst the ultimate threat of 
exclusion places a necessary limit on acceptance, and ensures that a requirement for civic 
responsibility is invoked. 
These points lead me to suggest that whilst radical democratic theory provides an 
extremely useful tool for the analysis of homelessness, further development in this area 
would be beneficial. Whilst a rigid conception of political institutions may be inappropriate 
for radical democracy, Mouffe's (2000) recognition of a limit to negotiation demands that a 
more explicit presentation of institutions is necessary in order for a practical application to 
emerge. Examples such as the Scottish approach to intentionality are helpful in this project, 
but a detailed description of the role of institutions would enable a more obvious picture of 
the possible applications to emerge. Crucially, such institutions would have to ensure 
adherence to the values of radical democracy, whilst recognising existing power relations 
and enforcing temporary point of closure. Therefore, the challenge to radical democratic 
theory lies in the development of institutional arrangements to facilitate the negotiation of 
inclusion, ensuring the ethical promotion of minority groups. 
Suggestions for future research 
This investigation has focused on the conditions of emergence for political identities 
and has therefore used debates surrounding the formation of 
homeless policy in order show 
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how definitions are constructed and contested. However, Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) 
expanded definition of the political means that radical democratic theory can also be 
applied to areas where antagonism may force the reformulation of discourse. For example, I 
have referred to the work of Rasmussen and Brown (2003), whose investigation into the 
efforts of local groups in Vancouver to break down barriers between those living with HIV 
and AIDS and the wider community. This work refers to the ever present possibility of 
antagonism and the efforts of various groups to re-integrate excluded citizens into the 
community. As an approach it offers one possible application of the theoretical framework 
advanced within this thesis and an opportunity to undertake empirical research into the 
effects on perceptions within a local community where groups working with the homeless 
have attempted to challenge existing stereotypes. Such organisations as Newport Action for 
the Single Homeless, the SMart network15 or Cardboard Citizens16 are trying to change 
attitudes by offering the homeless opportunities in art and self-expression. Laclau and 
Mouffe's (1985) model of identity formation stresses the role that existing assumptions 
play in upholding hierarchies and therefore the effects of such projects could prove to be 
important. 
The notion of social antagonism also provides the opportunity for radical 
democratic theory to be applied in other contexts, particularly where there is tension 
between the local community and an excluded group. In the context of homelessness there 
are many different examples of such a relationship, some of which have been highlighted 
through this thesis. For instance, in chapter 7 the issues surrounding asylum seekers within 
British communities were highlighted and the work of Laclau and Mouffe provides a useful 
framework for the investigation of such a context on a local level. Likewise, it is possible to 
apply radical democratic theory to other groups where there 
is not only an overtly hostile 
relationship with the local community, but where 
local authorities receive pressure to 
exclude certain people. One example that 
immediately fulfils this criterion is that of gypsies 
or travellers and the opposition that such groups receive on 
their arrival in most local 
15 SMart is an umbrella organisation that secures creative arts 
funding to the socially excluded, including the 
homeless. 
16 The Cardboard Citizens are a theatre company run by homeless people and 
based in Southwark, London. 
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communities. The addition of empirical fieldwork in such cases would allow future 
research to explore both effects of exclusion and the perceptions that lead to an 
exclusionary attitude. 
Whilst radical democratic theory is useful for the interpretation of the manner in 
which certain identities become subordinated and the antagonism that can result from this 
temporary closure of meaning, Mouffe's (1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 1996,2000) notion 
of citizenship offers a framework by which the `other' can begin to negotiate his or her 
inclusion. In this way it is possible to suggest a framework for inclusion with the expressed 
objective of breaking down the hierarchies of meaning that sustain antagonistic 
relationships. This is of particular relevance to groups who may not be excluded as a direct 
result of policy, as is the case for asylum seekers or gypsies, but who nevertheless feel 
excluded from either the community or from housing itself. Therefore this model can be 
used to analyse antagonistic relationships between different racial groups living together on 
housing estates, or low-paid workers who find themselves economically excluded from 
housing in rural areas. In both cases the key element of this model is Mouffe's commitment 
to a citizenship incorporating different identities, linked by a common responsibility to 
uphold the twin objectives of liberty and equality. 
It is in this way that radical democracy offers both a critique of exclusionary 
practices and a framework through which legitimate inclusion can be negotiated. This 
thesis has sought to rigorously apply this theory to the example of homelessness and 
present an argument against arbitrary exclusion from the terms of policy, whilst guarding 
against the endorsement of blanket acceptances of applications. It is through the 
consideration of the role of social and political power, the nature of social relations, that 
individual cases can be considered on their own merit and individuals have the chance to 
redefine their political identities. 
Through the application of this branch of theory, this thesis has added to existing 
knowledge by presenting an extended theoretical analysis of British homeless policy. 
The 
insights contained within this analysis are important because the theoretical model allowed 
for the consideration of changing normative definitions and therefore challenged 
the 
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justification of an objective view of society. Equally, the differing approaches to definition 
across Britain were seen to highlight the contingency of social relations and further 
undermine the legitimacy of conditional, exclusionary categories within policy. It is 
through the consideration of these issues that this thesis has presented a critique of 
objective measures of homelessness, as such a measure cannot account for the diverse 
circumstances in which an individual becomes homeless. In this way a deconstruction of 
homeless policy has been undertaken and the terms and concepts that we use in order to 
make sense of homelessness have been challenged. It is in this sense that radical democratic 
theory can be seen to add to our understanding of homelessness, by uncovering the 
assumptions that lie behind categories in policy, as well as the battles that constantly 
renegotiate the boundaries of inclusion. 
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